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RECENT RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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A Study in the Psychology of Religion

BEING A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS AND RESULTS OF REPRESENTATIVE INVESTIGATORS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA OF RELIGION

BY

REV. A. RUDOLPH UREN, PH.D.(EDIN.)

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TO

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PREFACE

It were good for every author of a new book on the Psychology of Religion to render a reason why he should not be placed in the stocks by the suffering public. The plea is therefore made that this volume is an attempt to meet a real need. No claim is made to special inspiration or originality, but simply to usefulness.

The purpose of this essay is to give an informing and critical account of the principal works of representative investigators of the American School of Religious Psychology, and to introduce clarity into a field which is rapidly becoming so overgrown that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees.

The following study in the Psychology of Religion forms a general introduction to the subject which at the present time intrigues men of all schools of thought. The book is adapted to the needs of Theological students of all denominations. It moreover meets the needs of busy ministers, the practical exigencies of whose lives leave little time for research, and who at the same time cannot afford to be ignorant of what Psychologists are doing in the field of Religion. The writer also believes that the book will be at once intelligible and useful to the thoughtful general reader, an increasing number of whom are becoming interested in Religion and its attendant phenomena.

A. R. U.

Edinburgh, 1928.

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RECENT RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

PART I.—HISTORY AND METHODS

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

THE Psychology of Religion is the youngest and not the least diffident of the daughters of general psychology. This new branch of inquiry came into being on American soil. America provides conditions peculiarly favourable to the birth and development of such a science. Observation indicates that there is much religion in the United States, and that its varieties are many. America is notorious for the plethora of its religious sects. Moreover, in the New World religion has not become stereotyped, as is frequently the case in purely Roman Catholic countries.[1] Yet again, the average citizen of the United States appears to be less trammelled by convention, and more inclined to relate his religious experiences than, for example, a member of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

It was inevitable that the type of experience organized in the religious consciousness should at last be subjected to the scalpel and scrutiny of science. Religion had seen every other department of human life and activity succumb to the conqueror. Science had, as a matter of fact, simply given religion the privilege Polyphemus permitted Ulysses, that of being eaten last. Therefore when at length Psychology turned its attention to religious experience, the psychological vivisectionist was more than eager to plunge

[1] Pratt, J. B., art. "The Psychology of Religion," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, vol. i., No. 4 (1908), p. 442.

his probe into this new quivering body of fascinating psychic phenomena.

Psychology was keen to discover if its principle of the unity of the mental life held good in the world of religious consciousness, while religious leaders, educationists, and evangelists became seized with the importance of a scientific knowledge of the mental processes which were involved in religious experience, in order to control and manipulate these processes.[1]

The whole concern of the Church was conceived of as that of making converts. A clamant need was felt for more efficient methods in this connection. It was soon realized that the question of methods depended upon the psychology of religious experience. In Evangelical Christianity the conversion experience is the presupposition of all else in the religious life. It was doubtless the striking nature of this experience, as much as its evident centrality, that appealed to the first psychologists who began to look into the phenomena of the religious life.[2]

The first works of Religious Psychology, therefore, deal almost exclusively with the phenomenon of conversion and its ramifications.

Mysticism was the next subject to fall into the hands of the living psychologist. Contemporaneously with this new psychological interest in the Mystics, attention was drawn to a fresh mass of material rich in psychological possibilities which had just been unearthed by modern historical and anthropological research.[3] In the course of its inquiries Anthropology had culled a number of interesting facts concerning cults and the elementary forms of religious life, the elucidation of which lies outside the province of history and anthropological science. Psychology eagerly responded to anthropology's invitation to investigate its religious data, and a psychological study of origins of religion and cults was begun. Following upon this line of study came comprehensive treatments of the whole field of religion, and attempts were made by religious psychologists to co-ordinate results.[4]

[1] Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 4.
[2] Leuba, J. H., art. "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii. (1906), p. 312.
[3] Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 6, 7.
[4] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 2.

If the honour of being the pioneer in the field of experimental religion is to go to the man who made the first attempt at systematic observation and analysis of the facts of religious experience, then this distinction certainly belongs to Jonathan Edwards. He was born in the year 1703, and was educated at Yale, and at the time of his death in the year 1758 was President of Princeton. Edwards was a man of singular philosophic genius and remarkable ratiocinative talent; he moreover possessed marvellous introspective powers. One hundred and seventy-seven years before Freud, Edwards was seized with the significance of dreams for revealing a concealed inclination repressed from consciousness during the waking life.[1]

Edwards spent the greater part of his life as a clergyman of the Presbyterian Church of America. He witnessed two important revivals during his ministry. The first took place in the year 1734. The results of Edwards' keen observations of this revival were embodied in a work entitled the *Narrative of Surprising Conversions.* The second revival occurred in the year 1740. It spread over Boston, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and his own parish of Northampton. Edwards watched this revival closely, and in 1742 he published his acute observations on the subject, entitled *Thoughts on the Revival in New England.* This work was at once republished in Scotland. The publication, however, which possesses the greatest value for the student of religious psychology is, *A Treatise concerning the Religious Affections,* which Edwards published in the year 1746. It was immediately republished in England and Scotland. This was the first important work on experimental religion ever published in America.[2] Edwards was well qualified to write on this subject. He was a religious man himself; he possessed a piercing intellect, in the presence of which no fanaticism nor sophistry could live; he was a minister on active service, continually moving within the circle of a spiritual clinic; in addition to all this, Edwards was a careful observer.

In the treatise on the *Religious Affections,* Edwards

[1] Edwards, Jonathan, *Collected Works,* "Original Extracts from Diary," vol. i. p. 69.

[2] Edwards, Jonathan, *op. cit.* pp. 234–340.

turns the searchlight of a merciless intellect upon that mass of emotions and sentiments which are commonly annexed to the religious life. With pitiless analysis he discriminates the spurious from the genuine, and distinguishes the merely accidental from the essential elements in religious experience. This systematic, critical examination of the religious emotions on the part of Edwards is the first great piece of work from the positive side, which has been done in America, in connection with the phenomena of the religious life. It is true that Psychology was not then a distinct science differentiated from Philosophy, and that Wundt's Laboratory was only established in 1897;[1] but there were thinkers who psychologized before Wundt, and Edwards was one of these. All Edwards' work was done in the first half of the eighteenth century, and is necessarily expressed in terms of the then current principles of mental philosophy.

For more than a century Edwards' work on experimental religion remained in splendid isolation. Then suddenly, in 1882, President Stanley Hall of Clark University broke the silence of 136 years with an article which was published in the *Princeton Review*, entitled "The Moral and Religious Training of Children." Dr. Stanley Hall's articles were the first in the nineteenth century to deal empirically with the subject of religion.[2] He also inspired a number of the psychological students of Clark University to pursue independent research along lines which he suggested. This was the origin of the Clark School of Religious Psychology.[3] Professor Stanley Hall may be said to have founded a new dynasty of religious psychologists. The phenomena of adolescence seems to have attracted these pioneer investigators. In 1891, W. H. Burnham published an article on the subject of adolescence.[4] Four years later, A. H. Daniels wrote an article entitled "The New Life," in connection with which he worked up

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 5.

[2] Hall, G. S., art. "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," *Princeton Rev.*, New Series, ix. (1882), pp. 26–45; see also art. "The Moral and Religious Training of Children and Adolescents," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. i., No. 2 (1891), pp. 196–210.

[3] Pratt, J. B., art. "The Psychology of Religion," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, vol. i., No. 4 (1908), p. 436.

[4] Burnham, W. H., "A Study of Adolescence," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. i., No. 2 (1891), pp. 174–195.

anthropological data.[1] In the same year another Clark man, E. G. Lancaster, produced an article dealing with the psychology of adolescence.[2]

These early essays of the research students of Clark University owe their importance chiefly to the fact that they are of the nature of first contributions to a nascent science. The work of the Clark School culminated in Professor Stanley Hall's great book, which was published in 1904.[3] In this work Dr. Stanley Hall treats of adolescence in all its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion, and education. In the same year Professor Hall founded a periodical for the exclusive study of the psychology of religion called *The Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.* Its appearances were spasmodic, and its principal value lay in its reviews of the literature of the subject.[4] In 1912 this was succeeded by *The Journal of Religious Psychology, including its Anthropological and Sociological Aspects.* This journal appeared quarterly, and finally was suspended in 1918. The credit of having emphasized the importance of the empirical study of the child and of the adolescent period in human life belongs to Stanley Hall and the school he created. While this school undoubtedly gave the modern impulse to the empirical study of the facts of the religious consciousness, its own contribution was chiefly to pedagogical theory.[5]

While Professor Hall and the majority of his students were engaged in researches more or less confined to adolescence and its pedagogical implications, two of them concentrated upon the specifically religious aspect of adolescence and allied phenomena. One of these students was James H. Leuba, the other was Edwin D. Starbuck. Starbuck gave himself to the study of the religious questions annexed to adolescence, while Leuba turned his attention

[1] Daniels, A. H., " The New Life : a Study in Regeneration," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vi. (1895), pp. 61–103.

[2] Lancaster, E. G., " The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. v. (1895), pp. 61–128.

[3] Hall, G. S., *Adolescence*, 2 vols., London and New York (Appleton & Co.) (1904).

[4] Pratt, J. B., art. " The Psychology of Religion," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, vol. i., No. 4 (1908), p. 440.

[5] Pillsbury, W. B., art. " The New Developments in Psychology," *Phil. Rev.*, vol. xxvi., No. 1, p. 57.

to the special subject of conversion. Leuba's work in this connection was the first important modern contribution to that young branch of scientific inquiry which, strictly speaking, deserves to be called the Psychology of Religion.[1] Leuba got his data by means of a questionnaire and from the reports of the conversions of notable religious men. He subjected this empirical data to keen analysis, and arrived at what appeared to be the psychological conditions of the ante-conversion complex, the crisis itself, and the post-conversion feelings. It was Leuba who first drew attention to three facts which Starbuck afterwards elaborated, namely, the necessity of self-surrender in conversion, the cataclysmic nature of the transition, and the passivity of the subject immediately before the crisis. Leuba's attitude is that of the dispassionate scientist throughout. The supernatural factor in conversion is ruled out of court. This is the general attitude of the American investigators, with few exceptions. At the same time, Professor Leuba, more than any other member of the school, represents the naturalistic point of view.[2] Starbuck's study of conversion followed Leuba's valuable article ten months later.[3] A second article from Starbuck's pen appeared the same year.[4] Both these articles were based entirely on answers to question circulars.

The pioneer contributions of Leuba and Starbuck may fairly be considered the antennæ of the nascent science of religious psychology, for which the labours of their predecessors at Worcester had cleared the way.

In 1899, Professor Starbuck published the first really elaborate treatment of religious phenomena by the scientific method, entitled *The Psychology of Religion.* This book marked an epoch in the history of American religious psychology.

It is interesting to note that up to the year 1907 nearly half the work of any value that had been done in the field

[1] Leuba, J. H., art. "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii., No. 3, April (1896), pp. 309–370.

[2] Pratt, J. B., art. "The Psychology of Religion," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, vol. i., No. 4. (1908), p. 438.

[3] Starbuck, E. D., art. "A Study of Conversion," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii., Jan. (1897), pp. 268–308.

[4] Starbuck, E. D., art. "Some Aspects of Religious Growth," *op. cit.* vol. ix., Oct., pp. 70–124.

of the psychology of religion had been done by Clark men, but there were contemporary investigators outside the pale of Clark University. In 1897, Luther Gulick published an article on the subject of sex and religion.[1] Then in 1900, Professor Coe's book on conversion and temperament appeared. In this work, called *The Spiritual Life*, Coe, though working independently, arrives at conclusions which agree in the main with Starbuck's. One year after the appearance of Coe's book, Professor William James of Harvard delivered the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University, during the years 1901–1902. Starbuck's book had influenced James considerably, and doubtless determined the choice of his subject, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. These lectures were published in 1903. James's *Varieties* is a piece of seductive writing, and is certainly the most widely read and reviewed work of the American School.

In 1905, Professor F. M. Davenport, a sociologist, published a study on the psychology of religious revivals, which was of the nature of a special contribution to crowd psychology.[2]

The next contribution to the now rapidly growing literature on the subject came from the pen of Professor J. B. Pratt. It was called *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, and made out a strong case for Mysticism. This was in the year 1907.

In 1908, George Barton Cutten published a book on *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*. Although this book is extremely interesting, it has not been very influential as a technical contribution. Its appeal is rather to the popular mind than to a scientific clientele.

The most important work subsequent to Pratt's *Psychology of Religious Belief* was *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, published by Professor E. S. Ames in 1910. The author puts down the loud pedal on the social origin and function of religion, and his point of view is that of the new functional psychology.

In 1911, a new and rare book appeared from the pen

[1] Gulick, Luther, art. "Sex and Religion," *Association Outlook*, vol. vii., Dec. (1897).

[2] Davenport, F. M., *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, New York (Macmillan Co.) (1905).

of Professor George Malcolm Stratton, entitled *The Psychology of the Religious Life.* His valuable work is catholic in its range of instances, and is based almost entirely on sacred scriptures and ethnic records.

In 1912, Professor James H. Leuba (who, since his first study in 1896, had been the most prolific writer of articles on the psychology of religion, over a score of which had appeared in rapid succession in the various scientific journals of both America and France) now published one of the most interesting and important books on the subject; its title was *A Psychological Study of Religion: its Origin, Function, and Future.*

In 1916, Professor Coe produced his *Psychology of Religion,* which is considered by many to be the most useful textbook on the subject in America. This book runs the whole gamut of the religious life, and attempts a co-ordination of the results of previous investigations.

In the year 1920 Professor Pratt gave us his second book, called *The Religious Consciousness.* This is probably the most helpful, and best balanced, single contribution which the American School has yet made to the psychological study of religion.

A new book was published in 1925 by Professor Leuba entitled *The Psychology of Mysticism,* in which he reaffirms the naturalistic conclusions of all his earlier contributions.

The term "American School of Religious Psychology," which has been freely used in the foregoing account, needs to be elastically interpreted. It is an arbitrary term whose only title to existence is utility. The group of investigators who have given themselves to the scientific study of the religious consciousness and its phenomena in the New World since 1899 have one thing only in common, namely, the naturalistic postulate, that everything in the religious consciousness may, in the last analysis, be explicated in terms of natural law. In all else they differ, no three agree upon what constitutes religious consciousness.[1] Each investigator has chosen his own problem, and his own way of dealing with it. The utmost diversity obtains in the gathering of data. One psychologist will pin his faith to the questionnaire; another will gather all his material from biographies; a third will rely on data

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion,* Preface, p. ix.

furnished by anthropology; yet again, another will work with the comparative and genetic method. Moreover, psychologists are divided into warring camps. One may be a structuralist, another a behaviourist, and a third a functionalist. One psychologist places all the accent on the individualistic aspect of the religious life, another stresses the social phase, while a third will attempt to hold the scales evenly. These, then, are some of the reasons why the term "American School" can scarcely be considered one of nice precision. The term as used in this essay simply connotes that group of eminent psychologists in America, who, while differing as doctors proverbially do in almost every respect, are at one upon the principle, that the religious consciousness and all that it contains can by patient investigation be brought under the known, or knowable, laws of the science of psychology.

CHAPTER II

METHODS

The purpose of the psychology of religion is to get at the laws of the cognitive, affective, and conative processes of the human mind, as these are directed to, or evoked by an object, or objects, felt to be divine. This mind which psychology studies is not mind in general, but the mind of particular persons.[1] Therefore what the psychologist would be at in this connection is the private experiences of religious persons. The psychologist of religion may, indeed, make use of material procured in other fields of inquiry, but in the last analysis that which he must construe is the religious experience of individual minds.

Several modes of procedure have been utilized by investigators to secure data on which to build a psychology of religion. Four methods in particular have appealed to workers in this field. These are the Questionnaire, the Biographical, the Historical, and the Comparative and Genetic methods. Let us subject these methods to closer scrutiny.

1. *The Questionnaire Method*

In connection with the Questionnaire Method the psychologist draws up a list of searching questions designed to evoke reliable information respecting the subjective religious life. These syllabi are then sent to subjects thought to be suitable. The responses are collected and analysed, and on this personal data a psychological superstructure is reared. This was the favourite method of all the earlier investigators. Starbuck's first book was founded exclusively on faith in the question circular. It

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 185.

is argued that the advantage of the Questionnaire is, that it goes directly to the subject of religious experience, it questions the living, and this is better than reading about the dead. The Questionnaire Method more than any other has serious drawbacks which outweigh its advantages. In the first place, it accentuates a methodological difficulty with which general psychology has long been conversant, namely, the difficulty of introspection.

Psychology is an inductive science which seeks to derive general laws from an adequate number of observations. The psychologist may observe the behaviour of other men ; he may study children, savages, and the conduct of animals ; he may look into the data of philology, sociology, and anthropology ; or he may investigate pathological conditions of mental life—in a word, nothing that has the hall-mark of mind upon it is a matter of indifference to the psychologist. But when all's done and said, he must interpret all this material in terms of his own mind.[1] Introspection then is, strictly speaking, the one method of psychology.[2]

Now this method has certain defects which psychologists at once deplore and concede. First, it is universally admitted that introspection tends to distort or to disintegrate the state of consciousness it would be at. If this method is to yield results at all, it must proceed by means of surreptitious peeps. Introspection, moreover, is most successful with sensations, and least successful with subjective processes such as willing, desiring, believing, and the emotional activities.[3] The psychologist then gathers up the glimpses of his mind and pieces them together as best he may. Most modern psychologists maintain that a pure act of introspection is an impossibility. There is always an interval between the act of introspection and the experience we would observe. We can never get at the original experience, for it is *sui generis*. The original experience can, however, be reconstructed in the memory.[4] We then read back into the original experience the results of our observation of its duplicate. Introspection then

[1] Stout, G. F., *Manual of Psychology*, p. 30.
[2] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 185.
[3] Stout, G. F., *op. cit.* pp. 45, 46.
[4] Höffding, H., *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 17.

is simply retrospection under another name. Now the memory is notoriously unreliable, therefore unless the reports of the experiences of our subjective life are given very soon after their occurrence, they are likely to be erroneous. Immediate retrospection decreases the margin of error, but even this is only a post-mortem inquest on mental states that have ceased to live.[1] All this means the psychologist is a dissectionist, rather than a vivisectionist.

Professor William James expresses the verdict of expert opinion on this subject in these words: "Introspection is difficult and fallible; and the difficulty is simply that of all observation of whatever kind. The only safeguard is the final consensus of our farther knowledge about the thing in question, later views correcting earlier ones."[2] Professor Stout says, that when introspection is consciously used to throw light on questions of theoretic importance for psychology, it becomes a scientific method. But to be effective it needs to be administered by the trained mind. "Introspection, to be effective for the advancement of science, must, like other modes of observation, be carried on by a number of experts in co-operation."[3] Now it is this most delicate operation of turning the mind's gaze inward upon its own interior processes which uninstructed and untrained minds are asked to perform in connection with the questionnaire method. It is notorious that the plain man misses all the finer details of his mental processes, when he is asked to exercise introspection.[4] An account of the conversion of a psychologist appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* of 1923. It is a most disappointing narrative. Professor Lutoslawski gives two or three variant reports of what happened in the psychological moment of conversion.[5] This indicates that even in the hands of a trained psychologist introspection is not infallible. If even Homer nods, how much more enlarged then will be the margin of error in the case of the plain man who is asked to reveal the sacred experiences of his subjective

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 189.
[2] James, W., *op. cit.* p. 192.
[3] Stout, G. F., *Manual of Psychology*, p. 45.
[4] Stout, G. F., *op. cit.* p. 43.
[5] Lutoslawski, W., "The Conversion of a Psychologist," *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxi., No. 4, July (1923), p. 709.

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life in response to a printed list of personal interrogations? This then is a grave defect of the question circular method. All the difficulties annexed to introspection as a method of observation are found here in an accentuated form. Poor introspective power makes many of the responses worthless to science.

It is noteworthy that the number of declinatures are greatly in excess of the responses to a religious questionnaire.[1] Now it is these very people who do not answer, whose religious experiences are important to the psychologist. It will generally be found that the spiritual experiences of such persons are typical of the community. The persons who respond with undue readiness to the stimuli of a questionnaire are chiefly persons of superficial religious character, the religious egotists, and those afflicted with religious mania. Since the value of the responses depends upon their being representative of the community, this fact seriously impairs their worth. It would seem that the people who are representative of the religious community, because they have no dramatic experience to relate, put the questionnaire into the waste-paper basket. The subjects who hasten with indelicate expedition to expose to the psychologist their private experiences often write profuse reports of meretricious brilliance. These are likely to mislead the investigator, who is apt to think he has his finger on the spiritual pulse of the community, when he has learned the symptoms of a small species only of the genus religious men. The number of responses is always incommensurate with the size of the community from which they come. Therefore broad inductions on such meagre data are certainly hazardous. A study of religious experience based on the questionnaire only, is prone to place all the accent on the shallow, or the freakish, or the pathological types.

Even when the interrogated subject is a typical representative of the religious community, and is willing to write an answer to the circular, the power of suggestion resident in the questions often dictates the answers, in the manner illustrated in Hamlet's ironical dialogue with the sycophantish Polonius.

[1] Pratt, J. B., *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 234. "I sent out 550 copies and received 83 answers."

"*Ham.* Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel ?
Pol. By the Mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.
Ham. Methinks it is like a weasel.
Pol. It is backed like a weasel.
Ham. Or like a whale ?
Pol. Very like a whale."

(Act III. Scene ii.)

Again it is worthy of note that many persons who are perfectly competent to describe their interior experiences, refuse to take pains in making their responses, and return an answer far too truncated to have any true psychological significance. The very fact that a searching question concerning his subjective life is put to a man, tends to put him on his guard, and sometimes to arouse resentment. The business-like schedule of the religious psychologist is for some men too reminiscent of income-tax papers, and is apt to create an atmosphere which is unfavourable to the divulging of the secret subjective history of their spiritual lives. We have to recognize the fact, that those whose religious experiences are most valuable are least voluble, while those whose experiences are least valuable are most voluble.

Even those persons who wish to meet the psychologist's demands, and sympathize with the whole object of the questionnaire, are put into an attitude of deliberation by it.[1] Such persons very carefully consider the whole matter, and finally write an answer in which the original experience the psychologist wants to get at is transformed by their own interpretations. Many investigators have been impressed with this difficulty, and with the lack of spontaneity which is engendered and fostered by the questionnaire, and have therefore preferred the biographical method. Here, they say, we get the utterances of religious souls poured out with unpremeditated art.

Persons absolutely sincere may make statements in response to a schedule of questions which are not true to fact, by reason of a defective memory. The memory is notoriously unreliable. The original spiritual experience can be reconstructed in the memory only, and if this fails in any respect, then the witness is not very valuable for science. A faulty memory is one great source

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 233.

of the fallibility of testimony meant to be absolutely sincere.[1]

Paucity of vocabulary must also be considered in this connection. Like many a good story, the most significant spiritual experiences may be ruined in the telling. Many religious people have at their command a conventional theological terminology only, and a certain pietistic phraseology, which often clouds the issue and drapes in drab the most dramatic occurrence in the religious consciousness. A unique experience may thus be reduced to the status of the most commonplace, and on the other hand, a commonplace experience may be gilded with a glory not its due. All this is likely to mislead the psychologist who depends entirely on written answers to his questionnaire.

Professor Stratton points out another objection to the questionnaire used in America. He says: "The persons most easily reached by such means are, for the most part, adherents of one and the same religion, they are of the Occident, and naturally show a preponderance of that special type of character that is ready to grant to a stranger an access to the secret places of personality."[2] Those most responsive to the questionnaire in America seem all to have belonged to the Methodist denomination, among whom reticence on spiritual matters is not conspicuous. A psychology based on returns from persons, the majority of whom are members of one communion, can be the psychology of a particular denomination only, but not the psychology of religion.

All the faults, however, may not be charged to the account of the respondent, for the psychologist himself may not put good questions. The questions may not be completely intelligible to the interrogated, and further the questions may not be apprehended by the questioned as understood by the interrogator. When we remember with Professor Coe, that not only must conventional language be interpreted by the psychologist in terms of his own mental make-up, but also whole religious complexes must be reconstituted by him from fragments given in the answers of respondents, and that sometimes the psycho-

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 374.
[2] Stratton, G. M., *Psychology of the Religious Life*, Preface, p. v.

logist does not know what religion is from experience, then it must be conceded that the margin of possible error is very great.

It is for these and similar reasons that the bald questionnaire has become suspect. This method can never of itself, when applied to the subjective life, yield exact scientific conclusions. It can at best indicate very general tendencies. The questionnaire may, of course, give valuable information regarding the externals of the religious life. The defects of the questionnaire method are so manifest, that no religious psychologist since Starbuck has used it without safeguards, or supplements, in the shape of auxiliary methods.[1]

2. *The Biographical Method*

The psychologist, however, is not bound to the questionnaire like Prometheus to his rock. He may read the extant autobiographies of the mystics and religious geniuses of his race. He may look into the biographies of the saints. He may study those spontaneous outpourings of the religious soul in the great confessions of religious history. Or he may peruse the letters of men and women eminent in the religious life, and read what they have to say to the initiated. Here, at all events, the psychologist is in contact with experts in experimental religion. This is called the biographical method, and was the method William James used in the preparation of his great book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* But even this method has the defects of its qualities. It is a truism to say that the substance of spiritual autobiographies and biographies has to do with extraordinary and even abnormal religious subjects. Such cases cannot possibly be typical of the life of a religious community. Therefore a psychological description, based on this method alone, cannot be a true portrayal of the religious life as it exists for the majority of religious men. The picture painted will inevitably be too tropical in its pigmentation. Together

[1] For discussion of the Question Circular Method in Religious Psychology, see: Pratt, J. B., *Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 232–235; also *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 32–34. Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 44–48.

with this wealth of hectic material there is the natural inclination of the psychologist to select for study those instances only which are dramatic and sensational. There is a tendency from which even psychologists are not exempt—to neglect cases that are normal as being commonplace and dull, and to focus the whole attention on extreme instances.

It has long been accepted as an interesting psychological fact that writers of their own biographies often mix fiction with their facts, especially, as James says, where the marvellous is concerned. This fiction may not always be intentional. Some of the saints had a good deal of egotism mingled with their sanctity, and this at times tinctured and alloyed their autobiographies. James says: "Every one must have known some specimen of our mortal dust so intoxicated with the thought of his own person and the sound of his own voice as never to be able even to think the truth when his autobiography was in question."[1] This, no doubt, is an exaggeration of the truth. At the same time, because of this egotistical failing of human nature, we cannot accept the deliverances of religious biography naively. When the biographical method is used exclusively, and uncritically, the picture drawn of the religious life is bound to be out of perspective. The virtue of the biographical method, as of the questionnaire, is that it seeks to get at the private experiences of individuals. Both methods seek the subjective facts of the religious life.

3. *The Historical Method*

Quite an opposite method has sometimes been taken by certain investigators of the religious life. This might be called the historical method. It is an objective method based on external manifestations of religion, its cults, rites, ceremonies, and creeds. It is an objective study of religion in all its institutionalized forms. Now, strictly speaking, this is not a psychological method at all. Professor Billia goes so far as to say that the historical method has no value whatever for the psychology of religion.[2] The objective investigation of rites, ceremonies, theological concepts,

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 374.

[2] Billia, L. M., "The Problem and Method of Psychology of Religion," *The Monist*, vol. xx., No. 1 (1910), p. 137.

and primitive superstitions "gives the illusion of describing and cognizing a mental fact while remaining outside the fact itself." An objective study of cults, ceremonies, and creeds falls within the province of history, sociology, anthropology, or theology, but this objective investigation is not psychology. Psychology is the science of the subjective life of individual minds. Psychology, of course, cannot ignore anything that has to do with mind. Therefore certain data of philology, sociology, and anthropology which have been unearthed by the historical method are of great interest to psychology. Psychology takes over this data gleaned by the historical method, and works back by a process of inference to the subjective states which gave rise to language, ceremony, cult, and creed. This being so, works based on the historical method, though sometimes written by professed psychologists, partake more of the nature of contributions to sociology and anthropology than to the science of psychology.[1]

4. *The Comparative and Genetic Method*

The fourth method of the American investigators is the comparative and genetic method. This is really the true psychological method which deals with the products of the historical method. It is by means of this method that the investigator makes psychological reconstructions on the basis of the data furnished by history, sociology, and anthropology. The comparative method as used by psychology tries to get at genetic descriptions by studying the facts of the psychology of man in the various stages of his mental development. This includes the study of animal psychology and that of social groups. "The scope of comparative psychology is as wide as animal life, it extends from infusoria to man." The genesis and evolution of consciousness in all its grades and levels, and its reactions to the physical and social environment, constitutes the subject-matter of the comparative and genetic method. This method assumes an unbroken line of descent in the phenomena with which it deals. It seeks to give a genetic account of the phenomena it investigates by reconstituting its antecedents. In the last analysis the

[1] *e.g.* Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology.*

results of comparative psychology are reached by a process of inference, not by direct observation. This method cannot show that certain antecedents and developments beyond the ken of history actually took place, but only that judging by parallel cases they most likely did take place. The comparative and genetic method then works back from the data of history and anthropology into that unknown region with which the methods of these particular sciences are incompetent to deal. Here in this prehistoric region, as Professor Tiele says, if any work is to be done on religion, psychology must do it.[1] The ambition of the comparative method is not only to indicate the probable forms of primordial psychic life, but also to make deliverances as to causes which lie back of prehistoric mental development. It aims at a genetic account of the beginnings of things psychic. Now this method can only give probability. In connection with the comparative and genetic method, more perhaps than with any other used in connection with religious psychology, we have to beware of the "psychologist's fallacy."[2] The psychologist who studies the religious life of primitive peoples often takes out of the inchoate mass of magic, religion, and morals which meets him ideas which he himself projects into it. There is a natural tendency to read our own standpoint into the mental fact we are investigating. The psychologist is particularly prone to this fallacy when studying the mental life of animals. Professor Stout's example of the interpretation of the behaviour of the inhabitants of a beehive is a splendid illustration of this. Because the economy of the beehive shows adaptation of means to ends, differentiation of function, and division of labour, foresight, a political faculty of a human kind, has been attributed to bees. As Stout shows, all the essential modes of bee behaviour can be explained by congenital tendencies and congenital differences of physical organization. "The besetting snare of the psychologist is the tendency to assume that an act or attitude which in himself would be the natural manifestation of a certain mental process must, therefore, have the same meaning in the case of another."[3]

[1] Tiele, G. P., *Outlines History of Ancient Religions*, p. 6.
[2] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 196.
[3] Stout, G. F., *Manual of Psychology*, p. 49.

It will be obvious, that according to the disparity between the mind of the investigator and the mind he is studying, so will be the difficulty of interpretation. After all, the psychologist can only interpret what takes place in the minds of savages on the analogy of his own experience. He must reconstitute the mental life of primitive man out of the elements of his own mind. All roads lead back ultimately to introspection as the one method of psychology. In connection with the comparative and genetic method we may say that no other method provides so many traps for the psychologist. The psychologist's fallacy is most frequently met here. To sum up, in the words of William James, we may say: "There are great sources of error in the comparative method. The interpretation of the psychoses of animals, savages, and infants is necessarily wild work in which the personal equation of the investigator has things very much its own way." [1]

5. *The Experimental Method*

Experiment is, as Stout says, simply observation under test conditions which we have arranged for ourselves.[2] Psychological investigators have attempted to observe the various mental processes which enter into religious reactions, such as suggestion, belief, and emotion under test conditions deliberately prearranged. Pathological religious subjects might be considered as experimental cases, nature having provided the test conditions which may be utilized by the psychologist. We might consider here the order of merit method, which can be used to determine the relative values of the different elements that enter into public worship, that is, what value these various elements have for the worshippers. Religious groups, large or small, are chosen as the subject of experiment, and by a system of preferential voting the individuals of the group indicate the elements which to them are of the greatest value by placing them in their order of merit, as "first," "second," "third," etc.[3] This method may be used to establish

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 194.
[2] Stout, G. F., *Manual of Psychology*, p. 51.
[3] May, M. A., art. *Journal Philosophy*, vol. xii. (1915), p. 691.

quantitative relations. Statistical analysis of these preferences would make it possible to establish general tendencies and rough quantitative relations between certain religious elements.

Field use may be made of experimental methods. General conditions can be ascertained by isolating and manipulating certain factors. The nature of the reactions of both children and adults to the specific stimuli of public worship and religious instruction can be observed, classified, analysed, and certain general tendencies inferred therefrom.[1]

Another species of the experimental method is that of hypnotic experiments upon religious subjects in order to ascertain peculiarities of temperament and degrees of suggestibility.[2] The function of the experimental method is not so much to discover new data as to increase our knowledge of the old, and it is most fruitful when it is used to settle some definite question. In its field use, in its order of merit form, and in the shape of hypnotic experiment it constitutes a valuable auxiliary method. It may suggest lines of inquiry, and confirm certain generalizations reached by other methods of investigation. The laboratory species of experimental method, however, proves unsatisfactory in practice.[3] Religion does not prove to be amenable to laboratorial inquisition. Religious feeling is not to be engendered or manipulated by psychological experts at will. The purely analytic interest of the laboratory is a foe to religious emotion, and the thought of psychological vivisection has a tendency to inhibit all genuine religious feeling. The psychical processes of the religious mind eludes "these prism, pendulum, and chronograph-philosophers." [4]

6. *An Unclassified Method*

In order to complete this account of the methods of religious psychology, mention should be made of a sixth method which cannot be as clearly defined as those we

[1] Coe, G. A., *Psychology of Religion*, p. 55.
[2] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 110.
[3] Coe, G. A., *Psychology of Religion*, p. 54.
[4] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 193.

have already reviewed. This mode of procedure consists in bringing tremendous psychological insight to bear on the ordinary facts of mental life. Professor Harold Höffding in his book, *The Philosophy of Religion*, illustrates this method better than any other modern writer. In Part Three, which constitutes the major portion of the book, he deals with the psychology of religion. None of the methods we have hitherto examined seems to have been invoked by Höffding, and yet we have a valuable contribution to religious psychology. The only feasible explanation seems to be that here we have a splendid intellect trained by the philosophic and scientific disciplines; rich in the acquirements of experience; practised in observation; and possessed of great powers of psychological insight, bringing all this powerful equipment to the elucidation of the facts of the religious life. A primrose by a river's brim is more than a primrose to minds like this. Professor Coe says, such a mind sees far into common facts. We are justified in calling this a sixth method, and may legitimately say, "research may take the direction of fresh analysis of material that is commonplace." [1] It may be thought that the mention of Höffding's procedure is irrelevant in connection with the discussion of the methods of the American School. It will be remembered, however, that one of the opinions advanced in this essay is that Edwards' *Treatise on the Religious Affections* is the first great psychological document in the archives of American religious psychology.[2] Edwards wrought after the manner of Höffding in compiling his great work on the emotions and sentiments of the religious life. Now we have seen that not one of the methods used by the investigators of the American School is infallible. What, then, shall we say to these things? These methods are the best psychologists have for the purpose. Naturally, the methods will vary in value according to the nature and extent of the field with which they deal. Generally speaking, to achieve results of sufficient precision to be of value for science, each method must supplement and check the other.

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 56.

[2] Beckwith, C. A., "Influence of Psychology upon Theology," *Amer. Journ. Theol.*, vol. xv., No. 2 (1911), p. 194.

Experience teaches that no method can be used alone with safety. The general defects of the published works of the American School are largely due to the fact that each investigator is an uxorious monogamist, passionately wedded to some one method.

PART II.—CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL WORKS

CHAPTER III

"The Psychology of Religion," [1] *by* E. D. Starbuck

EXPOSITION

This epoch-making study was the result of the conviction that Religion could be treated scientifically to the advantage of both science and religion. This conviction issued in two lectures which were delivered at Harvard in the years 1894 and 1895. These lectures were elaborated into two articles which appeared in the *American Journal of Psychology* of 1897.

These articles were the antennæ of Starbuck feeling their way into the new world of religious experience and in the year 1899 Starbuck produced his important book, *The Psychology of Religion*, a first work in the field of the new religious psychology which America is making so peculiarly its own.

Starbuck's basic assumption is that law runs through the universe all across, and that therefore no psychic event of man's life is exempt from law. Starbuck's ideal was to make a faithful inductive generalization on the scientifically ascertained facts of the religious life.

Professor Starbuck at the outset differentiates the psychology of religion from sociology and history. He says it is perfectly competent for us to study religion in the race; but this is not psychology, it is rather anthropology, sociology, or history. The psychology of religion must study religion in the individual. It may, indeed, receive

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, London (Walter Scott) (1899).

much help from data unearthed by other sciences, but it must go to the individual to discover the roots of religion.

Starbuck describes religion as a life, a deep-rooted instinct, which will function whether we understand its machinery or not, but he says it is to the interest of religion that it should be understood as well as felt.

Starbuck's work is based entirely on data gathered from autobiographies written in response to questionnaires. These personal records were then analysed. With heroic patience Starbuck spent several days over a single record. After critical analysis of the personal records the results were classified, then followed generalization and interpretation, which formulated laws, processes, and tendencies of growth, and indicated the relationships of the facts of religious consciousness to the facts of other sciences, *e.g.* sociology, biology, and psychology.

Starbuck's interpretation is psycho-physiological.

1. *Conversion*

In dealing with the subject of conversion, Starbuck uses the term in its broadest connotation. It is made to cover ante-conversion experiences, the conversion crisis itself, and post-conversion experiences. Conversion stands for revolution in character more or less sudden. Starbuck seeks to get at the psychic processes which are actually operative in conversion, by working over the raw material furnished by autobiographies written in response to personal solicitations. One hundred and ninety-two records only, of those received in connection with Starbuck's large questionnaire, were deemed complete enough to use. It is interesting to note the personnel of the respondents. Almost all of them were American Evangelical Methodist Protestants, and as to vocation ministers of religion and students preponderated. Starbuck concluded from his examination of these records, "that conversion is a phenomenon natural to religious growth"; and is independent of revivals. Dr. Starbuck affirms, as his inference from these data, "that conversion is distinctively an adolescent phenomenon," connected with the physiological growth of that period of life. Starbuck concludes from his statistics that the relation between bodily growth and conversion

is coincidental, while the relation between puberty and conversion is supplemental. Conversion avoids the year of puberty and coincides with bodily growth. At the same time, adds Starbuck, puberty and conversion may be mutually conditioned. Starbuck establishes a connection between spiritual events and physiological changes. The average age for conversion, according to Starbuck's statistics, is 16·4 years.

Starbuck groups the motives and forces leading to conversion into eight classes. He concludes that rational considerations play an insignificant part in conversion in comparison with instinctive. He finds, moreover, that response to teaching plays a small part, and that altruistic motives are least prominent, while fear of death and hell, and social pressure, are the most potent motives. Social pressure is very prominent in revival cases of conversion, while response to teaching and the lure of the moral ideal were found to characterize the non-revival cases.[1]

It was found that motives varied with age. In very early adolescence social pressure, conviction of sin, fear of death and hell were the powerful motives, whereas in later adolescence altruistic feelings, following a moral ideal, and response to teaching motivated the convert. The conclusion, therefore, is that "conversions during later adolescence represent a different kind of experience from those in the earlier years." Starbuck further infers that objective forces rather than subjective govern the females in conversion, while subjective forces play a larger part in the experience of the males.

In connection with the experiences preceding conversion, it was found that the central fact was the sense of sin, the form being determined by differences in temperament, and by what is most prominent in consciousness at the time. There is the passive type, who feel helpless and estranged from God because of the sense of a sinful life; there is the active type, who press towards the new life; and there is a third type, who vacillate between activity and passivity.

Starbuck concludes "that conversion is a process of struggling away from sin, rather than of striving towards righteousness." It is a process in which the deeper in-

[1] See Table vi., showing the relative frequency of certain motives and forces which lead to conversion, p. 52.

stinctive life most strongly functions. The intellectual side of the mind plays a relatively inferior part in these pre-conversion experiences.

Starbuck's statistics indicate a difference between the experiences of males and females, which precede conversion. He concludes that "feeling plays a larger part in the religious life of females, while males are controlled more by intellection and volition." Males when not at a revival insist on seeing their way clearly towards the new life, and on working their own passage. Females, on the other hand, are prone to accept the help of external influences, and surrender more easily to revival influences.

In his discussion of the nature of sense of sin, Starbuck points out that though it follows in the wake of evil conduct, it cannot be wholly due to conscious wickedness, for this sense of guilt is independent of conduct. Hence, he concludes, we cannot consider the sense of sin simply as a spiritual fact, it is an experience largely determined by temperamental and physiological conditions.

From the discussion of the experiences which antedate conversion, Starbuck passes on to discuss the nature of the crisis of conversion itself. He found that the feelings involved immediately before the crisis were very much intensified. Two sets of feelings are experienced at the time of the crisis: first, the feelings of the conviction period, greatly intensified; and second, those of relief and exultation. Something happens in time between these two sets of feelings. There is a turning-point where the old life ceases and the new life begins. Just what happens, says Starbuck, is at once the most interesting and difficult of the problems in the study of conversion. The conclusion of Starbuck's analysis of conversion is that "the typical experience has three features, namely, dejection and sadness, a point of transition, and lastly joy and peace."

Dr. Starbuck discovers two types of conversion. The first type is marked by the dominant thought of escaping from sin. The second is characterized by a struggling after a larger life. In the first type, the sense of sin predominates; in the second, the feeling of incompleteness. The experiences of the two types are different. Type I. has a feeling of helplessness, then of the burden lifted,

followed by a sense of freedom and joy. Type II. has a feeling of dissatisfaction, a struggling for light and life, then illumination comes, followed by a sense of harmony and peace.

Starbuck was unsuccessful in getting from his respondents reliable data for the reconstruction of the psychological moment in the conversion experience. It is evident that what happens at the conversion crisis itself, escapes the notice of the convert.[1] He simply has the feeling something has happened. The conclusion of the matter is, that there are two essential aspects of conversion: that in which self-surrender is the prominent thing, and that in which the new life bursts spontaneously into being. The will may, indeed, have been struggling in the direction of the new life, but at the crisis it must cease to strive, and the new life comes of itself.

It is here that Starbuck comes to grips with the fundamental questions raised by the conversion experience, namely, how much of the conversion process as it is being worked out rises into consciousness? and second, is there evidence of the automatic working out of part of the process by the nervous system? Starbuck accords to unconscious cerebration a large place in the conversion experience. He asserts that both conscious and unconscious processes are factors in conversion. The passivity of the will at the time of change, and the slight part played by the intellect in motivating conversion, are adduced as evidences of sub-conscious processes. His conclusion is, that in the majority of cases the conscious and unconscious forces act together, and their relationship is one of interaction.

The conviction period is a mental disturbance caused by the presence of an incipient idea in the mind. But how does this troublesome thought work itself out into a spiritual awakening? Starbuck is agnostic here; the whole thing is done below the threshold of consciousness, and therefore evades analysis. Spontaneous awakening is the fructification of that which has been ripening within the subliminal consciousness. Religious awakening is the

[1] "The Conversion of a Psychologist," by W. Lutoslawski; see *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxi., No. 4 (1923), p. 709, where a converted psychologist gives an unsatisfactory analysis of precisely this crisis moment.

same in principle as the sudden solution of perplexing mathematical problems, or the discovery of a scientific truth. The conversion experience is, therefore, not a unique phenomenon.

Since the automatic factor of the mind is so active, what does the conscious will do in the matter of conversion? It does two things: (1) Volitional striving clarifies the ideal we would be at; (2) it initiates the effort after the ideal. Its function is that of setting the mechanism of the sub-conscious in motion. Having done this, there is nothing more the will can do. Further, conscious interference on the part of the will retards the delivery of the finished product of this underground sub-conscious factory.

This explains the paradox of conversion, why self-surrender should succeed when volitional striving cannot. The forces and instincts of the sub-conscious are unerring, and having been set in motion by the willed ideal, they must be left to themselves to bring about its realization. The subject, therefore, having actively initiated the process, must become passive in order to receive its fruition.

Starbuck says, the post-conversion experiences are almost antithetical to the pre-conversion experiences. The central fact is the functioning of a new and exalted personality. Joy, peace, happiness, relief, are the specific feelings of the post-conversion experience in the order of their prominence. Starbuck attempts to establish a law of sequence between the experiences before and after conversion.[1] "In general, the clean-cut positive experiences after conversion follow the intenser pre-conversion phenomena."

The distinctive thing in the new life is the organization of the whole life about a new centre. Conversion seems to do at least four things for a man. It gives a new sense of the worth of self; all things in his environment become new; a sense of reality is given to things which they never had before; and lastly, the man remains no longer self-centred, but becomes altruistic.

New elements seem to enter into consciousness at conversion. It is suggested these may have been latent in the mental life before conversion, and now are simply new

[1] See Table xv., showing relation between the pre-conversion feelings and the post-conversion feelings, p. 123.

to consciousness. These elements are clarification of mind, new insight, and new volitional enthusiasms. Conversion is a process of releasing the latent energies of the human personality stored up in the individual through his own activities and racial activities which he has inherited.

Starbuck gives the conversion process as a whole a sociological and a physiological interpretation. The individual is controlled first by the egotistical instincts of self-preservation and self-enlargement. He himself is the centre round which he organizes his experiences. "But as he grows he gathers much"; he discovers that there is a physical world order, and a social order with which he must come to terms. He may rebel instinctively against these standards which have been fixed without his consent, but sooner or later he bends to the social will. Here, says Starbuck, "there is a sudden revelation and recognition of a higher order than that of the personal will." This is precisely what conversion is in the religious sphere. Adolescence is the natural time for this recognition of the larger life of society. Puberty is the physiological intimation that one is qualified to take one's place in the larger life of society through the avenue of the family.

Parallel with this physiological development elements of the psychic life are ripening: the moral sense, the æsthetic sense, the affections, and the appreciation of the truths of nature, all of which are developed in social relations, and are carried over into religion. The individual is brought into such a condition of ripeness of mental capacity in adolescence that religious impulses find a hospitable organ ready for their reception and expression. This arriving at puberty is the occasion of tribal, racial, and social customs among all peoples, savage and civilized alike. These universal customs initiate the youth into the larger life of the community, and their significance is psychological as well as physiological.

There is also the purely physiological aspect to be considered. During adolescence there is a tremendous change taking place in the anatomy of the nervous system, especially in those higher cerebral centres which are the seat of the mental states. The sudden bursting forth of new psychic powers in adolescence is due to the rapid growth and new functional activity of the higher centres in the

brain. Here, then, we find a clue to adolescent depression, unrest, and distress. Biologically, then, "the sense of imperfection is the price we have to pay for the, at first, unwieldy enlargement at the top end of the spinal cord." In Starbuck's opinion there is definite correlation between physiological adolescence and conversion.

Starbuck also sets forth a psychological view of the situation. The question is, How does life get in such a state that conversion is necessary before things will get right? The answer Starbuck finds in the study of the growth of ideals. The self that might be stands over against the self that now is, and the youth sees the two in vivid contrast. The existence of the ideal over against the actual makes him dissatisfied. The second thing to be considered is native inertia. When a person becomes conscious of the ideal, he also becomes acutely conscious of down-dragging primitive impulses. The third thing is the complexity of the forces of environment which drag the person in different directions. All these forces fracture the unity of consciousness.

This fracture often occurs beneath the surface of clear consciousness and shows itself as a struggling in the dark for a somewhat. Sometimes the subject is acutely conscious of the vacillation and the contrast between the ideal self and the actual. Now nature's method of healing the breach is to make it worse. It belongs to the nature of mind to emphasize contrasts. Revivalists work on this tendency. All the conviction phenomena which antedate conversion belong to this fracture period. To this period of dislocation are annexed the sense of sin, the feeling of incompleteness and disunity. The struggle continues in all such cases until exhaustion comes, and the subject surrenders to the higher forces that are trying to claim him. Then conflict ceases, and the self arrives at unity.

But this unity may be achieved in two ways. Where the sense of forgiveness and Divine aid are the distinctive elements at the time of crisis it indicates that the forces which precipitated the crisis are not recognized by the convert as his own subjective forces which have functioned sub-consciously. He seems to be a passive agent on whom work is done by an external agent, which he believes to be Divine. On the other hand, where conscious self-direction

is the central thing at the conversion crisis, it points to the fact that the subject of conversion has been a conscious participant in the whole process.

In connection with the abnormal aspect of conversion Starbuck's standard for testing the normality or abnormality of the experiences is the testimony of the respondents themselves, a most unscientific procedure. He wisely says, however, two errors must be avoided—the blunder of the alienist who thinks of everything in terms of psychiatry, and the mistake of the religionist who interprets the wildest excesses carried out in the name of religion as of God. There are grave dangers in the emotionalism and excitement of religious revivals. The principles of crowd psychology apply to revivals. In mob action the tendency is for the higher cerebral centres to relax, and for the lower centres to escape from the inhibitory control of the higher. This makes the mind more suggestible. Both the demagogue and revivalist work upon this fact. They make confident affirmations guiltless of reasoning and proof. They use the expedient of reiteration, and the mechanism of mob contagion. The tactics of the revivalist are those of the hypnotist, the forces manipulated are those of suggestion and hypnotism. There is just the suspicion that the imported professional revivalist is governed by the hunting instinct, each new convert being another scalp to hang on his belt.

Starbuck is careful to point out that religious hypnosis is not an evil in itself, but, he says, there must be some rational sanction to conduct, otherwise the frothy emotion will foam itself away, and terrible moral injury may be done to the supposed convert. The blunder of revivals is that they attempt to force a standard which is the best perhaps for the vicious, upon children, the virtuous, and on those temperamentally unsuited to those crude tactics. Starbuck says most justly it is criminal to focus all the terrible power of mob contagion "on a young child just beginning to feel its way into clear light."

2. *Lines of Growth not involving Conversion*

Starbuck states in this connection that many Christian Churches do not urge a catastrophic conversion, but teach

rather that the spiritual life is a process of even and continuous development. Starbuck finds that the progress of this gradual growth type is just as definite as that of lines of growth involving conversion, but there is no cataclysmic crisis.

The data for this section was obtained wholly from autobiographies. Starbuck states that the judgment of the respondents was followed " implicitly " as to whether they belonged to the gradual growth type or to the catastrophic group. " Complete reliance was placed upon the statements as given by the subjects." The respondents were nearly all modern Americans and adherents of the Christian religion.

Starbuck dismisses the subject of the religion of childhood in a few pages. He depends entirely for his facts upon the reminiscences of his respondents concerning the experiences of their childhood. Starbuck's respondents nearly all had similar early religious training of the orthodox sort, therefore their reports were fairly uniform. Starbuck found the following features prominent in the religion of the child: First, credulity and unconscious observance. Second, the relationship with God or Christ was one of intimacy, not one of fear and awe. Third, fear, awe, reverence were hardly present, but love and trust were very prominent. Fourth, the sense of right and wrong was found to develop early, and was a potent factor in the religion of childhood. Starbuck found that credulity and conformity abounded in about one-half of the cases he investigated, while great intimacy with God occurred in one-third of his cases. Again he found that fear, awe, and reverence, the typical religious emotions, were almost absent. All this indicates that children especially are receptive to the influences of their surroundings, and that " religion is distinctively external to the child rather than something which possesses inner significance."

Adolescence is a period of physiological unfoldment with co-ordinate psychological processes. It is a period of flux and ferment, and a most difficult period to study, because of its contradictory phenomena. Looked at from the point of view of the religious life, it is the period of clarification. The ideas of God, duty, and religious observances which have been external for the child begin

to have a new significance for the adolescent. There is sudden intellectual insight into the meaning of religion, a new perception of the moral worth of things, and an emotional response. Now though it is the rule that an awakening of religious feeling comes during adolescence, the adolescent is not necessarily a religious being. There is simply a physiological and a mental unfolding of which education and religion may take advantage. This dawning of religious feeling during adolescence Starbuck terms "spontaneous awakening." This experience is distinctly an adolescent phenomena. It is related to conversion of the milder type, but is more like the vision that comes to the poet and thinker.[1] There are no remarkable conviction phenomena, and no tremendous sense of change, instead there is the gradual dawning of insight. In Starbuck's opinion, this "spontaneous awakening" precedes by a little the conversion experience. His general conclusion is, that religious experiences of all kinds, cataclysmic or mild, are confined to adolescence. Temperament, religious prepossessions, and training explain why one adolescent should have a catastrophic experience and another a gentle awakening.

Starbuck asserts there are three waves of religious feeling. The first culminates shortly after puberty at the age of twelve. The second wave follows at about the age of fifteen and a half, coinciding with the period of most rapid development in physique and weight. The third arrives at about eighteen years, when the higher cortical centres show marked development. The religious experiences of this period are different from those which come earlier, in that they are more mature and have more insight. These three periods constitute the three crises in adolescence. The adolescent's energy seeks outlet not only in thinking and feeling, but it also takes a motor form. If this energy takes a religious channel the adolescent throws himself into church activities.

Towards the middle of the adolescent period the most characteristic phenomenon is "storm and stress." This lasts with females about three years, but in the case of males

[1] Starbuck suggests that had the subjects of "Spontaneous Awakening" been drilled in "Evangelical Phraseology" it would have been termed "Conversion," p. 200.

about five years. The factors of temperament and environmental conditions give rise to well-marked types of the "storm and stress" experience. Starbuck indicates five such varieties: Type I., where the preponderating feature is the sense of incompleteness, which may become the sense of sin; Type II., where brooding, depression, and morbid introspection are the prominent features; Type III., where the dominant characteristic is pain and distress in connection with religious doubts; Type IV., where friction against surroundings is the most outstanding feature; Type V. is characterized by the struggle to control passion.

The physiological and psychical readjustments which characterize the period of transition from childhood to adulthood condition three sets of phenomena: first, "storm and stress"; second, "spontaneous awakening"; and third, "conversion." The age distribution he finds is much the same in each case. Conversion is just a concentrated form of adolescent growth. Religion, when it brings its power to bear on the adolescent, simply intensifies normal tendencies and shortens up the storm and stress period by bringing things to a crisis.

Behind these years of turmoil lies a physiological background. The physiological explanation of storm and stress is in terms of fast growth, ill-health, and low physical vitality, all of which make for nervous instability. Parallel with this rapid physiological readjustment there is the development of psychic powers. Therefore physiological disturbances and spiritual difficulties synchronize. The adolescent restlessly desires and gropes after a somewhat. A larger world is crowding in upon him; he must take all this in and make it part of his personality. The pedagogical implications of all this is that the adolescent should be treated with the utmost discretion. His cardinal needs are confidence and wise counsel. Physical strain should be avoided, and the laws of health observed. The loud pedal should not be put down on the fact of sin, personal unworthiness, and the horrors of hell. Moreover, the ideal of perfection should not be pitched as high as Everest. The wise religious guide will stimulate the hesitant and diffident youth to wholesome activity with all his might.

In connection with the subject of adolescence, Starbuck

addresses himself to the phenomenon of doubt. The adolescent tries to prove everything. He questions authority, and wants to know the reasons on which it is based. Among the causes which Starbuck assigns for this phenomenon are calamity, misconduct of Christians, unanswered prayer, ill-health, and external and sociological contact for the first time with institutional life. Educational influences play the greatest part. The study of science, philosophy, the reading of new books, and the first real contact with new ideas and modern thought, all these are important factors.[1] Why, asks Starbuck, do these social influences take effect during adolescence and not at an earlier or later period ? Because of the psychophysiological changes in the organism. Doubt belongs almost exclusively to youth. The important fact is not that these external influences cause doubt, but the fact that in the adolescent period these influences find a most hospitable soil in which to germinate. Starbuck's deliverances on the objects of adolescent doubt are extremely interesting. He found that these were principally the things which had become crystallized into creeds and theologies, and handed down by tradition.[2] Starbuck noted that if one specific thing is doubted it leads to the rejection of all other things with which the first is supposed to be indissolubly bound. He also found that there was a difference between men and women in this connection : the men began with doubts about specific things, and then went on to scepticism regarding abstract and universal conceptions ; while the women started with the universals, lumped everything together, and doubted all. The period of doubt is assigned by Starbuck towards the latter end of adolescence, and is subsequent to the phenomenon of storm and stress. Generally speaking, doubt is necessary if personality is to attain its highest possibilities.

Starbuck's conclusion is that for women, adolescence is primarily a period of storm and stress, whereas for men, it is a period of doubt.

Starbuck passes on to deal with the third phenomenon

[1] See Table xxi., showing relative prominence of the occasions of religious doubt, p. 236.

[2] See Table xxii., showing the relative prominence of first objects of doubt, p. 238.

of adolescence, namely, alienation. One-third of the persons Starbuck studied passed through a period of alienation either for a short time or for several years. With some it became a chronic condition. The characteristic feelings of this period are scepticism, indifference, antagonism, and cynicism. Alienation is often the natural outcome of doubt and storm and stress conditions. Starbuck finds the central principle in alienation is the necessity of preserving one's own integrity of personality. The growing personality must become adjusted to the social order. He may adopt one of four attitudes. He may take up the antagonistic attitude, defend an egoistic point of view against the will of society, and so become an outlaw. Or he may accept things as they are, and let sleeping dogs lie. This is the attitude of passive acceptance. Or again, he may stand off from society and cynically criticize the social order. Yet again, he may, with Voltaire, laugh at society and the world, and adopt the satirical attitude. Alienation from all social and religious conventions occurs at the latter end of the adolescent period. Its significance is that it points to the fact that the difficulties of the two preceding periods, storm and stress and doubt, are being settled one way or another by the intellect.

The central thing in the whole adolescent development is the birth of a larger self. A child, says Starbuck, is born into a social organism which sets certain social and religious standards to which he must conform if he is to take his place as an organic part of the social order.

From a pedagogical point of view, says Starbuck, we should not attempt to free young people from storm and stress, or doubt. These are necessary struggles. This is nature's way of producing full-orbed manhood possessing self-reliance and spiritual insight. Starbuck draws attention to the fact that there are substitutes for religious feeling in adolescence. Energy is drawn off in directions other than religious. Three interests persist and are heightened during adolescence, namely, the ethical, the intellectual, and the æsthetic. The ethical takes pride of place, the intellectual interest comes second, and the æsthetic last. These three interests are present when the distinctively religious feelings are absent. These three things are not constitutive elements of religion, but may be

taken up into religion, and in all developed religions are so taken up. These three lines of development are late products of evolution, therefore they are delicately balanced and are the first to succumb to emotional shocks. They are very susceptible to disintegration at a time of physical, mental, and nervous instability such as obtains at adolescence. These three interests represent demands which must be met by the religious educationist.

Psychologically adulthood marks the end of adolescent ferment. It is characterized by reconstruction of the religious life. That which has been objective now becomes a subjective possession. The usual mode of religious growth, says Starbuck, is from childhood credulity through the doubt-reaction and estrangement to a positive hold on religion by means of an individual reconstruction of religious belief. This reconstruction takes place between the years twenty and thirty. Three modes may be discerned. The individual works out a point of view independently of others and lives by it; or reverts to the faith of early childhood, giving it a larger content; or, in the third place, he mingles both these modes enumerated.

Among the means by which transition is made from adolescent ferment to mature decision Starbuck calls attention to five. One way of escape from storm and stress and doubt is through some sort of activity. Three interests persist in the absence of religious feelings, as Starbuck has shown—the ethical, the intellectual, and the æsthetic. Some find their way out by following a path of intellectual insight, others by following up the path of duty are led to religion through the moral instincts. Others again work their passage along the line of æsthetics.

Among the forces which determine the processes of religious growth, Starbuck places as first in importance the influences of home life, and second, the influence and example of others.[1] But he affirms that external influences rarely make a deep impression after maturity. The adult's habits are formed, and his life is controlled by ideals of his own.

Some persons develop so evenly that we have the phenomenon of religious growth without transitions. He

[1] See Table xxv., showing the relative prominence of the external influences which shape the religious life, p. 204.

seeks the conditions of this harmonious development, and finds that four conditions are usually present. One is that the subject has been brought up from childhood in religious surroundings. Another is that he has been kept from dogmas he is incapable of assimilating. A third is that his needs as a child were met at every point in his development by wise parents and teachers. And in the fourth place there has usually been freedom to question things, and enough trust and insight to remain rooted in the heart of religion.

The adult religious consciousness, says Starbuck, nucleates about certain distinctive beliefs. Starbuck has here two interesting tables showing what beliefs are central, and how the intensity with which these are held varies with age.[1] Starbuck finds that belief in God is the most central conception. Belief in immortality increases with the years. Belief in Christ has chief prominence in the early twenties. The organization of religious beliefs about morality is a constant factor in the religion of the mature mind. Another interesting conclusion is that religious beliefs which nucleate about science and philosophy are peculiarly a feature of the early twenties. The appreciation of religion as an interior life makes definite progress with the years, and along with this there is a dropping of beliefs held to be non-essential. Starbuck draws attention to the interesting fact that all the religious types, those who have come through storm and stress, the catastrophic, and the gradual growth group, meet at the same goal in mature life.

The religious feelings of adult life centre about three things: one's own spiritual life, the consciousness of a larger life outside one's self, and the sense of relationship between one's own life and the larger life. Starbuck's table shows the religious feelings of adulthood in order of prominence and frequency.[2] Schleiermacher's feeling of dependence has pride of place. Then come respectively reverence, the mystic sense of oneness with God, and finally faith and trust. A comparison of the religion of childhood

[1] See Table xxvi., showing in per cent. of cases the most central religious beliefs, p. 312; also Table xxviii., showing how beliefs vary with age, p. 320.

[2] See Table xxix., showing the absolute and relative prominence of the religious feelings, p. 332.

with that of maturity shows that reverence, which is relatively absent in childhood, is very prominent in adulthood. Starbuck's conclusion is, that here we have the permanent and essential elements of religion in terms of feeling. "Religion is that which centres about the relationship of the human being with God."

Starbuck's analysis of replies to a questionnaire respecting the motives and ideals of adult religious life revealed three large classes of motives: 1. Egoistic motives; 2. Motives inhibitory of egoistic motives; 3. Altruistic motives. Under class 1, Starbuck places ideals like self-perfection, self-realization, and the urge to self-expression. Again the desire to know, based on the instinct of curiosity, belongs here. Under class 2, Starbuck brings the motive of self-abnegation which inhibits the primitive outfit of egoistic instincts. Under class 3, Starbuck considers the motives based on social instinct and the welfare of society, the desire for union with God and for the love and service of God.[1] Starbuck's analysis shows that the altruistic group of motives preponderated over all desires for self-enlargement. His conclusion is, that from childhood to maturity the most fundamental line of development is from egocentric motives to those that are anthropo-centric and theo-centric. Religion then curbs and sublimates the primordial instincts. Starbuck's finding is that in religious growth there are three great stages. First, that in which religion is viewed externally as in childhood where God is a being who lives in the sky, and where relationship with Him is expressed in objective concrete terms. Second, where religion becomes conceived subjectively as an inner life, the centre of activity being one's own personality. The third stage is that in which the centre of activity again becomes objective, society becomes the centre, and God is conceived of as the all-enveloping life of the whole, of which the individual is a working significant unit.

[1] See Table xxx., showing the absolute and relative prominence of certain religious ideals, p. 343.

3. *Comparison of the Lines of Growth with and without Conversion*

In Part III. Starbuck traces the after-development of persons who had experienced conversion. Are such subjects exempt from the storm and stress, and the struggle and doubt which are annexed to the experience of the non-converted?[1] The testimony of Starbuck's respondents was that after conversion they were beset with the same difficulties that attend adolescent development from which this crisis has been absent. There was the ebb and flow of religious emotion. Religious enthusiasm waxed and waned. There was the painful struggle with old habits. There was the sense of incompleteness, and the feeling of the contrast between the actual and the ideal, which shows that conversion only clears the way for spiritual development. Thus Starbuck's correspondents witnessed to the fact that storm and stress are not evaded by the fact of conversion. Starbuck concludes, therefore, that these things belong to the period of adolescence as such. Starbuck affirms that the result attained by conversion, namely, the birth of consciousness on a higher spiritual level, is also attained by the moral outworking of adolescence without the conversion experience. Starbuck's conclusion from his comparison is that at the end of the day it is the same with both. At the same time there is a difference between the two groups. The conversion group feel their way, while the non-converted religious subject prefers to see his way. The thought of the all-sufficiency and finality of their experience is prominent in the case of the converted. Three conceptions are absent in connection with the conversion cases: "Religion as centreing in scientific and philosophic conceptions, religion as a process of growth, and religion as concerned with conduct."

Starbuck analyses the records written by persons who profess to have experienced sanctification. Fifty-one such records were examined. Starbuck considers sanctification as identical in form with conversion; but, succeeding it in time, it is really a second conversion. Sanctification is the climax of spiritual development, differing from

[1] See Table xxxi., showing the frequency and nature of the post conversion struggles, p. 357.

conversion in degree but not in kind. The period between the experience of conversion and that of sanctification varies from two months to forty years. Starbuck's conclusion is that "sanctification is the step usually, after much striving and discontent, by which the personality is finally identified with the spiritual life which at conversion existed merely as a hazy possibility."

In the last chapter of his book Starbuck deals briefly with the pedagogical implications of his study. He says the fact that thrusts itself into prominence is that of successive stages in growth from childhood to maturity. Now, says Starbuck, both ethical and religious education must recognize this fact and adapt themselves to the growing personality of the individual. "There are duties and ideals which are especially fitting for each stage in life, and so there is a religious ideal peculiar to each age." Therefore, in childhood we should emphasize obedience and conformity. In youth we should stress the maxims, "Insist on yourself; never imitate," "To thine own self be true." But in maturity the accent ought to be on service, and losing oneself in the cause. Special emphasis on each of these ideals is demanded in each period.

CRITIQUE

With respect to method, and handling of material, Starbuck's book is imperfect. It ought to be stated in all fairness that this book is a first study in a comparatively unexplored and uncharted region of human experience. The defects which appear in Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* are the inevitable defects which are annexed to a pioneer work in any field of inquiry. It is obvious at the outset that Starbuck attempted too much in a first work. He tried to cover the whole field of the religious life, but with indifferent success. A feature of Starbuck's work is his fair-mindedness. Starbuck has no naturalistic thesis to prove. His single aim is to get at the facts of the religious life in order to discern the laws of their interaction. Two of Starbuck's positions need to be pondered by the more recent psychologists of religion, for the investigations of whom his own paved the way. We refer first to Starbuck's recognition of the fact that the stand-

point and method which the science of psychology adopts impose upon it definite limitations. The business of a psychology of religion as Starbuck conceived it was to get at the factual data of the religious life and their laws, but not to pronounce upon their essential nature and ultimate ground. Starbuck's second attitude was that while it is prefectly legitimate to study religion in the race, this is not psychology. A psychology of religion must study religion in the individual. Starbuck's insistence upon the distinction between anthropology, sociology, and the history of religion and psychology still needs emphasis. Naturally, like many other works, Starbuck's book has the defects of its qualities. Most of these seem directly due to his method, which was personal and interrogative. His treatise is based entirely on replies to question circulars, and in the hands of no other author of the American School does the questionnaire method so clearly reveal its imperfections. The questionnaire at its best can only yield rough-and-ready indications of general tendencies in a restricted field of instances.[1] Data so derived can never yield conclusions possessing that quality of precision which is requisite before an induction can receive the imprimatur of science. Starbuck has with Teutonic patience and herculean labour collected and sifted a mass of documentary data gathered by a method that can yield loose approximations only. One would regret the fact of so much careful work with so relatively meagre scientific results, were it not for the conviction, which grows upon one with the perusal of the book, that Professor Starbuck has a passion for documents and delights in diagrams. The book contains thirty-two elaborate statistical tables and fourteen carefully constructed diagrams. These tables leave the impression of artificiality and over-elaboration.[2] Tables x., xv., xx., especially seem to excessively multiply classes of feelings, bodily affections, etc.[3] These too exact numerical tabulations give spurious scientific precision to the deliverances of the book. It is notorious that statistics may prove anything; an argument based entirely on statistics, especially respecting psychical realities, needs careful scrutiny. It

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 48.
[2] Coe, G. A., *op. cit.*; see footnote, p. 47.
[3] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 67, 123, 220.

was an American who proved from statistics that bed was a most dangerous place, because more people died in bed than anywhere else. Statistics may be manipulated in favour of one's own thesis, and conflicting deductions may be derived from the same statistics. An interesting commentary on this fact is a comparison of Starbuck's conclusion as to the average age of conversion with that of Leuba. This, Starbuck finds from his statistics, is about seventeen years. Professor Leuba, who also used the questionnaire method, shows from his instances that the average age is about twenty-five years.[1] The doctors differ here. The disparity is explained by the fact that Leuba's question circular was calculated to elicit profounder religious experiences than Starbuck's. These naturally occur more frequently in manhood than in childhood and adolescence, while Starbuck, on the other hand, registered the most shallow experiences of childhood and adolescence as conversions. This general criticism applies more or less to the whole of the book.

The questionnaire used in isolation and without safeguards is an inadequate method at any time, but Starbuck does not always use this imperfect method wisely. Starbuck's experimental material is unsatisfactory, because the cases he investigates are not numerous enough nor sufficiently representative. Starbuck professes to be writing a psychology of religion, but he limits the scope of his questionnaire to practically one type of religionists, and to one phase of the religious life. The reports on which he bases his conclusions come almost entirely from American evangelical Protestants of the Methodist persuasion. The types investigated then are in the main American, and they are Americans who favour revival methods, and who use a certain pietistic vocabulary. Conversion to such is the central experience. Now what is true of Starbuck's respondents need not be necessarily true of religious men in general, nor of a denomination other than the Methodist.

It is quite apparent that Starbuck has studied not the genus man, but the species American Methodist; his conclusions, therefore, are loosely true of this species of the genus religious man. The Roman Catholic Church has a

[1] Leuba, J. H., art. "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii. pp. 371–385 (April), 1896.

distinct type of piety in which sacramental ideas occupy the prominent place conversion has in the religious life of the Methodist. Again the Lutheran Church has another type of piety which is the product of the Christian home and the Christian community. Moreover, a definite type of piety is produced by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Church of England, the Greek Church, not to speak of Buddhistic and Mohammedan Churches. All these important types are ignored by Starbuck. His generalizations, therefore, are scarcely valid with respect to the great national churches whose theological and psychological climate differs considerably from that of the American Methodist denomination.

Starbuck is frequently guilty of the fallacy of imperfect enumeration. His broad inductions repose on insufficient data.

Not only are Starbuck's investigations confined to a narrow class, but his questions to this class were sometimes crudely formulated. Many of the questions overlap, more exact terminology could have been used with advantage. Starbuck is dealing almost entirely with the members of a denomination which stresses the "Cross of Christ" and the "Shed Blood" as absolutely necessary for salvation, yet he asks no question designed to evoke information concerning the place of "The Atonement" in the religious experience of the representatives of this type of piety.

Again Starbuck's definition of the conversion experience is too wide. The term "Conversion" is used in the loosest sense.[1] It gathers up into its sweep experiences which differ tremendously in quality and intensity. Profound experiences which sound the depths of personality are grouped with religious experiences of the most superficial kind. It is quite competent for any psychologist to treat of varieties of conversion by the method of comparison; but Starbuck's mode of procedure is scarcely legitimate, for he masses unlike phenomena together, and then proceeds to draw exact statistical conclusions from them. Such conclusions are naturally misleading.

One of the irritating features of the book, from a scientific point of view, is Starbuck's habitual use throughout this study of the theological language of his subjects.

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 24.

Starbuck uses the vocabulary of pietistic phraseology when psychologizing without translating this language into the terminology of psychology. Such uncritical language is scarcely suitable as a basis for psychological classification.

In this study of the religious life Starbuck gives no evidence of introspective power. The impression grows upon one, with the perusal of his book, that Starbuck is judging the cathedral window from the outside. He seems to be entirely indebted to his written reports and returns for the whole of his material for a psychology of religion. With much more laborious care, and apparently with as much psychological insight as a civil servant compiling census returns, he sifts, and counts, and tabulates his statistics in the most objective way possible. This may, of course, be useful as throwing light on the externals of religion, for the compiling of church statistics and for the purposes of practical ecclesiasticism, but it is certainly inadequate when we have to do with fluid realities and the most complex subjective experiences of the religious life.

We have already referred to the fair-mindedness of this investigator, and to his passion for documents; a third characteristic is also prominent in his book, namely, his naivete.[1] Starbuck accepts the statements of his correspondents concerning their alleged religious experiences in the most uncritical manner. Referring to the question of the abnormal aspect of conversion, Starbuck says: "The testimony of the respondents, then, is our standard of judging the two classes of normal and abnormal." Again, with respect to sanctification, Starbuck says: "We shall rely first upon the testimony of the respondents." We shall quote a typical response under this last head. One subject writes: "I felt so pure and clean that I wished I were made of glass, so that everybody could look within my heart." This spiritual priggishness is paralleled by other utterances. Fifteen of Starbuck's subjects professed to have become so free from sin as to be perfect. All the various assertions concerning the most complex experiences, motives, and influences of the religious life are swallowed by Starbuck, hook, line, and sinker. He does not think it necessary to get corroboration for a single

[1] See Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 164, 184, 379, 387.

statement. Such artlessness on the part of a scientific investigator is extraordinary. Starbuck appears to ignore all across the psychological truism that it is just here with respect to the dynamics of the subjective life that untrained introspection is most incompetent and unreliable.[1] It is precisely this uncritical acceptance of anything his respondents put on paper that results in the plethora of classes of moods, feelings, and motives, which receive such elaborate tabulation in this book. Many correspondents tell of the same or similar moods, feelings, and motives in inexact theological language, and Starbuck immediately taking their reports at their face value writes down as many motives as there are men. Starbuck admits that the language of his respondents is confused. He says: "It sometimes occurs that definite religious awakening is not called a conversion by persons who are not accustomed to that specific terminology. On the other hand, a religious experience was called a conversion when it was specifically said by the respondent that the experience had no especial significance."[2] In spite of this knowledge Starbuck consistently accepts the statements of his subjects at their face value. Professor Pratt, when gathering data for his *Psychology of Religious Belief*, used the questionnaire; but Pratt, in contradistinction to Starbuck, interviewed his respondents and discussed their answers with them. He refused to take them at their face value.[3] No investigator since Starbuck has ever used the questionnaire without safeguards such as these.

Starbuck's study gives no information regarding the sources of religion in the individual or the race. He does not tell us in what the religious consciousness consists, or of the relation of religion with the other great master forces and factors of human life. In common with subsequent workers in this field no account is taken of the supernatural factor in religious experience. The important subject of the religion of childhood is dismissed in a few pages. Starbuck's dominant interest is in the adolescent development of American evangelical Protestants, which he assigns to biological and physiological causes.

[1] Stout, G. F., *Manual of Psychology*, p. 43.
[2] Starbuck, E. D., *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 184, 200.
[3] Pratt, J. B., *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 234.

Starbuck's study attempts to establish two important propositions. First, conversion and other adolescent phenomena are mutually related. Second, conversion and physiological adolescence are definitely correlated. Starbuck's genetic explanation of conversion is fourfold. First, the sociological explanation, the individual grows up from childhood through adolescence to manhood. As a child he is egotistic, " but as he grows he gathers much," and realizes he is not the whole universe but a member of society. He learns, therefore, that there is a social will to which he must submit his individual self. Conversion on this view is simply an aspect of the social phenomenon. Second, Starbuck explains conversion by biological conceptions. He connects conversion with sexual development; it is a by-product of puberty. Third, it may be explicated in terms of physiology, bodily changes and transformations in the nervous system have much to do with religious experiences. Or, in the fourth place, conversion may be given a psychological explanation. We begin life with the lower self as the centre of reference, but as the child passes to maturity the higher self grows in power and glory, a fracture of personality occurs, and the higher self becomes, after a paroxysm of emotional intensity of long or short duration, the centre of human activity. This experience is conversion. Conversion, then, with Starbuck may be explained either in terms of sociology, biology, physiology, or psychology, or all of them together. Natural laws explain the phenomenon of conversion. Now plainly these things belong together, and there is some connection between conversion and all these things, but there is an obvious objection : many persons grow to sexual maturity ; experience all the normal physiological changes ; and admit the claims of society, but they do not get converted, nor do they feel like it. If conversion is to be explained by natural laws this is a serious objection, for natural laws operate universally. Therefore these biological, sociological, and physiological explanations are inadequate to account for the phenomenon of religious conversion. There must be another cause. Starbuck's explanation seems to embody the logical fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc.* His inference that that which accompanies or goes before another thing has a causal connection with that thing is

a hazardous one. At the period of adolescence there is the rise and development of new powers, and, as Starbuck, Coe, and Stanley Hall point out, conversion usually belongs to this period. But this is all the facts warrant us in saying. Professor Leuba's cases of conversion, which are appended at the end of his first study, took place at the average age of twenty-five years. Many of them occurred late in middle life. To say adolescence has a causal connection with conversion is to confound concomitant with cause.

The most remarkable and important conversions in the history of religion are probably those of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Tolstoy, and these are not adolescent conversions.[1]

Professor Ladd seriously calls into question Starbuck's general conclusion that the principal factor in religious conversion is the sexual changes that accompany the period of adolescence. He shows that Starbuck's curve of conversion does not agree with the physiological and sexual curve, and that therefore Starbuck's alleged induction has no scientific value.[2]

In the whole of this study Starbuck does not present us with the complete religious history of a single subject. The number of recorded cases is legion, but we have no exhaustive study of any one case. Starbuck never seems to have followed through a single case to the end. Internal evidence indicates that Starbuck's plan was to get from a certain set of persons reports relating to their pre-conversion experiences. He would then derive from another group information concerning the conversion crisis itself. Then he would go to a third set of people for intelligence of the post-conversion phenomena. Again, his conception of what the phenomenon of sanctification must be like is got from another group altogether. Having collected his data in this piecemeal fashion, Starbuck proceeds to fashion a mosaic. The inevitable result is that Starbuck builds out of these pieces of religious experience gathered from several different sets of subjects, an experience which no man ever had, or is likely to have. A psychology of religion reared on such fragmentary data is not scientific.

Starbuck's treatment of the religion of childhood leaves much to be desired. He dismisses this important subject

[1] Thouless, R. H., *Introduction to Psychology of Religion*, p. 187.
[2] Ladd, G. T., *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i. p. 276.

in a few pages. He depends for his facts, not as one would suppose upon the actual study and observation of the child-mind, but upon what adults like to tell him concerning the religious experiences of their childhood. "We shall have to depend," says Starbuck, "for our picture of the religion of childhood upon the reminiscences of the respondents." But why should we have to depend on the adult for our knowledge of the religion of childhood when we may go to the child direct? Starbuck is clearly unscientific here. His unpsychological approach to this subject is all the more reprehensible since he admits that such statements of adults concerning childhood are largely invalidated by defects of memory and errors of interpretation due to an adult standpoint. Starbuck's conclusions with regard to the religion of childhood can be considered as probabilities only, until they receive confirmation by investigators who apply themselves to the observation and study of the child himself.

Starbuck at one time counts æsthetic and ethical feelings as real factors in religion; at another time he speaks of these impulses as substitutes for religion. On one occasion he refers to the sense of duty as one of "the most prominent and persistent factors in the spiritual life." Again, referring to the ethical instinct, he says it is "the most constant and persistent factor in the religious life." Then, in another section of his work, Starbuck shows that æsthetic and ethical feelings are not real factors in religion, but are frequently substitutes for it during adolescent doubt, and storm and stress, and that when religion goes to wreck these things endure. But Starbuck cannot have it both ways.

We cannot find out what religion is by the questionnaire method alone; this method needs to be supplemented by an intensive study of actual cases which are subjected to both observation and experiment, and also by the biographical method.

Starbuck's classification of the content of the conversion experience is imperfect because of his absolute reliance on the questionnaire. Many of the things Starbuck sets down as factors in this experience overlap. There are many elements in a convert's experience, but when the psychologist comes along with his question circular,

the convert singles out some one element which was most vivid at the time, and all the other elements tend to become obscured. Starbuck's classification of the content of this experience is imperfect, because he takes what his respondents affirm to be the central thing as the only thing.

The general defects of Starbuck's book are perhaps the inevitable penalty of strict fidelity to the questionnaire method. With all these defects, the most of which are unavoidable in a pioneer work, Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* is a valuable contribution to that new science which America is making so peculiarly her own. Starbuck defined the topography of the field for subsequent workers. He stimulated a host of investigators to further inquiry along the line suggested in his study. It is probable that Professor W. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* would never have been written had Starbuck's study not appeared. One of the valuable contributions Starbuck has made to the psychology of religion is his classification of types of conversion. Three definite types result from his research, the principle of classification being the attitude of the will in conversion. These three types are the positive determination or volitional type, the negative determination or self-surrender type, and the spontaneous awakening type. Starbuck's types have become classical. The great stimulus Starbuck gave to this new line of inquiry; his own valuable research in this virgin field of study; and his clear recognition of the limitations of his science; also his eminently judicial spirit make him especially fitted to be the trail blazer of the American School of Religious Psychology.

CHAPTER IV

"The Spiritual Life," [1] *by* George Albert Coe

EXPOSITION

Professor Coe's book on Temperament and Religion appeared one year after Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*. *The Spiritual Life*, though not of formidable bulk, deserves more than passing notice for various reasons: first, this volume is one of the pioneer works of the American School; second, the results of Coe's independent investigations present marked agreements and contrasts with Starbuck's earlier work; and, in the third place, Coe draws attention for the first time to the tremendous part played by temperament in religious life and experience. This discovery of temperament as the prime factor in determining modes of expression of the religious life is Coe's special contribution to the psychology of religion.

In this unpretentious volume, Coe groups under psychological laws many of the apparently isolated and unrelated phenomena of religion. The whole book is written in a sympathetic spirit, and there is an evident desire on the part of the author to place the results and methods of the psychology of religion at the disposal of the practical religious worker and educationalist.

A brief exposition of Coe's book is here attempted. Professor Coe starts from the position that co-ordination between religious development and the chief periods of physical and mental growth is one of the established facts of the psychology of religion. Coe accepts as axiomatic the generalization that conversion or some equivalent personalizing of religion is a normal part of adolescent growth. Coe finds from the examination of carefully compiled

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life* (1900), The Abingdon Press.

statistics concerning 1784 men that the average age of conversion is 16·4 years. This investigator holds that the statistics establish the concomitance of two groups of facts, namely, puberty and conversion. Coe concludes that the average age of conversion synchronizes with the age of accession to puberty, and that the mental condition accompanying the physical transformation is specially favourable to religious impressions. The general conclusion reached is, that while the physical changes which occur at adolescence do not actually produce religion, they certainly do make the subject of these transformations more impressionable.

Coe is conspicuous for the remarkable accent he places on the physiological causes of the characteristic feelings of adolescence such as vague unrest, dissatisfaction with self, and general discontent. Even the religious difficulties of adolescence have a physical cause. Coe cites Starbuck as fixing the age of religious doubt at eighteen years for men, and at fifteen years for women. This adolescent doubt, according to Coe, is not perplexed reasoning so much as it is a symptom of the physical conditions of the adolescent period. In Coe's opinion, whenever theoretic doubts produce morbid states the causes are physical, not intellectual. According to this author, the strain on the nervous system at this period is terrific, and the worry, despondency, bad temper, indecision, morbid introspection, and susceptibility to sexual temptations, all of which characterize adolescence, are the effects of nerve fatigue. Coe insists that fatigue, however induced, is the neural basis of the morbid consciousness of adolescence. General mental ferment, bad teaching or lack of teaching, and an overstrained nervous system, these three causes, according to Coe, lie back of the morbid states of adolescence. Coe protests against the present mode of religious instruction for leaving out of its reckoning the relation of physiology and psychology to the spiritual life.

The theories of Bain,[1] Havelock Ellis,[2] and Leuba,[3] which attempt to explain variations in the religious experi-

[1] Bain, *Emotions and Will*, 3rd ed. p. 453.
[2] Ellis, Havelock, *Man and Woman*, 2nd ed. p. 292.
[3] Leuba, J. H., "Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii. p. 340.

ence of conversion, are criticized by Coe as inadequate, because they ignore the tremendous factor of temperament.

In order to substantiate his assertion, that temperament is the important determinant of types of conversion, Coe carefully examined seventy-seven cases, of whom fifty-two were men and twenty-five were women. It is worthy of note, that as to personnel nearly all were college students, sound in mind and body, and all had positive moral and religious training, for the most part of the Methodist type.

As the result of his investigations in connection with these subjects Coe discovered two things: first, that there were many differences between types of religious experience, and that these varied greatly in degree; and, second, that the difference between types of mental organization were also many and varied in degree. Coe arrived at the conclusion that abrupt and striking religious changes happen among denominations that set out to get them.

Coe's subjects were divided into two great classes: those who had experienced a remarkable conversion were placed in one group, and those who had had no such experience were placed in another.

Coe then made a second classification on the principle of expectation of sudden transformation. Two classes were formed, one consisting of the subjects who expected a remarkable conversion, and another consisting of those without such an expectation.

Those who belonged to the expectant group fell before analysis into two classes—namely, those who got what they expected, and those whose expectations were unrealized. Coe insists here on the significant fact that those who were disappointed had put themselves in the same attitude of will as those who were not.

Coe next looked into the temperament of these two classes. With regard to each of these groups, he raised the question as to whether the intellect, sensibility, or the will was predominant. He discovered that where expectation was satisfied, there sensibility predominated, and where expectation was disappointed, there the intellect was sovereign.

Coe discovered the interesting fact that those whose expectation was satisfied belonged to the slow-intense and prompt-weak varieties of temperament, which approach

most nearly the traditional melancholic and sanguine temperaments, while those who were disappointed belonged to the prompt-intense species, which approximates to the classical choleric temperament.

This investigator now studied the relation of these experiences to mental and motor automatisms, and found that 65 per cent. of those subjects who had a striking religious transformation also exhibited automatic phenomena, while only 8 per cent. of those who had vainly tried for the striking experience had either a mental hallucination or a motor automatism. Coe places on record therefore his conclusion that "the mechanism of striking religious transformations is the same as the mechanism of our automatic mental processes."

It is important to note Coe's use of experimentation in this connection. The two groups with which he worked were now placed under the influence of hypnotic suggestion, in order to discover the relative susceptibility to suggestion on the part of these two classes of subjects. Coe discovered that among those whose expectation of a striking conversion was gratified, thirteen out of fourteen were passive subjects, possessing great suggestibility but showing little spontaneity. On the other hand, he found that eleven out of twelve persons whose expectation of such a transformation was unrealized, were not very suggestible, and belonged to the spontaneous type. Coe's hypnotic experiments established a correlation between religious experiences and suggestibility, and resulted in the generalization that susceptibility to suggestion is an important factor in striking cases of religious transformation.

Given these three factors, a temperament of extreme sensibility, a tendency to automatisms, expectation, and passive suggestibility, a striking religious transformation can be predicted. For Coe, the physiological and psychical make-up of a man determines the nature and mode of his religious experiences.

All these facts bear upon the phenomena of revivals, the "Power" phenomenon, trances, visions, miracles, mental therapeutics, etc. The phenomenon of the "Power" which puzzled John Wesley is explained as induced by hypnotic processes. The pressure of religious excitement produces a sporadic case of hallucination or auto-suggestion

in the form of a trance, vision, voices, or catalepsy. The bystanders are filled with dread lest they should be affected in the same way, and the auto-suggestion works; the more suggestible soon realize their fearful expectation; every fresh case adds power to the real cause, and soon there is an epidemic of phenomenal experiences.

Coe maintains that the hypnotic rather than the moral or religious influences are often the decisive ones in revival meetings. The great evil of revival methods, according to this author, is that all too frequently the mind of an earnest subject is fixed upon the attainment of some religious experience which his mental constitution and temperament makes impossible. This often results in revulsion of feeling, and entails needless anxiety, and even positive antagonism to religion.

The treatment of the subject of Divine Healing is distinctly illuminating. The law of mental healing is the law of suggestion, and, according to Coe, 90 per cent. of the population can be hypnotized. Suggestion is an instrument of great and subtle power, and it is easier to produce pain by suggestion than to remove it; therefore Coe insists that indiscriminate hypnotic experimentation is dangerous, and the handling of suggestion should be left to experts.

Coe explains the visions that frequently accompany Divine healing as due to four causes: first, there is the extreme suggestibility of the subject; second, there is the possession of a stock of mental images of the saints, the Virgin, or the Christ; third, there is great emotional pressure; and, finally, intense concentration upon Divine things.

All cures wrought in the name of faith at shrines and in connection with the relics of the saints must be ascribed to suggestion. Coe reminds us that cures have been wrought at shrines other than Christian, and that all the successes of Christian Science healing fall under the general law of suggestion. Coe's position here is, that cases which can be explained by natural law must be so explained. Trances and visions are to be explained, therefore, in terms of auto-suggestion. Suggestion, moreover, is the clue to the miraculous element in the lives of the saints, in the life of Christ, and in the wonders of religions other than the Christian. Coe raises the question here, Why should it be

thought a thing incredible that Christ should employ the ordinary forces of nature and mind at hand ?

Physical phenomena like the stigmata of St. Francis of Assisi and the five wounds of Louise Lateau are all explicable in terms of auto-suggestion. With Coe, then, suggestion does not explain everything, but it explains much of the phenomena of the religious life.

Coe's last chapter, " A Study of Spirituality," continues his discussion of temperament and religion. He acutely examines the traditional conceptions of sainthood, contemporary hymnology and spiritual exercises, popular current conceptions of spirituality, and the historic influence of Mariolatry. As a result of this penetrating analysis, Coe concludes that the feminine element unduly predominates over all others in worship and the religious life. He protests that Christ's universally human conception of spiritual life has been warped into a narrow temperamental form by organized Christianity. Men who are full of intense purposes, eager and earnest, whose need is action, are sacrificed in the interests of those who are given to feeling ; in other words, the Choleric temperament is starved and subordinated in the interests of the Melancholic.

Coe impeaches organized Christianity because it does not offer the kind of spiritual refreshment and modes of activity adapted to many-sided human personality. The great problem before the Christian Church is to find a solvent for the maladjustment of temperaments. Coe's remedy is to definitely broaden the psychological basis of Church life and ideals, so as to meet the needs of all the varied temperaments of men. Coe's constructive policy embodies the following propositions : first, the spiritual conceit of the melancholic temperament must be resisted ; second, the spiritual trivialities of the merely sanguine temperament must be transcended ; third, the spirituality of the moral will and of the truth-loving intellect must not only be conceded, but preached and gloried in. The Church must cease to look at things through feminine eyes, and must emphasize the more rugged, active, intellectual, and social virtues.

Coe's argument is cumulative ; all his different lines of investigation converge upon this conclusion—namely, that organized Christianity, Protestant and Roman Catholic alike,

places too light an accent on the more active practical qualities of goodness; in Coe's own words, "the forms of religious life natural to the choleric temperament are habitually discounted in favour of those natural to the sanguine and melancholic temperaments, particularly the latter."

CRITIQUE

Coe's *Spiritual Life* is one of the earlier works of the American School of religious psychology; it makes a distinct and valuable contribution to that new science to which America has proved so hospitable. Following hard upon Starbuck's book, Coe's treatment presents several important points of agreement with and differences from that work.

It is interesting to observe that Coe, though working independently, arrives at substantially the same conclusions as Starbuck with reference to the average age at which conversions take place, namely, 16·4 years.[1]

It is worthy of note, that while Starbuck's classification of religious types is according to the attitude of the will in conversion, Coe's classification, in contrast with Starbuck's, is based on temperament.

Another point of difference between these first investigators is, that while Starbuck maintains conversion and puberty are supplemental rather than coincidental,[2] Coe insists that these phenomena synchronize and are vitally connected.[3] This intimate connection between puberty and conversion is a postulate not yet proven.

It will be remembered that Coe's most important conclusions were reached as the result of an intensive study of seventy-seven religious subjects. Coe's respondents were intellectually, socially, and religiously a special class; they were university men and women, with a Methodist upbringing which stresses peculiar religious experiences. Coe's generalizations, therefore, are strictly true of this class only.

It must be conceded, however, that Coe's study of his instances was most thorough and exhaustive. Both

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 31; cf. Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 45.
[2] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 41.
[3] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 45.

Starbuck and Coe use the questionnaire, but with a difference. Starbuck used the questionnaire without safeguards of any kind. Coe uses the question circular method, but safeguards himself at every step. *The Spiritual Life* was published one year after Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*; it shows a great advance on Starbuck's method, and indicates how quickly the inadequacy of the bald questionnaire was perceived by subsequent investigators.

Coe supplemented the question circular method by personal interview. He carefully cross-questioned his respondents. With the assistance of other psychological students, Coe kept his subjects under observation for objective evidence with reference to temperament. In contradistinction to Starbuck, who accepted everything his respondents liked to tell him at its face value, this less ingenuous investigator, recognizing the fact that very few persons can give a trustworthy account of their own motives, refused to accept the facts recorded in answer to his questionnaire without corroboration. Coe arranged for interviews with the intimate friends and close acquaintances of his subjects in order to confirm old facts or to elicit new data.

Coe's procedure is particularly important, in that it involved experimentation.[1] He subjected all his crucial cases to hypnotic experiment for the purpose of discovering degrees of suggestibility. The questionnaire used with these safeguards and supplements becomes a valuable method for the psychology of religion.

Coe's thesis, that temperament is an important factor in religious experience, and a most influential determinant of types of religious expression, must be regarded as being made out.

Coe's insistence on the simple psychological truth, which seems to have escaped the notice of popular evangelists and public advocates of the Christian religion, namely, that there are temperaments other than the emotional in existence, is to be commended. With his plea, that organized Christianity should strive to meet the needs of every temperament within its pale, we are in thorough accord. Organized Christianity must appeal to the moral will as well as to sensibility.

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 110.

Again Coe is right in urging that the Christian Church should place a heavier accent on the Manliness of Christ. A religion which is set forth as a shelter, or a refuge, and which stresses the motive of playing for safety, does not appeal with any force to the robust mind. It was this sort of thing which provided Nietzsche with material for his diatribes against Christianity. It can be safely affirmed that any presentation of Christianity which emasculates it of its virile factors will fail to capture the imaginations of the best type of men at present outside the Churches.

CHAPTER V

"The Varieties of Religious Experience," [1] *by* William James

EXPOSITION

The Varieties of Religious Experience is the most widely known of all the contributions of the American School. The author's eminence as a psychologist, the genius which gleams out of every page, and the fascination of an inimitable literary style have all contributed to the fame and popularity of this bewitching book.

The Varieties can scarcely be called a systematic treatise on the psychology of the religious life. Professor James had a thesis to prove. The philosophy that appealed at once to his heart and mind was pluralistic idealism. James therefore sought support in the religious life for his hypothesis that the universe is a protean world of spiritual beings. In religious experience James hoped to find proof of the invasion of human life by spiritual agencies. This, then, seems to be the animating purpose of this fascinating book. *The Varieties* does not treat of religious life as a whole, but that portion of it only which appeals to James as supporting his favourite hypothesis. The lectures, therefore, are chiefly concerned with the description and appreciation of two classes of religious phenomena, namely, conversion and mysticism.

James sets himself to solve the problem, Is religion true? He begins by demonstrating the truth of the unique value of religion in human life. Having established the truth of the value of religion James addresses himself to the question of the truth of religion.

The method adopted was the biographical. James gets

[1] James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), Longmans, Green, & Co.

at the autobiographies and personal confessions of extraordinary religious men and women. With regard to the subject of religious experience whose God-consciousness is to be investigated by the science of psychology, James affirms repeatedly, that for profitable study we must go to the extreme type of religious temperament for whom religion exists as an acute fever. It is in this connection that James asserts there is intimate connection between religion and neurology. James says a great number of the supreme religious figures have been psychopaths, but he argues if there be such a thing as inspiration from above, it might well be that the neurotic temperament furnishes the chief condition of the requisite receptivity. Morbid origin does not discount religion, for it is by fruits, not by roots, it must be judged.

James sharply distinguishes between existential judgments and judgments of value. Mere existential accounts of the facts of mental history do not decide their spiritual significance. The test of religious experience must be pragmatic. Is the religious mental state a happiness bringer? is it morally helpful? is it serviceable for life? —these are the criteria.

James divides the field of religion into two portions, namely, institutional religion and personal religion. It is with personal religion that James takes to do. Religion, he says, is a complex conception and must not be defined in terms of any one of its elements. There is no one elementary religious emotion, but a storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw. Religious emotions are just natural emotions evoked by and directed to religious objects. James defines religion thus: "Religion is the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." "The divine shall mean for us only such primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse, nor a jest."

Morality and religion are differentiated from each other by an emotional mood, and by the way the universe is accepted. Morality obeys the regnant laws with a cold heart, and in the stoical spirit it is characterized by a tense volitional straining. Religion submits with glad-

ness and serenity to the reigning laws. A higher kind of emotion seems to carry the religious man through. Religion gives a man a new sphere of power, and joy. James's conclusion is, that religion makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary, and it is the only agency that can do this. Religious feeling, therefore, is an absolute addition to man's range of life.

James affirms the reality of an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in adjusting ourselves to it. Men who have intuitions of the unseen find them as convincing as any sensible experiences can be. If a person feels the presence of the living God, no critical arguments can change his faith. Therefore rationalism can't destroy religious convictions, neither can it give conviction when it chooses to argue for religion.

James divides religious men into two great classes, the healthy-minded and the morbid-minded,[1] and proceeds to show how religion tends to unify the mind, and to adjust it to its natural and social environment, in connection with both these chief types.

The healthy-minded arrive at unity by deliberately turning attention from evil, and denying that it belongs to us. This type systematically disregards the unpleasant in life.

The religion of the morbid-minded, on the other hand, asserts evil is so inherent that relief can only come from without by a deliverance. Failure, disappointment, sin, anguish of soul are realities in every life. There will always be misunderstanding between these two types, says James. The "morbid-minded" think the way of the healthy-minded shallow, while the "healthy-minded" think of the "sick-souls" as unmanly and diseased. The cause of this distinction between these two types is temperamental.

This state of intense pessimism and melancholy on the part of the morbid-minded, says James, is always the religious experience of neurotic subjects. This melancholy when intense must lead to a crisis before relief comes. There is no getting gradually better and better; a crisis is reached, and a second birth is the only way out. There

[1] Cf. Höffding's terms, "Discordant Natures" and "Expansive Natures," *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 284, 286.

is no such morbid crisis in the religious lives of the healthy-minded. Here, then, we meet one of James's important conclusions, namely, an intense state of melancholy always exists as a temporary condition of spiritual evolution. The way to religious rapture is through this antecedent state of intensest unhappiness.

In all of us, says James, the normal evolution of character consists in unifying the inner self. The period of introducing order is marked by unhappiness vague or definite. In persons religiously quickened it takes the form of moral remorse and issues in intense melancholy. The unification of the self may come gradually or abruptly, through altered feelings, new intellectual insights, or new mystical experiences; but, however or whenever it comes, it brings relief. This reaching unity is a psychological process which need not always take the religious form.[1]

Conversion is the psychological process of unification of a discordant self which takes the religious form. We need not discuss the supernatural cause of conversion, says James, but will simply consider the fact. The psychological history of conversion is as follows: an individual's ideas tend to fall into groups which are relatively independent. If the individual concentrates intensely on a single aim, a certain group of ideas nucleates about this aim. There are, of course, other groups of ideas in the mental field, but these are ignored. The habitual centre of the man's personal energy is the set of ideas to which he devotes himself. But when his interest is fixed on incompatible aims, we have the phenomenon of a divided self, for a man cannot have two habitual centres of personal energy; he must work from one set of ideas or the other and the process of deciding which set is often agony. Now it makes a tremendous difference in a man's life whether any group of ideas he possesses becomes central or remains peripheral in his mental life. When oscillation in emotional interest ceases, and the interest is fixed on one aim exclusively, we have a unified self. This, then, is how a self may be divided and unified.

Conversion then simply means, that a certain set of religious ideas which inhabited the periphery of the mental

[1] See cases of non-religious conversion and counter conversion, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 175–183.

field becomes central, *i.e.* the group of ideas to which a man devotes himself and from which he works. This shifting of the group from the circumference to the centre is of the nature of a painful dislocation. The former central system is flung out to the circumference, and the peripheral system rushes in as it were to the newly created central vacuum.

Why do sets of ideas which were peripheral become central? James is agnostic here; it is so, is all psychology can say. New insights, mutations of propensities and instincts, and emotional upheavals are believed to play a part. These factors and others unknown precipitate the crisis which leads to mental reorganization. James endorses Starbuck's conclusion that conversion is a normal phenomenon of adolescence. There are two main types of conversion, according to James—the volitional type and the self-surrender type.[1] In connection with the first type the transformation is gradual, it is the building up of a new set of moral and spiritual habits; but in the second type the change is sudden and remarkable.

The cause of conversion in both types is the same, namely, sub-conscious maturing processes. James passes by the volitional type as being less interesting than the self-surrender type where the sub-conscious effects are startling. One fundamental form of religious experience, says James, is that in which the dominant feeling is that conscious effort gets us nowhere, and that success is attained by self-surrender.[2] When the surrender is made, a crisis occurs, after which regenerative phenomena appear. James translates the self-surrender type of conversion experience into psychological terms. He says: "When the new centre of personal energy has been subconsciously incubated so long as to be just ready to burst into consciousness, 'hands off' is the only word; it must burst forth unaided." Psychology agrees with religion that there are forces apparently outside the conscious individual that bring redemption to his life, but differs from religion in that psychology holds the whole matter of conversion is due to the incubation of the individual's own sub-conscious forces, and not the supernatural operations of Deity.

[1] Cf. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 100.
[2] Cf. Starbuck, *op. cit.* p. 115.

For James, then, conversion is a phenomenon of the sub-conscious. There are two causes which shift the centres of personal energy in a man's life. These are explicitly conscious processes of thought and will, and second, sub-conscious incubation of motives deposited by the experiences of life. The whole field of objects present to the mind at any given time is the unit of the mental life. The margin of this field is vague. Outside this conscious field there is a smoky region, of the contents of which we are only half conscious. Beyond this smoky region again there float memories, thoughts, feelings, and powers. The discovery of this extra-marginal region of the mind in 1886, says James, casts incandescent light on the phenomenon of conversion. The important consequence of the existence of this world of the sub-conscious is that the ordinary consciousness is liable to incursions from it.

James's position is that conversion can be explicated by the "explosion" into the field of consciousness of ideas which have incubated in the underground mental life. If there be any spiritual agencies, the psychological condition of their influencing human life is the possession of a sub-conscious region, "which alone gives access to them." All this explains why there are two types of conversion, namely, the gradual and the sudden. It is not that there is miracle in the one case, and not in the other, it is simply the presence of a different psychological outfit. The recipient of instantaneous conversion is a person with a large underground region to his mind where work goes on subconsciously. When all is ready the finished product of the underground factory bursts through into consciousness. The condition of sudden conversion, then, is the possession of a large and active sub-consciousness, together with a leaking margin which admits invasions of the powers of the subliminal realm. The subject of the gradual experience is one whose conscious field has a tough margin and a relatively small and inactive sub-conscious region. In such a subject conversion, if it occurs, must be gradual, and resemble any other growth into new habits.

Conversion, then, is explicable in terms of psychology; does this discount its worth? James says no! Origin never decides the worth of anything; if the fruits are good, that is all that matters. What are these fruits? James finds

four things at least attained by conversion : a new level of spiritual vitality, things formerly impossible become possible, new endurances are born, and the personality is transformed. James's analysis of the conversion experience yields the following content : the sense of moral bankruptcy and extreme melancholy ; the sense of a higher control at the time of crisis ; the achievement of moral unity ; and the consequent joyous conviction that all is well.[1] In this affective experience, loss of worry, new insight, objective change in the physical world, and ecstasy are distinguishable elements.

In Lectures XI., XII., XIII., XIV., XV., James makes a penetrating analysis of the saintly character and its value, and concludes that religion in spite of all its blunders and excesses occupies a supreme place in human history. James affirms, that the best fruits of the religious life are the best things history has to show. Saintly character, he says, may be defined as the character for which spiritual emotions are the habitual centre of personal energy.

James raises the question, What is the value of that which religion adds to human life ? He says, when judging religion we ought to remember that most of the evils charged to the religious spirit should be charged to the ecclesiastical spirit. The only charge that can be substantiated against religion is fanaticism. All the virtues of the saintly character may be carried to extremes, but this does not discount their worth for the world. James estimates the value of the religious character in these words : " Men with interior resources of strength, with absolute purity of life and motive, with a great all-embracing love and divine patience, and with self-severity are the men the world cannot do without." Saints have real sociological value. They are the leaven of righteousness in society. The saintly group of qualities are economically indispensable to the world's welfare. Finally, James concludes, that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint's magic gift to mankind.

James maintains the proposition that personal religious experience has its centre in mystical states of consciousness. The states are real and their importance is great. The differentia of mystical states are four in number—

[1] Cf. Starbuck, *op. cit.* p. 83.

namely, ineffability, a noetic quality, transiency, and passivity. There may be non-religious forms of the mystic state induced by certain aspects of nature, or by alcohol and drugs. James says nitrous oxide stimulates the mystical consciousness to an extraordinary degree. Religious mystic consciousness has been systematically cultivated by Hindus, Buddhists, Mohammedans, and Christians. Mystical experiences are as varied as the idiosyncrasies of men. During some of these mystical states the intellect and sense swoon away. The fruits of the mystical states are sometimes stupefaction, sometimes over-abstraction from affairs of practical life, and sometimes the energizing of the whole man. James holds, the non-admirable traits in the lives of the mystics are not due to their being mystics, but to the fact that their mysticism was annexed to a weak character and a poor intellect. Theoretically the mystic is a pantheistic monist. The mystic becomes one with the absolute. Do mystical states of consciousness furnish evidence for the truth of the supernatural? James's answer is, mystical states have absolute subjective authority, but have no such authority over those who have not had the mystical experience. James concludes, the mystic is invulnerable, and must be left with his creed; he offers us an hypothesis we may ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot upset.

James definitely breaks with philosophy and theology; neither, he holds, can guarantee the objective truth of man's religious experience. As a matter of fact, dogmatic theology has never been objectively convincing. At best it can only find arguments for convictions which our mystical intuitions have already fixed. Philosophical theology, then, can do little to establish God's existence, and less to establish His attributes. The principle of pragmatism when applied to God's metaphysical attributes reveals them to be utterly destitute of intelligibility. They do not matter for life and conduct. Our religious faith, then, must do without the backing of dogmatic theology.

Further, James asserts, the philosophy of modern idealism can do no better. It is only a very fine description in philosophic terms of the religious experience of the mystic. James's conclusion is, that the attempt on the part of purely intellectual processes to demonstrate

the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is hopeless. Dogmatic theology and philosophy are of no use to religion in their present state. They must become metamorphosed into a science of religions if they are to become of utility in the service of religion.

In Lecture XIX., James says that in the last analysis we must test religion by empirical philosophy. In a previous lecture James had implied that actual religious experiences bring their own verification of reality, they are self-authenticating. Here he says, the uses of religion to the individual who has it and the value of this individual to the world are the best arguments for its truth. The test is then pragmatic, the true is that which works well on the whole. Immediately James goes on to say, religion stands or falls by the genuineness of prayer. If nothing happens through prayer, religion is a delusion. The subjective influence of prayer is not enough. Prayer must liberate energy which operates in both subjective and objective relationships. James believes that prayer does release spiritual energy which becomes active in the phenomenal world.

James goes on to say, manifestations of the religious life usually connect up with the sub-conscious mental life. Inspiration is due to incursions from the sub-conscious beyond. The phenomena of revelation, religious mysticism, the striking unifications of discordant selves, and the extravagances to be met with in the saints of history all have to do with the region of the sub-conscious. In religious persons, affirms James, the door into this region seems unusually wide open. Experiences making their entrance through that door have shaped religious history.

In his concluding lecture James presents us with certain of his conclusions. He lays down the proposition that when we deal with private and personal phenomena we are dealing with realities. Positive science deals with symbols of reality only. The sense of a self occupying a certain attitude to a felt or thought object in its field of consciousness is a tremendous fact. This fact, as felt or thought, equals reality for us. Religion has contact with this kind of absolute reality, and therefore must play an eternal part in history. The psychological phenomena of

religion have supreme biological worth. The faith state is one of the forces by which men live.

All religious creeds give a uniform deliverance consisting of two parts. First, there is the uneasiness, and a feeling of something wrong about us as we naturally stand; and second, there is a solution, in the sense that we are saved from this wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.

What is the objective truth of the content of these subjective deliverances? The answer is to be found, says James, by inquiring what is that higher life which seems to connect with the portion of the higher life in us in religious experience? James now advances his hypothesis or over-belief that this higher power is a power beyond our sub-conscious mind, but impinging upon it. The further limits of our being plunge into another dimension of existence, name it the mystical, or supernatural region, or what you will. This unseen region produces effects in this phenomenal world. When men commune with it, work is done upon their finite personalities.

Now, argues James, that which produces effects within another reality must be a reality itself; we ought not, therefore, to call the mystical or unseen world unreal. The Christian term for this enveloping reality is God. God produces real effects in the phenomenal world through the instrumentality of human personalities who connect up with the unseen world, and allow God to pour His life into their veins.

Here, says James, "we have, in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience, which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes."

James's precise attitude to the transcendental region is indicated in the following diagram. First, there is the region of conscious experience. Second, there is the region of the sub-conscious where heterogeneous psychic elements abound. Here are the potentialities of snake and seraph. Third, there is the region of the transcendent from which religious experiences come. This region contains God, The Absolute, or Reality, as thought of in the pluralistic theory of James.

From this mystical or supernatural region saving experiences come into the conscious life through a sluice in the sub-conscious which impinges on the transcendental



FIGURE SHOWING JAMES'S DOCTRINE OF THE SLUICE IN THE SUB-CONSCIOUS, WHICH ADMITS INCURSIONS FROM THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALM.

region. It is the postulating of the existence of the realm of over-beliefs, this unseen spiritual region, and the affirmation of the existence of this sluice that differentiates James from the empirical psychologists.

CRITIQUE

The author of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was, in Professor Stanley Hall's words, " the most brilliant littérateur and stylist in philosophy since Schopenhauer." [1]

[1] Hall, Stanley, *Adolescence*, vol. ii. p. 292.

Any one who has read James's enthralling book will not deem this eulogy too extravagant. *The Varieties* is a piece of seductive writing, which for sheer witchery is incomparable in the literature of religious psychology. When, however, we are able to break the spell which the author's genius casts over us, and sit down in a cool hour, certain grave defects become apparent.

One of the most obvious of these is, that the whole of the argument of this important work is based on exceptions. This is the fundamental defect of James's great book.[1] James appears to pass by the normal religious life in order to treat of the religious experiences of extraordinary persons who have figured in religious history. One rises from the perusal of this fascinating volume with the impression that none other than the extremely vicious or the extremely neurotic can have a religious experience which is worth notice. All James's varieties of religious experience and types of conversion have either bottomed the abyss of vicious degradation or have been morbid psychopaths in their psychological make-up. Stanley Hall asserts, that "many, if not the most, of these experiences are the yellow literature of religious psychology," and that some of James's cases are positively "teratological."[2] These strictures are perhaps too harsh, but James's work certainly lends itself to such criticism, for *The Varieties* is entirely based on the religious experiences of extraordinary religious subjects.

James attempts to evaluate religion by taking as his standard extreme cases in religious history. He never seems to differentiate the typical from the aberrational, and exceptional cases are conceived as characteristic of the religious life.[3] Is this a sound procedure? Let us take an analogy from the realm of Art. There are fanatical persons in the artistic world who have delighted to violate the received canons of Art. These persons depict figures on canvas as a multiplicity of cubes, as wheeling masses of pigment, or as a complex of vortices. There are three types of these fanatics—the futurists, the cubists, and the vorticists. Now if we desired a right conception of Art

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*; see footnote, p. 34.
[2] Hall, Stanley, *Adolescence*, vol. ii. p. 293.
[3] James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 6, 45, 50, 480.

in general, would we go to these freaks for our standard ? If freaks are not to be considered as normative in art, can they be regarded as normative in religion ? [1]

It is true, James reiterates, that he has deliberately taken the extreme religious type as yielding the profounder information. At the very outset he lays down the principle that for profitable study we must seek out the abnormal type of religious temperament for whom religion exists as an acute fever. James consistently adheres to this principle throughout. Although he admits that such persons are usually psychopaths. We may concede with James that the psychopathic temperament has certain advantages over the prosaic mentality, but with Stanley Hall we would add, these advantages " are at least only literary." [2] It is notorious that these psychopathic subjects of the religious life who have occupied a prominent place in religious history had also a passion for autobiography. Such documents are of immense psychological value, but they need to be critically examined in the light of the fact that a great deal of literary genius mingles with their piety. On the whole, Jonathan Edwards seems to be in possession of a sounder principle of procedure, which he lays down in his great *Treatise on the Religious Affections*, namely, " the way to learn the true nature of anything, is to go where that thing is to be found in its purity." [3] James's principle of procedure is scarcely wise, for review of normal form and function ought always to precede the study of disease. James professes to be dealing with religious experience as a whole, therefore the extraordinary religious experiences of psychopathic subjects cannot be legitimately taken as the criteria of religious experience in general.

Professor James seems to be perfectly cognizant of the fact, that normal religious life is other than that of the exceptional types with which he is so fascinated. Instead of going to the subject of the normal religious life to study religious experience there, James holds that by removing with his scalpel the extravagances of the extreme subject, by cutting off an abnormality here and a pathological

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Religion of a Mature Mind*, pp. 232–233.
[2] Hall, Stanley, *Adolescence*, vol. ii. p. 293.
[3] Edwards, Jonathan, *Collected Works*, vol. i. p. 242. London, 1834.

feature there, what is left will be the normal religious experience. This is how James gets at the religion of the average man. This is a highly artificial and psychologically unsound procedure. James therefore never deals justly with the normal religious life. He seems to ignore all across the supreme fact, that religion is a world-wide phenomenon, and that it is not the possession of a few psychopathic monopolists. James's picture of religious experience is out of perspective; he paints in morbid growths with a broad brush, and presents us with what is really a caricature of the religious life.

In *The Varieties* James asserts that religion stands or falls by the genuineness of prayer. The effects of prayer are final proofs of God's existence, and that spiritual agencies break into the natural order. If prayer be not effective then religion is delusion. These effects may be subjective only, but something must actually be effected by prayer which is impossible by other means. Religious experience, however, only warrants us in saying that the ideal power with which we feel ourselves in contact in prayer is "something larger than ourselves." [1] Now this somewhat tame and even feeble conclusion is disappointing to readers of James's *Principles*. James is clearly out to establish empirically a transcendental scheme of things. This statement of the case does not seem to be as strong as James might have made it. The religious consciousness and prayer life really demand much more than the vague "something larger than ourselves" of which he speaks in *The Varieties*.

In his *Principles of Psychology*, James finds proof of God not as in *The Varieties* in the subjective influences of prayer, but in the incessant urge to pray. Here the reason men pray is not because they experience subjective effects, but because they must. James discovers here that self-consciousness necessarily involves a reference to "the highest possible judging companion," and he says, "This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the Great Companion." James asserts here that the impulse to pray is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the innermost social self of man "can find its only Adequate Socius in an ideal world." [2]

[1] James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, see pp. 405, 400, 523
[2] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 315, 310.

This appeals to us as being a more powerful forthsetting of what the religious impulse really demands.

In his lecture on the subject of Mysticism, James asserts categorically "that personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness." This certainly denies religious experience to a vast multitude of men of all religions, Christian and other than Christian, whose commerce with Deity is objective and external rather than mystical. This non-mystical type of religion is more usual, and certainly as influential in the religious affairs of men as the mystical type. In the Old Testament we have represented a fundamental type of religious experience which stands over against the mystical. This is the prophetic type of religious experience. In the mystical experience man is merged with God, but in the prophetic experience man retains his own individuality, and his transactions with God have the marks of externality. This supremely important type of religious experience which affirms personality and distinction between man and God, and which leans on history, is ignored by James. For the Hebrew prophets and their modern representatives there is no fusion of God and man as in mysticism. The sovereignty of Him who inhabiteth eternity occupies a towering place in their thoughts. With the Hebrew prophets God remains beyond and outside man as the judge of all the earth, the rewarder of the righteous, and the punisher of the wicked. Man can maintain with this Majestic Maker objective relations only.[1] The type of religious life, then, for which the Old Testament prophets stand—the type represented in modern times by Calvin, and by John Knox, that lineal descendant of the Hebrew prophets, by Jonathan Edwards, by Ritschl, Herrmann, Kaftan, and a host of other pivotal men in religious history—is cut out of *The Varieties*.

Not only is this supremely important prophetic type of religious experience ignored by James, but he also fails to take account of several other important varieties. The melancholic temperament gets more than its share of attention. The religious experience of the subject of active temperament with the constructive instinct well

[1] Leuba, James H., "James's Interpretation of Religious Experience," *International Journ. Ethics*, vol. xiv. (1903), p. 325.

developed, and to whom the call, "Come in and help us to build the Kingdom of God," makes a specially powerful appeal, finds no place.[1]

The religious experience of the intellectual type, of whom George John Romanes may be taken as a typical modern representative, ought to find a place among the varieties of religious experience.[2] This type of religious experience, of which Romanes is a classic example, is finely expressed by Tennyson in the lines:

> "He fought his doubts and gathered strength,
> He would not make his judgment blind;
> He faced the spectres of the mind and laid them.
> Thus at length he found a stronger faith his own,
> And power was with him."

Justice has never yet been done to this intellectual type of religious experience by either psychologists of religion or by the Christian Church. For centuries the Church has sacrificed the interests of those who want to know, and to do, in the interests of those who want to feel. Surely this type, eager to seek truth, and wanting light as well as heat—this the noblest type of all—deserves consideration in a treatise purporting to deal with the varieties of religious experience? "We should lapse into spiritual barbarism were this type to fail in representatives."[3]

Strangely enough, though James omits these important types he includes among his types of religious experience that of a subject whose religious experiences are as varied and rich as those of a well-nourished gorilla.[4] Here is a man who affirms religion means nothing to him. God, Heaven, the Angels, are so much mystic bosh, and there is no agency of the supernatural. In spite of this blatant confession, James includes this case among his varieties, and says the writer's state of mind may by courtesy be called a religion. Is not this carrying courtesy too far?

In connection with the instances of conversion phenomena recorded by James, the majority of the cases cited took place about eighty years ago.[5] This time factor is important, because at this period the thought of the wrath

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 244.
[2] Romanes, G. J., *Thoughts on Religion*, see pp. 28 and 184.
[3] Höffding, H., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 125.
[4] James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 92.
[5] James, W., *op. cit.* pp. 189, 223, 220, 171, 196, 157, 159, 217, 212.

of a terrible God and the fear of a literal hell were tremendous co-operant factors in bringing on the crisis of conversion. Now it is quite evident that at the present day the terrible sanctions of religion, so effectively wielded by the evangelist of an earlier period, have lost their potency. Fear and flight are no longer the results when the evangelist paints pictures of the ceaseless furnace or shows "lime-light views of hell." Instead, there is simply a scornful smile for the idea, and a feeling of pity for the orator. In view of this fact it is significant that James's instances of the conversion experience are nearly all of ancient date. The great change which has taken place in psychological climate during the last half-century must considerably qualify any argument based on ancient instances. The conversion complex of to-day will be different from that of a hundred years ago. More allowance should be made for change in psychological climate.

We are presented in James's book with an interesting analysis of the varieties of religious experience as a preliminary operation to the discovery of their value for human life by purely empirical standards. It will be conceded that James's description of the uses of religion is a powerful forthsetting of the case for the truth of the value of religion. But how is it when James addresses himself to the demonstration of the truth of that which he has so conclusively shown to be precious in human life? Here James is most disappointing to the theistic reader. He says, the feeling of reality given in religious experience is presumptive evidence of its truth. Again he affirms, religious experiences bring their own verification with them, they are self-authenticating. Anon he says, the uses of religion are the best evidences for its truth. We are, therefore, led to anticipate that somehow James is going to make the value of religion prove the fact of its truth, but our anticipations are not realized. For James goes on to say, religion must stand or fall by the persuasion that effects do occur through prayer in the subjective life, and in the objective order, which would not take place without it. Here, then, in conversion phenomena, the uses of religion, the subjective effects of prayer, and in the metaphysical deliverances of the mystical consciousness, we have evidence that a spiritual world is in contact with the natural world, and

that higher spiritual agencies penetrate the human spirit.

Now observe how James, the psychologist, destroys the elaborate structure which James, the transcendentalist, has lovingly fashioned. Everything he has given with one hand he takes back with the other. More convincingly, perhaps, than any other psychologist, because of his known genuine sympathy with a transcendental explanation, James shows that all the phenomena of religious experience can be accounted for by purely psychological processes and the laws of the science of psychology.

James definitely says, that in his opinion the most important step forward psychology has taken was in 1886, when it discovered a vast extra-marginal field outside of the primary consciousness altogether with a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings of its own. The most important consequence of this fact is that the ordinary field of consciousness is liable to invasions from it in the form of unaccountable impulses, obsessions, and hallucinations. This realm of the sub-conscious " is obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent, and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. It contains all our momentary inactive memories, and it harbours the springs of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations, come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor ; our life in hypnotic and hypnoid conditions if we are subjects to such conditions ; our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects ; our supra-normal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion." [1]

Could James be more explicit and inclusive ? He shows conclusively that sudden moral transformations, startling conversions, the subjective effects of prayer, and mystical phenomena do not require a superhuman origin ;

[1] James, W., *op. cit.* pp. 483–484.

all these religious phenomena are completely covered by the hypothesis of the sub-conscious.

Now it seems to be obvious from a perusal of James's book, that his purpose in writing *The Varieties* was to attempt to discover in the facts of religious experience an empirical warrant for the transcendental hypothesis. But can James get beyond human personality on his own premises? Can the existence of the region of " over-beliefs " be justly inferred from the data James places before us? Does not James show with cumulative force that the existence of the sub-conscious with its angelic and demoniac powers which explode under favourable conditions into conscious experience is a sufficient explanation of the facts of religious consciousness? James does not really go beyond the limits of human personality; on his own showing all can be explicated in terms of the natural order.[1] James gives us no grounds for holding that our subjective religious activities are the work of God in us, other than our experience that it is so. He has conclusively shown that the transcendental hypothesis is superfluous in this connection. If James's purpose was to establish the existence of the transcendental region where God, The Absolute, and the Pluralistic Spiritual Agencies dwell (on the empirical grounds recognized by science), then clearly he has not made out his case. As a matter of fact, James's transcendental hypothesis is just a postulate of faith; it is in his own terminology simply an " over-belief." The scant comfort left to the friends of religion is simply that a great psychologist pre-eminent in his department chooses to make his personal venture on the hypothesis of a spiritual order impinging on the natural order, and infiltrating into this phenomenal world by means of the sub-conscious.

In spite of these issues which challenge criticism and controversy, one cannot pass from this great book without recognizing that here we have a unique contribution to Religious Psychology. It is the work of a genius, and every page bears the imprint of the personality of the author. The book coruscates from commencement to conclusion. *The Varieties* is replete with penetrating insights and analyses. The following instances may be specially

[1] Leuba, J. H., *The Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 271.

mentioned as illustrative of this statement: The analysis of the healthy-minded genus into two species, those who possess the involuntary natural happy way of looking at life, as exemplified by the Greeks and Romans, and a second species who systematically disregard the unpleasant in life as a deliberate policy; the clear delineation of the dominant ideas and driving forces of New Thought and Mind Cure movements; the definition of the saintly type of character, and the discussion of its features; the evaluation of the psychological levels of asceticism, and the different ation of ts varieties; the timely insistence on the need of iron in the blood of the present generation; the necessity of asceticism in modern life; the analysis of mysticism, and the investigation of mystical experiences induced by drugs and anæsthetics; the insistence on the full rights and primacy of feeling, intuition, and concrete personal experience as against the usurper claims of reason and merely rational constructions. Coruscations like these gleam out of every chapter. Finally, James's distinctive contribution to the psychology of religion is his powerful forthsetting of the value of religion for human life.

APPENDIX

CLASSIFICATION OF JAMES'S TYPES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

James's book is a brilliant but unsystematic treatment of the religious life. The varieties of religious experience are presented in any order, or in no order. The attempt is here made to isolate and classify the numerous types which are treated by James with irritating desultoriness.

First of all, religious persons are divided into two main classes:

1. The Healthy-Minded, of which there are three species:
   - (1) The Pathological Optimist.
   - (2) The Involuntary Happy Person.
   - (3) The Voluntary Systematic Optimist.
2. The Morbid-Minded, of which there are two species:
   - (1) The Absolute Born Pessimist.
   - (2) The Merely Serious-Minded.

Two fundamental types of religious experience correspond with these two great temperamental classes set out above, namely:

1. The "once-born" experience.
2. The "twice-born" experience.

These experiences are differentiated from each other by the presence or absence of a crisis. The "once-born" subjects have no

startling crisis in their experience, and invariably belong to the Healthy-Minded class. The "twice-born" have a cataclysm in their interior life, and generally belong to the Morbid-Minded class. These two fundamental types break up into the numerous varieties, which are scattered through the book.

Analysis reduces the varieties of religious experience in James's book to three great classes, which break up into many species; these are:

I. The Conversion Experience.
II. The Healthy-Minded Experience.
III. The Mystical Experience.

I

The typical Conversion experience yields the following general content:

1. Antecedent melancholy. (James accentuates this.)
2. A feeling of moral bankruptcy.
3. An experience of crisis, and a sense of higher control.
4. The achievement of moral unity.

The typical post-Conversion results are:

1. Loss of worry.
2. Intense happiness.
3. Illumination.
4. All things become new.

There are three fundamental types of Conversion experience:

1. The Volitional type, where the subject struggles for the experience, and the will is at tension until relief comes; pp. 201, 207.
2. The Self-surrender type, where the subject at first consciously wills to possess the experience but finds that the harder he struggles the less he is able to secure it. Then when it comes home to him that conscious volitional effort spells failure, or he becomes too exhausted to struggle any more, he relaxes. Immediately a crisis occurs, and relief comes, and there is left a feeling of cleansing, peace, and power; p. 218.
3. The Spontaneous Awakening type, where the subject feels that he does nothing, but is simply wrought upon by the Spirit of God. Here the experience just comes; pp. 212, 224.

Many of the varieties of religious experience in James's book are related to one or other of these three types of conversion, either as antecedents, concomitants, or results.

1. Antecedent Experiences:
   (1) The Anhedonia experience, where the dominant characteristic is total incapacity for joyous feeling. There is no getting gradually better here, it must be new birth or nothing; pp. 146–155.

(2) The Prometheus experience, where the antecedent melancholy takes the form of positive torment. There is a diseased sense of guilt and morbid introspection. Envy of the placid beasts is a remarkable feature of this experience ; pp. 159, 186.

(3) The Claustrophobia experience, where the dominant emotion is a panic fear of the universe ; p. 160.

2. Concomitant Experiences :
   (1) The Vocal experience, where conversion is accompanied by voices.
   (2) The Vision experience.
   (3) The Motor experience, *e.g.* bodily movements, convulsions, etc.
   (4) The Pyrotechnic experience, where conversion is accompanied by luminous phenomena, *e.g.* photisms.
   (5) The Chromatic experience ; p. 253.

3. Post-Conversion Experiences :
   (1) The Dionysiac experience, where conversion is followed by extravagant transports of joy ; pp. 254, 256.
   (2) The Panoramic experience, where the world appears to have undergone objective change, even the animals seem different ; p. 248.

II

The second great variety is the Healthy-Minded type of religious experience. This is the experience of the "once-born" type. The general content of this experience is :

1. No intense feeling of vileness or guilt.
2. God is thought of as love rather than as awful Holiness and Majesty.
3. There is a feeling of being already one with the Eternal without any need of an abrupt conversion.
4. There is present a general feeling of calm trust in the Providence of God.

James's Healthy-Minded type falls before analysis into two main classes :

1. The definite type, which is the product of the great national Churches, and of religious education.
2. And the large and important class, which is leavened by Christian principles, and practically influenced by the same.

III

The third great type of religious experience is the Mystical.
The typical Mystic experience has four characteristics, namely:

1. Ineffability.
2. Noetic quality.
3. Transiency.
4. Passivity; pp. 380–381.

There are several varieties of the Mystical experience:

1. The Halcyon complex, where the chief element in consciousness is the experience of being enveloped in the great Being of God. There is an exquisite feeling of serenity and security; p. 276.
2. The Amatory complex, the content of which has three features:
   (1) Intense devotional feeling.
   (2) Great erotic emotion, directed into religious channels.
   (3) Lover-like transactions with Deity; pp. 345, 347.
3. The Cataleptic experience, characterized by three things, namely:
   (1) Great religious sensibility.
   (2) Feeble intellectual outlook.
   (3) Frequent swoonings; p. 344.

TABLE SHOWING JAMES'S VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I. The Conversion Experience:
   1. The Volitional type.
   2. The Self-surrender type.
   3. The Spontaneous Awakening type.

II. Experiences Antecedent to Conversion:
   1. The Anhedonia experience.
   2. The Prometheus experience.
   3. The Claustrophobia experience.

III. Concomitant Experiences:
   1. The Vocal experience.
   2. The Vision experience.
   3. The Motor experience.
   4. The Pyrotechnic experience.
   5. The Chromatic experience.

IV. Post-Conversion Experiences:
   1. The Dionysiac experience.
   2. The Panoramic experience.

V. The Healthy-Minded Experience :
   1. The type produced by religious education and the great national Churches.
   2. The merely leavened class influenced by Christian principles.

VI. The Mystic Experience :
   1. The Halcyon complex.
   2. The Amatory complex.
   3. The Cataleptic experience.

CHAPTER VI

"The Psychology of Religious Belief,"[1] *by* James Bissett Pratt

EXPOSITION

Professor Pratt's most interesting book makes a special contribution to the psychology of religious belief. The able author discusses his subject under three heads—namely, primitive credulity, intellectual belief, and emotional belief.

1. *The Psychology of Religious Belief in General*

At the very outset, Pratt breaks with the traditional tripartite division of psychic life into knowing, feeling, and willing. Pratt maintains, the will is not an element at all but a psychic compound, and that psychic material when analysed will yield sensation, ideation, and feeling only.

In place of this conventional threefold distinction, Pratt proposes a bipartite one. He makes the distinction between the centre and fringe of consciousness well-nigh absolute. According to this author, the reasoned results of thought belong to the centre, while the non-rational intuitional products of feeling belong to the fringe. It is important to observe here, that Pratt makes the distinction between the focal experiences and the marginal experiences one of kind, whereas the majority of psychologists make the distinction one of degree of attention only.

Pratt's classification of the mental life then is twofold: there is a central part of consciousness which has to do with sensation and ideation; and a peripheral part, which has to do with feeling, emotions, instincts, intuitions, our inborn loves and hates, etc. This feeling fringe links us to

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief* (1907), Macmillan Co.

our past and to our ancestors. With Pratt, this marginal region is the basal region, his emphasis throughout is upon the vital importance of the instinctive life as manifested in this feeling background, especially in connection with the religious consciousness. Pratt tells us here, that his contention is, that the whole man must be trusted as against any small portion of his nature, such as reason or perception.

According to this psychologist, three distinct bases may be discerned as underlying all belief: these are primitive credulity, reasoned belief, and emotional belief. Pratt includes under the term "belief" reality feeling, and defines belief as "the mental attitude of assent to the reality of a given object."

Primitive credulity, in Pratt's vocabulary, stands for naive acceptance of the given. Intellectual belief is that which is based on reasoning of some sort. Pratt brings belief on authority under this head, for here we believe because we have reasons for relying on the knowledge of experts.

Emotional belief is distinguished from the kinds already enumerated in that it gets its peculiar strength from the feeling background. In emotional belief we believe in things because we need them; the desired object may not indeed be present, but the organism insists that it shall exist somewhere. This kind of belief may and does defy argument.

These three species of belief considered in connection with man's faith in the Divine have, according to our author, given rise to the religion of primitive credulity, the religion of thought, and the religion of feeling.

2. *Historical*

I

Pratt affirms, that primitive credulity may be discerned in all religions, but more especially in the childlike faith of primitive peoples. It nevers enters the head of the unsophisticated savage to doubt the oral traditions concerning spirits and gods, or the reality of what he sees when awake, or in his dreams. In the early stages of Animism this primitive credulity is all the faith there is.

But, says Pratt, in the later stages of Animism there is evidence of the religion of thought. The transformation that takes place in the nature of the gods of primitive man is one proof of this. The gods are conceived of as withdrawing from the strange stone, the tree, and the animal, and become mobile spirits who use these objects as their manifestations. The old sense-gods pass away, and gods who can be conceived only, displace the gods who could be perceived. All this, according to Pratt, was the result of the application of reason. Spirit activity was the intellectual concept which explained every striking event and mystery for primitive man.

Primitive man believed in the gods because the elder men taught him to do so; but these are the experts in the matter, hence it is reasonable to believe on their authority.

Again, Pratt points out that when the mind of primitive man asks causal questions, we have the beginnings of generalization and inferential thought. The conclusion of this intellectual process is that great gods have made all things. Here, then, in the early history of the race, it is supposed, we have manifestations of the religion of thought.

Pratt now adduces his evidence for the religion of feeling. He maintains that at this primitive animistic stage emotional expressions of the religious life verge on the abnormal, as illustrated in the ravings of the shaman. At this low stage of human culture uncontrolled feeling dominates the situation. This is seen in the religious dances which at once express emotion and arouse frenzy. The participant is roused not only by the dance itself but by the contagious excitement of the crowd, and the feeling thus generated nucleates about the thought of the god or gods in whose honour the dance is performed. The direct consequence of all this is, that the frenzied participants feel that they are in communication with the god or gods.

Apart from this public excitement in which all alike share, there are phenomena experienced by individuals only, without the contagion of a crowd. These remarkable individuals feel the emotional background of their minds boiling up, and there is cast upon the shore of their consciousness products which they feel are not of their own making; moreover, their bodies also seem to be shaken by a power which is not theirs. All this is interpreted as

the possession of a man's mind and body by a spirit. Those only with a certain nervous make-up are prone to this possession, and such persons are reverenced at a low stage of human culture. This proneness to spirit possession is accentuated by the use of austerities and narcotics. In the higher religions, says Pratt, possession is conceived of as not so much due to spirits as to gods, and in the religion of the Hebrews, to Jehovah. Shamanistic phenomena continue even into civilization.

Pratt emphasizes the fact that he who has once had this experience of possession is absolutely convinced he has been in contact with the spirit world. Here we come on Pratt's characteristic insistence, namely, that the religion of feeling is invulnerable.

II

Passing from primitive religion, Pratt next traces the development of religious belief through these three stages in the religion of India. Primitive credulity, he holds, is essentially the same in all religions. Pratt finds that ancestral tradition is a dominant force in the popular religion of the Hindoos. He points to the fact that in the *Rig-Veda* the forces of nature are personified, and religious belief is based on the fact that one has been so taught, and further can see the gods, the sky, the sun, and the dawn, with one's own eyes.

But gradually the religion of understanding supplanted the religion of primitive credulity in India. In addition to the physical wind which can be felt and heard, there grew up the idea of the god of the wind who can neither be seen nor heard with the senses. The unifying tendency of the reason began to seek for the one power back of all phenomena, and as a first result of the application of reason many of the gods of sense perception were wiped out of existence.

Pratt holds that the constitution of the human mind enables us to predict that the goal of a religion of thought will be a monism of some kind, for reason is driven by its inherent nature to seek an explanation of the particulars of experience, and, further, it demands a single ultimate explanation. Now our author detects this monistic tendency in the religious thought of India.

He traces the development of the religion of thought from its faint beginnings in the *Rig-Veda* to its highly metaphysical outcome in the absolute idealism of the *Upanishads*. Pratt points to the fact that the early Scriptures are polytheistic, with a tendency towards the formation of a pantheon with one supreme god. He indicates that the leaders of religious thought became dissatisfied with a plurality of gods, and the more philosophically-minded began to think of the gods as manifestations of a single fundamental unity. This monistic speculation issued in the conception embodied in the *Upanishads*, where all things, men and gods, are merged in the Absolute; here Brahman alone is real, and all that exists is Brahman. Here, then, according to Pratt, we have a conception of God, the product of pure reason, which ignores the actual facts of life's experience and all moral considerations as it cleaves its way to its unitary goal.

Pratt draws our attention to the significant fact that throughout all this period of monistic speculation the masses clave to polytheism. Authority, habit, feeling, and the will all led to a clinging to the old gods.

Now, as Pratt clearly points out, materialistic pantheism logically issues in atheism. This actually occurred in India; an atheistic Samkhya philosophy grew up which became the matrix of the Yoga movement, and Buddhism sprang from the Yoga movement. This atheistic philosophy failed to grip the masses. According to Pratt the problem Buddha sets himself to solve was how to make this philosophy into a religion.

Buddha failed to solve this problem. He proclaimed that man must work out his own salvation by means of intellectual knowledge and the strict practice of virtue. Buddha's personality gave his atheistic philosophy a tinge of warmth in his own lifetime, which attracted a few of his contemporaries, but the people have never been Buddhists. The deification of Buddha, Pratt affirms, shows the futility of an atheistic religion. Atheistic Buddhism and Pantheistic Brahmanism cannot become real religion; both strikingly illustrate the fact of the insufficiency of reason alone as a basis of religious belief.

Pratt asserts, just as primitive credulity had to give way before the march of reason, so the religion of thought

had to give way to the religion of feeling. Our attention is drawn to the fact that in the *Vedas* we have the thought of getting supernatural power, illumination, and ecstasy as the result of ascetic practices. Traces of longing for the personal approval of the Deity and a yearning for closer intimacy with the Divine may be discerned in the Vedic hymns, but this religion of feeling gets its completest expression in the *Upanishads*. Here, says Pratt, the thought is that of mystical union with Brahman. This bliss of Brahman, this consciousness of identity with the Eternal, is a religious experience of great emotional intensity and is not to be gained by mere intellectual assent to a proposition; it is a thing of the heart, not of the understanding.

Pratt describes the Hindoo Mystic seeking by the inhibition of the senses, by devices such as the contemplation of a single idea and the management of the breath, to provide favourable conditions for the coming of this supreme religious experience. These practices resulted in the narrowing and unifying of his consciousness and in the intensification of a central emotion. The final result was the attainment of the state of ecstasy, which, when prolonged, issued in a state of unconsciousness.

A heavy accent is placed on the fact that all these experiences of the Hindoo mystic arise in the vast feeling fringe of man's mental life. Here, again, we have this author's reiterated insistence on the fact that experiences arising in this fringe region are self-authenticating; he says, he who has once experienced union with Brahman can no more doubt the reality of Brahman than his own existence.

III

Pratt now proceeds to trace the development of the credulous, the rational, and the emotional factors in the religion of Israel. He adduces the unquestioning acceptance of tribal traditions, and the authority of the law on the part of the Hebrews, as evidence of the presence of the religion of primitive credulity. It is asserted that the religion of the early Hebrews made its appeal directly to the senses, and that at this stage their unreasoned traditional faith required sensuous props. Pratt instances here,

the holy places of Palestine, the Messeba, the Ashera, the Fetish Stone in the Ark, the Ephod, and the many images of Jehovah. Again attention is drawn to Israel's fetishistic view of Scripture, every syllable and letter of which had to be handed down intact, as illustrating the credulous stage of religious belief.

Pratt now makes the transition to the religion of thought. He indicates that the time came when the more advanced minds of the nation disengaged themselves from the sensuous props of the masses. The prophets began to teach that the worship of visible objects was treason to Yahweh.

As in the case of the religion of India, the application of thought to religion on the part of the Hebrews pronounced the doom of polytheism. The history of Hebrew thought with Pratt, is the history of the evolution of an ethical monotheism out of a crude polytheism. Pratt brings out clearly here the striking differences between the driving forces of Hebrew as contrasted with Hindoo thought.

He indicates that at first the concept of Yahweh was not ideally moral. He aptly says, Yahweh's holiness in primitive times was like electricity, a close approach was fatal, but as the Hebrew thought of righteousness developed, the concept of Yahweh became filled out with moral content. We are shown that the presupposition of all Hebrew reasoning was the moral righteousness of Yahweh, and so the problem of each generation was, given the righteousness of Yahweh, how to square politics and history with this tremendous fact.

Pratt finely brings out the fact that the Hebrew God, who was of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, could never become the Absolute of Hindoo speculation, who ignored all moral distinctions. The best thought of the Hebrew prophets was based on the moral category; this, according to Pratt, is why Hebrew thought never issued in the pantheistic position of Brahmanism, but arrived at the goal of ethical monotheism.

For this investigator, the beginnings of Hebrew prophecy illustrate the feeling phase in Israel's religion. In his opinion, the early prophets were men of neurotic, if not psychopathic, constitution who were subject to trances

and frenzies. The frenzy was interpreted as possession by the Spirit of Yahweh; this wild frenzy becomes more spiritualized as time goes on.

Pratt asserts that many of the convictions of the prophets are not to be accounted for by conscious reasoning; they are matters of religious feeling or intuition, and are sourced in the vast feeling background of the mental life. The declarations of the prophets come fully formed into their minds, bearing with them that sense of externality which James speaks of as characteristic of the products of the sub-conscious. According to Pratt, this consciousness of immediate inspiration brings a new meaning into religion. Yahweh now becomes the God not merely of the nation, but of the individual, and this sense of a personal, as distinct from a public or national, relation to God is made articulate in the Psalms.

The general conclusion is, that everywhere we may see the same three factors at work in the religion of a people. The credulous basis of belief crumbles before the advance of reason; but the reason can never give the certainty the religious mind desires; it may fashion elaborate conceptual constructs for religion, but these fail to satisfy; religion therefore turns for support to the instinctive and emotional region of human nature.

IV

In Pratt's view these three typical bases of religious belief may be found in all developed religions. Christianity is no exception, and with Pratt, as always, the emotional basis is the surest.

Three phases of the Christian religion are taken as illustrating these three bases of relief.

Primitive credulity is illustrated by the dominance of authority in the mediæval Church. The attitude of subservience to authority was, says Pratt, typical of the Middle Ages up to the time of the Reformation; the traditional teachings of the Church were accepted simply because they were presented. Authority was at once the basis of faith and the court of appeal, and if science and philosophy did not agree with theology they were *ipso facto* false. Reason, when used, was used to establish

ecclesiastical dogmas, not to scrutinize the teachings of the Church, nor to come to independent conclusions.

At the Reformation the authority of the Church was overthrown for a large portion of Christendom, but a new authority arose in the shape of a Book, instead of a Pope, and the war between authority and reason recommenced, reason being represented by the science of Biblical Criticism.

Pratt now makes the transition to the religion of feeling; the emotional factor, he says, may be clearly discerned in Christian Mysticism. Mysticism is defined as the experience of union with God, and an epistemological doctrine founded on this experience. The one doctrine of Mysticism is, that the human spirit can immediately apprehend Transcendent Reality independently of sense perception, or the processes of inferential thought.

The Mystic, says Pratt, deliberately attempts to get rid of discursive thought; he uses ascetic practices to free his mind from sense distractions; his whole field of consciousness is focalized on the idea of God; his self is put in the mood of passive waiting; then the ecstatic experience just comes. This mystic experience of union with God cannot be compelled, but passivity is a condition of attaining it. There is absolute assurance on the part of Mystics, that in their experience they have come into conscious connection with a larger life which surrounds their own and is continuous with it. Here, again, we observe Pratt's characteristic stress on the invulnerability of the religion of feeling; he says, the Mystic is absolutely convinced that he has been in communion with God, and his experiences remain inviolable when confronted with the objective realities of life; dreams and delusions cannot stand this test.

The intellectual factor is to be discerned in Deism, the cold religion of the understanding which was the product of eighteenth-century rationalism. Reason in this period was the final court of appeal in all matters of religion. In the eighteenth century it was supposed that the existence of God could be demonstrated by reason independently of revelation; the argument from revelation was valid enough, but it was held that it rested with reason to say what was, and what was not, revelation.

Pratt holds that this type of religious belief based on purely intellectual grounds has been badly hit by the Evolutionary Theory and the Higher Criticism. The Design argument, in his opinion, has been destroyed by Darwinianism, and the Causal argument has been killed by Kant's conception of an infinite regress of finite beings. Certainly the scientific notion of law and order remains, but he says, arguing back from this notion we cannot get the kind of God religion demands. Moreover, it is vain to look to the Philosophy of History for comfort, for it can prove any thesis we want to prove. If we studied history without theological bias, we could never arrive at belief in the kind of God religion portrays ; we could only logically argue to a limited Being baffled on every hand.

The conclusion is, therefore, that if we are ever to believe in the God within the shadow keeping watch above His own, we must get that belief from some source other than an inductive argument from the facts of Nature and History.

Pratt's discussion of belief in God based on rational grounds lands him in this dilemma, namely, the arguments the people can grasp are untenable, while the arguments which are tenable they cannot grasp. Pratt's opinion is, that the rational basis of religious belief in modern times is approaching collapse.

3. *The Present Status of Religious Belief*

Pratt discovered that his respondents fell before analysis into three main classes. Those who belonged to the first class believed in God on authority. The second class consisted of those whose religious belief rested on some sort of argument, good, bad, or indifferent. A third well-marked class consisted of those whose religious beliefs rested on volitional, emotional, instinctive, and intuitive grounds. The data collected by this psychologist points to the great preponderance of the affective experience over reason and authority, as the basis of the religious beliefs of our contemporaries.

Pratt's chapter on the value of God shows the actual significance which belief in God and the practice of prayer have for religious men and women in our own time. His

questionnaire yielded the information that God's metaphysical attributes have little significance for the majority of religious people, but that His personal relations with individuals matter much. The answers pointed to this unanimous conclusion, namely, "God is valued not as an explanation of things, but as an immediate help in the practical and emotional life."

As against Leuba, who asserts God is valued merely as a "Meat Purveyor," Pratt maintains that God is valued as an end in Himself rather than as a mere means to an end. Pratt discovered that it is not as a giver, but as a companion God is valued and sought; it is not His gifts, but Himself which the religious soul desires. This investigator found that the religious consciousness values prayer not primarily because of benefits to be received, but because it is assured by its means of coming into immediate social relationship with God. In so far as God is regarded pragmatically as a giver, it is of spiritual benefits: *e.g.* strength, insight, comfort, courage, and serenity.

In his concluding chapter Pratt presents us with his observations concerning the present status of religious belief. His outlook and adumbrations are rather gloomy. He notes the general reaction against uncritical acceptance of the authority of tradition in all fields of thought, and that the outstanding feature of the present age is revolt against authority. He tells us the religion based on primitive credulity and mere authority has ceased to play any influential part in the affairs of men. In Europe he sees nothing but hostility to religion, and in America indifference; men, he says, are seldom seen in church.

Moreover, the old intellectual arguments are no longer valid, and in any case reason is not a sufficient basis for religion. It may, of course, furnish a satisfying belief for the more philosophically minded, but an involved and subtle argument, which only a few of the most brilliant philosophers can appreciate, can never form a foundation for the faith of a people.

What, then, shall we say to these things? Pratt's opinion is that the only religious belief that can endure in these days, is that which is broad based on a private quasi-mystical experience, but he exclaims pessimistically, half the religious community are non-mystical. The impression

Pratt leaves us that religion is destined to become the possession of an esoteric circle of the mystically minded.

Be that as it may, Pratt is emphatic on the point that the religion of authority and of reason are both passing away, and that the one hope for the future lies in the religion of feeling.

In the last analysis Pratt holds that belief in God is not a theoretical matter but a vital matter; it is the religious man's reaction to the stimulus of the whole cosmos — it is an outcome of the needs and demands of the organism, not of the reason. Religious belief in these days must be based on emotional convictions which are instinctive and a matter of the whole psycho-physiological organism. Religion must take its stand on the region of the non-rational: instincts, intuitions, and feelings (here, according to Pratt, is the *τοῦ στῶ* of religion.

CRITIQUE

Professor Pratt's admirable book is most lucid in style, interesting in matter, and illuminating in treatment. No investigator of the American School has given more evidence of a sympathetic understanding of the religious life. This has been the outstanding feature of all Pratt's work in connection with the *Psychology of Religion*, and it especially characterizes his later and greater work, *The Religious Consciousness*.

In this his first book, Pratt deals with an aspect of the religious life to which his predecessors, Starbuck, Coe, and James, gave little heed. These earlier investigators gave themselves almost entirely to the study of the religious phenomena of Conversion and Mysticism. Pratt's special contribution is made to the psychology of religious belief.

In a work purporting to treat of the psychology of belief in general, and of religious belief in particular, would it be impertinent to suggest that the historical side of the book is rather fully elaborated, and has been developed at the expense of psychological analysis?

One of the interesting and controversial points in Pratt's book arises from his insistence on a distinction in kind between the marginal and focal regions of the mind. Here Pratt breaks with the most of his compeers. The dis-

tinction for the majority of psychologists between the central part of consciousness and the penumbral region is a distinction between degrees of attention. The same object may be in the region of hazy consciousness one minute and the object of eager attention the next; it is all a matter of attention. Pratt's absolute distinction in kind between the centre and fringe of consciousness cannot be held to be established.

For Psychology, the marginal region of consciousness is simply the region of dim awareness. Pratt puts more upon this fringe region than it can possibly bear. According to Pratt, this peripheral region links us to our past and to our ancestry; it is the storehouse of all our biologically innate dispositions, our inborn loves and hates, appetites, and instincts; it is the seat of our feelings and the emotional life. Now it is quite evident that Pratt makes this fringe region do duty for what modern psychology recognizes as the sub-conscious. We do not think Pratt's extension of his term to cover all the phenomena of the sub-conscious is legitimate. Further, such an extension introduces an unnecessary confusion into a field of the psychical life which is already complex by nature. Pratt is not justified in taking a term like the fringe region, or the marginal region, which has a quite definite connotation in the vocabulary of psychology, and using it to cover phenomena which psychologists have agreed to group under the concepts of the sub-conscious and the unconscious.[1] Pratt asserts that many of our most important desires spring from a region of our life which is not conscious at all. Now this cannot possibly be the fringe region or borderland of the field of consciousness as understood by psychology; it must be the sub-conscious region, which may be conceived as the continuation of Pratt's large feeling fringe of consciousness.

With Pratt's contention that the whole man must be trusted as against any small part of his nature such as reason, or sense perception, we are in full accord. But does not Pratt himself depart from this very excellent principle by placing an unduly heavy accent on the element of feeling in human life? There is clearly a tendency on Pratt's part to subordinate all other factors in man's

[1] Rivers, W. H. R., *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 9.

mental life to the element of feeling, and the impression is left that the emotional part of man's nature must be trusted as against the reason, or any other part of his nature.

Although Pratt is perfectly aware of the fact that the conscious life is actually a unity, and not divided into three or four elements or compounds, his treatment leaves the impression that his conceptual divisions are the actual divisions. The three kinds of belief of which this investigator treats, namely, credulous belief, reasoned belief, and emotional belief, are not neatly divided off from each other, but all three may and do co-exist in real life.

Pratt's mode of treatment of the historical religions leaves the impression of successive dynasties, the one rising on the ruins of the other. Primitive credulity crumbles before intellectual criticism and the relentless march of reason, next the dynasty of thought is swept away before the tidal wave of feeling. Pratt does not emphasize sufficiently the fact that these three phases of belief not only tend to displace each other, but that they actually run parallel one with another, and may actually coincide in the same social group, and even in the same individual.

Though we differ with Pratt on this question of distribution of accent, it must be conceded that he has been very successful in showing how these three phases of belief have been manifested in the historical religions of India, of Israel, and Christianity.

In the case of each of these religions, Pratt has clearly shown how credulity, thought, and feeling act and react upon each other. But we do not think Pratt is quite as convincing in his case for the presence of the religion of thought in Animism. At this early stage of human culture, Pratt is certainly more successful in indicating the presence of primitive credulity and the factor of emotion than that of thought.

In this book, belief is considered under three categories, namely, credulous belief, reasoned belief, and emotional belief. Now belief is never a matter merely of credulity, reason, or feeling; it is also a matter of will. Pratt does not here recognize sufficiently the tremendous part volitional belief plays in human life and religion. This will to believe he subsumes under the head of emotional belief.

but it is clearly conative, and should therefore come under the voluntary head.[1] Volitional belief ought to be considered in its own right, and have a category to itself. Pratt himself seems to have been seized of this defect of his first book, and in his recent study he makes good this deficiency of *The Psychology of Religious Belief* by providing a fourth category, namely, the volitional, which does justice to the powerful pragmatic tendency in human nature.[2]

According to Pratt, the outlook is distinctly sinister for religion. Credulous belief, he asserts, is no longer possible. Belief in God on the basis of authority is dead, and faith in God on the grounds of reasoned belief is dying. The old rational philosophic arguments for the existence of God were killed by Kant. The result of Pratt's whole discussion of the type of belief based on reason impales him on the horns of a dilemma, namely, "the arguments the people can grasp are no longer tenable, while the arguments that are tenable, if such there be, the people cannot grasp." [3]

Now Pratt has traced the roots of religion to the instinctive depths of human nature. He finds that religious convictions are the outcome of the needs and demands of the psycho-physiological organism, not of the reason. His contention all across has been that such beliefs are invulnerable. Further, Pratt has discovered from a careful study of his cases that affective experience preponderates over reason and authority as the basis of belief. The real basis of religious belief to-day, then, is not rational arguments but inner experience, and this religion of inner experience is inviolable on Pratt's own showing. Whence, then, his gloomy forebodings for the future of religion?

Pratt is inclined to exaggerate the importance of the decline of religious belief on the basis of authority. Pratt himself has affirmed in connection with his discussion of the development of the religion of thought in India, that throughout all the period of monistic speculation the people clave to Polytheism. Authority, habit, feeling, and will,

[1] Cutten, G. B., *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, p. 310.
[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 13–14.
[3] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 194.

all led to a clinging to the old gods. It is much the same to-day; imitation, habit, social pressure, sentiment, and authority will always determine religious belief for the majority of mankind in the future, as it has done in the past. Belief on authority is far from being extinct; the majority of men do not do their own thinking, political or religious, nor want to do it; they prefer to have it done for them. They accept their beliefs on authority.

As a matter of fact, a minority of religious persons only arrive at their religious beliefs and convictions as the result of a process of discursive thought. Where reason is used by religious persons it is generally in order to vindicate a conviction which is held on grounds other than reason, or to merely formulate in an intellectual form their emotional and instinctive beliefs.

The alleged downfall of the old rational arguments, which Pratt considers is fraught with such disaster to religion if proven, will affect theology rather than religion itself. Religion never was built on these philosophical arguments. For the majority of religious persons, God is never the conclusion of a syllogism, nor a sorites, but the Reality with whom they feel in contact in experience. Religious convictions are reality-feelings and emotional beliefs. If Pratt's thesis is true, that religion is rooted in the vital instinctive depths of human nature, there seems to be no justification for his pessimism regarding the future of religion. All we know tends to verify the hypothesis, that men will continue to be religious to the end of time, unless their mental nature changes in a manner which nothing we know should lead us to expect.[1]

[1] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 316.

CHAPTER VII

"The Psychology of Religious Experience," [1] *by* Edward Scribner Ames

EXPOSITION

With the dawn of the twentieth century, a relatively new tendency made itself felt in the science of psychology; this was the disposition to view its data from an evolutionary-voluntaristic point of view. The University of Chicago seems to have been specially hospitable to this interpretation of human consciousness under biological categories.[2] Professor Ames, in his *Psychology of Religious Experience,* definitely represents this movement of reconstruction of psychological standpoint with regard to religion.

His attitude in this book is that of the new functional psychology which is founded on biological patterns. The human mind is treated as an instrument, and an organism which functions in response to specific situations. All the psychical events in consciousness are conditioned by the demands made upon the organism by the environmental situation.[3]

Ames gathers his data from anthropology, the history of religions, and the social sciences, and interprets this mass of material from the functional standpoint. The biological conception of religion dominates Ames's thought throughout. The thesis laid down is, that religion is the consciousness of the highest social values, and that these are, in the last analysis, simply the sublimated expression of

[1] Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (1910), Houghton Mifflin & Co.

[2] Coe, G. A., "Religion from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *Amer. Journ. Theol.*, vol. xv., April (1911), p. 301.

[3] Angell, J. R., "Relation of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," *Phil. Rev.*, vol. ii., May (1903), pp. 243–271.

the biological instincts of food and sex. Ames sets out to prove that religion originates in the biological needs and the social impulses and arrangements of men. In a word, religion is a by-product of social evolution.

1. *The History and Method of the Psychology of Religion*

The book opens with an historical sketch of the movements of thought and the scientific and practical religious motivations which attended the genesis of the psychology of religion. Ames conceives that the business of psychology is to get at the mental activities, the psychic needs and desires which stand back of the cults and customs, the ritual, and the rites of mankind, revealed by the historian and anthropologist. Psychology asks, in a word, What function do these things perform in the experience of the individual and of the race ?

The Psychological Standpoint

Ames treats the phenomena of religion from the standpoint of functional psychology. Three things are vital for Ames in this conception. 1. The mental life is to be conceived as an instrument by which the organism adjusts itself to its physical or social environment. 2. The emphasis must be laid throughout upon processes directed to adjustments. 3. The adjustment is always made through the psycho-physical organism, and is registered in neural activity and objective effects.

Now with Ames, mind includes the instinctive and perceptive processes as well as the reasoning powers. Mind is conceived biologically as the most important factor in the survival of the highest organisms ; it is the biological instrument which enables adaptations to occur in complex situations.

There is no such thing as ethical or religious consciousness conceived of as ultimate faculties. The kind of consciousness we have depends precisely on what we have attended to in life. Religion is not an original endowment, but normal people acquire it from their social environment.

Ames makes a series of statements of the most controversial nature concerning philosophy, logic, ethics, æsthetics, metaphysics, theology, and the philosophy of religion.

He reduces all these disciplines to phases or elaborations of psychology. The new conception of the functional psychology has, according to Ames, the last word in all these departments.

Ames holds, the psychology of religious experience is the conditioning science for all branches of theology. The idea of God is subject to the same laws of the mental life as other ideas; it is therefore psychology which must pronounce on its truth.

The method of functional psychology is genetic and historical; it goes to anthropology and the history of religions for the concrete setting of the psychic life of primitive peoples. It then works back from customs, ceremonies, and cults to the psychic states which occasioned these. The assumption all across is, that ideas and emotions are always sourced in practical interests.

2. *The Origin of Religion in the Race*

Ames contends religion at first is purely a matter of social custom. Man's life is determined from the very beginning by the two fundamental instincts of food and sex. In primitive society woman is the social centre. Occupational activities develop traits in both sexes. These occupations are reflected in all forms of savage culture, and specially in primitive religious ceremonies. In primitive life it is the men who organize and direct the ceremonials of the social group, but the processes reflected in tribal ritual are those of the occupations of women as well as men. The means of life are the central objects in primitive religion. The ritual comprises the mimetic movements representing the activities involved in securing the means of life. Economic considerations determine the features of primitive religion. Religion then with Ames in its first form is just a dramatic representation of the most vital group interests by means of social ceremonials. Ames's fundamental Thesis is that the elemental instincts of food and sex are in the last analysis back of all religion primitive or developed. Religion, he asseverates, always mirrors the interests of man which have to do with the means, maintenance, and perpetuation of life.

Custom and Taboo

In treating of the subject of custom and taboo Ames discusses and rejects the views of Frazer, Jevons, and Crawley, and lays down the proposition that customs and taboos are non-rational in origin. Ames describes them as non-rational instinctive reactions to felt needs. If, he says, we search for ideas and rational beliefs in connection with primitive customs, as the above authorities do, we will be side-tracked, for they are mechanical and arbitrary. Human needs are the source of the customs of a group, not ideas and reflection. Sanctions are an inherent part of custom. These forms and customs of social life become fixed, and secured against change by terrible sanctions. All departures from the customs are taboo. The customs are the "Thou shalts" of primitive life, and the taboos are the "Thou shalt nots." The most important customs centre about the things vital to the life and well-being of the tribe, *e.g.* food-getting, childbirth, initiation at puberty, marriage, death, and war. The group is the custodian of the tribal customs. An irregularity on the part of a tribesman is punished by the tribe as a whole. The objects of taboo are, in the last analysis, determined by the life processes which underlie reproduction, and by the tribal organization, which includes relations with the dead, with members of the opposite sex, with kings, and with the gods.

Ceremonials and Magic

According to Ames, ceremonials are customs of a peculiar kind which have been elaborated into highly ritualistic observances, and which are conducted publicly under the authority of the leader of the group in time of emotional crisis. In this connection Ames lays down a fundamental proposition, namely, "all ceremonies in which the whole group co-operates with keen emotional interest are religious." Ames is emphatic on the point that that which makes these ceremonials religious is their public and social character. The ceremonials of circumcision, initiation, marriage, etc., all these group practices are religious.

Religious ceremonials, then, are group reactions in connection with the fundamental biological processes

which involve the very existence and welfare of the group. These group reactions dramatically represent these processes in nature and human life.

Ames argues, since all the activities of primitive man are touched with magic and spiritism, religion cannot escape this alloy. Ames makes no attempt to define magic; he contents himself with indicating the things to which the term applies. In this connection, Frazer, Jevons, and Lang are criticized for attributing far too advanced ideation and logical processes to the savage mentality. Ames scouts W. R. Smith's distinction of magic and religion on the principle of individualistic versus group action.[1] This distinction, he says, is simply that between collective magic and individual magic. Magic is an elastic term. There are many species of magic, imitative, sympathetic, and direct, and public ceremonials illustrate all these types Emotional reactions are involved in these ceremonies. Emotions arise in tense situations. The occasions of public ceremonials are the acute crises in the life of the group, such as, *e.g.*, famine, hunger, love, birth, youth, pestilence, death, war.

Spirits

Ames criticizes Tylor's theory of the conception of spirits because it is based on the supposition that primitive man is a metaphysician. For the savage, any object that is thrust upon his attention in any exciting way is a living thing which is positively friendly or unfriendly. Such objects are living agents or spirits. Primitive man's thought is hazy, therefore he does not distinguish between an object and its spirit; the object is itself the spirit.

Now according to Ames, all startling and awe-inspiring experiences are not religious, but those only which elicit social responses and become the occasion of public ceremonial. And, in like manner, all spirits have not religious significance, but those only who have to do with group activities.

Ames insists it is the central life interests that always hold the attention of the savage. Spirits symbolize these vital interests, and the environment determines the character of such spirits.

[1] Smith, W. R., *The Religion of the Semites*, pp. 263 f.

Ames affirms that the economic, social, and ethical history of the tribe can be read in its sacred objects and ceremonies. As the moral experiences of the tribe deepen, the tribal spirit or God improves in ethical character. The development of the idea of God goes along with the social development of a people.

Sacrifice

With regard to sacrifice, Ames asserts its meaning is not to be found in the ideas it expresses, but in what it does for the participants in the rite. The idea of worship in the sense of reverence and trust in a High God must not be read into the mind of primitive man. The basic act in this rite is that of eating food. Sacred objects were first sacrificed, not sacrificed to. The animal, the fish, and the plant became sacred because they satisfied hunger and gave strength. The sacrificial meal benefits the group in a very practical manner.

Ames argues against Jevons's view that the savage eats the totem because it has become sacred ; on the contrary, says Ames, the totem has become sacred because it is good for food. In the primitive and most typical form of sacrifice, the food object is the divinity—the god himself is eaten. The vague purpose of it all is, that the group may gain the magic power of the object or deity thus eaten. The occasions of sacrifice are the critical junctures in tribal life.

A second means of gaining magic power grows up where contact with the sacred object is believed to effect the same result as eating it would bring about. The central fact in sacrifice is the getting of the sacred object's potency by contact.

Sacrifice, then, with Ames is a ceremony, the function of which is to effect contact with the powerful sacred object or divinity in order to inoculate oneself against coming dangers, or after having touched a tabooed object in order to get more magic to counteract the evil power. Thus there are two types of sacrifice. Type I., where the thought is to get into helpful relation with powerful agencies : here the thought of placating angry divinities is entirely absent. Type II., where the thought is to avert evil consequences annexed to violated taboos, or to overcome natural taboos.

Here belong rites of purification in which water, blood, and fire are used. The idea all across is that some potent quality is conferred by contact with these things rather than the thought of cleansing. The two views may be held together, says Ames : contact with the sacred object expels something that is impure, and also adds something to the worshipper's life.

In the later evolution of sacrifice the mysterious forces become identified with particular objects and persons, *e.g.* the priests. The priests make the choicest sacrifices, and the sacred objects are periodically distributed to the people to make them strong. The primitive thought of participating in the divine life through sacrifice endures throughout the whole evolution of the rite. The idea of a victim being offered to God is a late development. In primitive sacrifice the victim is the god, and the most sacred thing in the ceremony. The Roman Catholic Mass is true to the primitive type ; the body and blood divinity are consumed by the priests and worshippers.

Ames affirms the modern idea of sin as transgression of the moral law did not exist for primitive man. The only sin in primitive society is breach of custom or taboo. The idea of sacrifice as atonement for sin simply meant at first a rite which counteracted the physical effect of breach of custom or taboo. The expiatory sacrifices of the Hebrews perpetuated this function.

By means of sacrifice there were secured to the tribe homogeneous feeling, and contact with ancestors and with divinities. Sacrifice consolidated the social life of the group ; in this lay its value. Auto-suggestion increased the effect of sacrifice, *i.e.* it worked, the warrior really gained courage, the apprehensive peace, and the despairing hope from participation in this group ceremonial.

Prayer

Prayer, according to Ames, plays a secondary part in primitive religion. We get a clue to the understanding of prayer through speech, which at its origin is a thing of gestures and inarticulate cries. Every thought and feeling of the savage as of the child is spoken out. In its beginnings, then, prayer is just an impulsive optative expression on an emotional occasion.

Prayers and chants are found first, as incidental accompaniments of savage group ceremonials. These verbal accompaniments are expletive or descriptive; they merely assert certain actions are taking place, and are just epiphenomena; the actions are the all-important things in the ceremonies.

But prayer does not remain a mere epiphenomenon; there arises the thought of power and magic resident in words as well as in actions, and prayer begins to be used to help the action out. Power is attributed to words to bless or curse with literal physical consequences. Prayer in its concussing character is spell whether it be impersonal or personal, as against Marett's view that impersonal prayer only is spell.

Again, the written word is thought to have the same magical power as the spoken word. Ames instances the Thibetan prayer-wheel as a vivid example of this. Ames holds that this magical alloy in prayer may be detected in modern times in the Ave Marias and Paternosters of Christianity, which are often used as spells. When the scientific conception of nature exorcises magic from prayer, it becomes meditation and communion.

Mythology

In discussing the subject of mythology, Ames differs from Wundt, Robertson Smith, Spencer, and Frazer, in that he limits the term mythology to cult-lore, which he regards as an integral part of the sacred ceremonies. Ames thus draws a line of demarcation between mythology and the folk-lore which is not bound up with the sacred ceremonies. The myth proper, he asserts, is a real part of primitive religion. The cult-myth is recited on special occasions only, with reverence and in archaic language. The whole drama of the tribe is re-enacted in the cult-myth.

Ames insists there are two sides to primitive ceremonial: the physical and psychical, the dance and the trains of imagery. Both spring from the original occupations of the group; it is these which are being reinstated by the mimetic dance and the trains of imagery. When the trains of imagery get verbal expression, they issue in the cult-myth.

Ames stresses the fact that the occupational experiences of the tribe always determine of what sort their ceremonies shall be. The causes of cults and cult-lore are the activities and emotional strivings which arise from the elemental needs of primitive man. Self-preservation and race preservation are the pillars of the whole social structure of primitive society.

The content of the myth then depends on the actual experiences of the group. Here, then, is Ames's explanation why the topography, the fauna, and flora of the country, and human heroes, either great hunters or warriors, loom large in mythology proper, and why cosmic objects find so subordinate a place. The reason, says Ames, is because the primitive interest is in food, not in first causes. The savage is no metaphysician or theologian; his mind is fixed on the objects that will serve his fundamental biological needs and those of his group. Heroes are in the cult-myths because their exploits result in a better food supply, or because they have been social saviours.

Ames emphatically maintains that primitive ceremonial, cult, and cult-lore are all saturated with self-interest and tribal interest, and originate in fundamental human needs. Therefore it is a fallacy to seek the origin of primitive religion in the wonder and awe elicited by cosmic objects.

The Development of Religion

Ames's fundamental proposition is that primitive religion is entirely a group concern. He identifies social consciousness with religious consciousness. Ames asserts that for primitive man the things upon which his life and the well-being of his tribe depend are the precious things. This consciousness of the greatest values of life is, with Ames, religious consciousness. Religion is the result of the outworking of the elemental instincts of food-getting and sex, in a world unscientifically apprehended. The content of primitive religion is wholly determined by what will satisfy the elemental instincts of hunger, thirst, and sex. The form of primitive religion is the tribal ceremony.

By development in religion Ames understands simply enlargement and elaboration of social interests, for it is in social interests that religion consists. Development in social organization, changes in economic conditions, and

an increasing knowledge of how to control nature are the factors which cause advance in religion. All these make for the elaboration of the social consciousness which is synonymous with the religious consciousness. With Ames progress in religion is progress in group organization.

Now the things that are vital to the life and well-being of the group are always vividly prominent in the consciousness of the group. Therefore in the progress of a people from savagery to civilization, every stage in that social evolution is registered in their religious rites and traditions.

Now Ames argues since religion is so indissolubly annexed to the social organization of the group, and is, as a matter of fact, the highest social consciousness of the group, then every social, economic, and political factor which dominates the vital interests of the life of the group must inevitably appear in the religion of the group. We find to-day that democratic ideas and scientific methods and results occupy a towering place in the social consciousness of modern society, therefore it is these things which must determine the lineaments of modern religion.

3. *The Rise of Religion in the Individual*

Since Ames's thesis throughout is that religion is synonymous with social consciousness, the question of the rise of religion in the individual is with him the question of the genesis of his social consciousness. Ames therefore proceeds to expound the view with which social psychology has made us familiar; namely, that every individual is environed from birth by the social institutions, beliefs, sentiments, and the practices of his group, all of which develop his personality. The individual gets his religion as he gets everything else from the social group into which he is born.

Ames's treatment of the psychology of childhood follows in the main the usual lines but is marked by his characteristic heavy accent on the social reference of the child's development. During infancy says Ames the child is a non-moral, non-social growing organism. At this stage he is non-religious because he is non-social. The child does not yet appreciate social relations and has

not yet an outfit of social attitudes, but he has made a beginning towards personality. In the period of pre-adolescence there is the development of social attitudes and the tendency towards co-operation with others.

Ames concludes that there is no special innate religious instinct in the child, therefore if religion is to come to the child at all, it must come from the social environment. Personality, morality, and religion are not given, all are acquired as the result of social influences. With Ames, then, religion is entirely a social product; the child does not have it by nature, he acquires it by nurture. Ames's conclusion is that it is impossible for the child under nine years to pass beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude to any considerable degree; but in later childhood he responds to social interests, and therefore manifests tendencies which are religious.

Adolescence

Ames accepts the conclusion of Starbuck, Coe, James, Leuba, and Hall, "that the period of adolescence is pre-eminently the period for the rise of religious consciousness in the individual." In Liturgical Churches, Ames reminds us, this period of adolescence has been chosen for confirmation. These confirmatory ceremonies of modern times correspond to the initiatory rites of primitive society. Adolescence, then, is the period when the individual enters naturally upon religious and other social relations. He begins to respond to the established institutions of the group, and becomes seized of the importance of group values.

The appearance and development of the sexual instinct is the most important factor in the whole business. The adolescent must learn to accommodate his sexual desires to the customs, standards, and values of the social group of which he finds himself a member.

Ames holds there is fundamental connection between the appearance of the sexual instinct and religious awakening. They occur together, and they both have a social reference. But it is the social character of the sexual instinct which makes it significant for religion. Mere imitation, mental development, and social pressure are insufficient to explain the phenomenal intensity of the

adolescent's social impulses. The explanation, Ames asserts, must lie in the development of the sexual instinct. The new instinctive sensitivity of the adolescent to the praise or censure of his group is an irradiation of the sexual instinct, and this acute sensitiveness to the approval or disapproval of the social group is the foundation and the safeguard of all social relations.

Now, says Ames, social groups themselves use the devices of the sexual life. The group woos the individual member, and he responds to the stimuli. The nation seeks recruits for the Army and Navy with the arts of the coquette. The appeal of a religious revival is really a courting of the convert. The etiquette of nations employs the technique of the sexual life.

The maturing of the sexual instinct in adolescence is accompanied by a remarkable development of the senses, the imagination, the will, and the intellect. Adolescence is the period of aspiration, altruism, and idealism. Psychology, says Ames, does not corroborate the view that there is an innate religious consciousness whose outcropping is inevitable, but it does affirm that man is disposed to social relationships, especially during the period of adolescence, and that, given the opportunities to do so, he naturally participates in communal activities, including those of religion.

Normal Religious Development

Ames recognizes that religious growth may be either normal or abnormal. The normal development of adolescence is marked by gradual growth, the abnormal by intense emotional changes brought about by manipulation. Ames agrees with Starbuck that the ideal development is gradual without a crisis. He notes that the term "conversion" has been used in two senses. In its narrower connotation it signifies the sudden and forced emotional transformations which take place at revivals. In its wider meaning the term simply means the natural, normal process of passing over from childhood to adult life. Ames affirms "the methods and atmosphere of the Liturgical Churches tend to gradual growth."

Ames declares that spontaneous awakenings are perfectly natural, and occur outside religion altogether. The

process of gradual growth comprehends various types which are differentiated by temperament. But gradual growth must not be conceived as an absolutely even process. Religious growth follows the fashion of all biological growth : there are rhythm, periodicity, epochal moments, level planes, and even shocks and crises. But we must not put the loud pedal on the crises as if they possessed extraordinary value.

The process by which the individual comes to share in the religion of his people is that of education. Ames puts a heavy accent on the proposition of modern educational psychology, namely, " that education is not a preparation for life, but that it is rather a means of larger life at each stage as it unfolds." Psychology, he says, has discovered the epochal nature of the child's development. There are five important general principles with which the psychology of religion furnishes religious education. These are :

First, religious education ought to respect the nature and individuality of the child. The psychology of religion does not find the child naturally depraved.

Second, the education of the child must be more than intellectual, it must exercise the will and the emotions as well.

Third, the material for religious training ought to be found in the duties and companionships of home and neighbourhood, and in the movements of the community life.

Fourth, we ought to respect each stage or epoch of the child's development as possessing a unique value of its own.

Fifth, religion is psychologically capable of extension in middle life, therefore the educational process may be continued far beyond adolescence.

Conversion

In discussing conversion, Ames uses the term in its narrower connotation, as that catastrophic emotional experience resulting from the direct control and suggestion of parents, teachers, and revivalists. Conversion in this sense, says Ames, " occurs chiefly in those communions

which have cultivated an elaborate technique to produce it."

The great national churches emphasize gradual development through education and ceremonies of confirmation. Ames finds that the mental phenomena of the conversion experience are just those found in working out any intense problem under pressure, namely, first, a sense of perplexity and uneasiness; second, a climax and turning-point; and third, a relaxation marked by rest and joy.

Ames follows Starbuck and James in his description of the content of the conversion experience. Ames accepts Starbuck's conclusion, that conversions vary with sex, age, and temperament. Ames's general conclusion is the same as Starbuck's, that conversion is due to artificial control and forcing of natural processes.[1]

Ames has some interesting dicta concerning the revival method of inducing conversion. He endorses the general finding of the psychology of religion that the method of the revivalist is that of the hypnotist.

4. *The Place of Religion in the Experience of the Individual and Society*

Professor Ames maintains that law, art, science, and religion have all arisen from a protoplasmic undifferentiated mass of human activities, all of which are sourced in the fundamental biological processes. The religious consciousness is just the consciousness of the vital life-interests of the tribe. The objects and functions which are held as sacred are always those in which the life of society is felt to centre. Religion, then, always reflects the life-interests of human society. Where these are purely material the religion will inevitably be concerned with physical satisfactions. Where ethical and spiritual interests are supreme in a people's life, the religion will reflect these interests. Every advance in civilization and morals registers itself in the religion of a people. Religion must always adjust itself to the contemporary life-interests and needs of the social group. In the twentieth century these interests and needs are democratic and scientific. Therefore if the present forms of institutionalized religion refuse to incor-

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *Psychology of Religion*, p. 224.

porate these interests which are vital to the social group, then the real religious consciousness will find sanctuary outside the organized churches in the great living social movements of society.

Ames identifies religion with morality. As a matter of fact, religion and morality are concerned with the same things, namely, the vital interests of the social group. All moral ideals which express the vital interest of society are religious. With Ames, then, religious consciousness, moral consciousness, and social consciousness are interchangeable terms.

Ames tilts at the old associationist psychology with its watertight compartment theory of mind. There is only one mental life involved in all the varied interests with which man concerns himself. There are not three natures: the rational, the moral, the religious, each with its own mechanism. Religion is an affair which involves the reaction of man's entire nature.

Ames denies that there is any unique religious faculty or instinct, and repudiates the notion to which James gave his imprimatur that in the sub-conscious we have such a special organ of Divine revelation. Ames admits that religion gets sustenance from this underground treasure-house of the sub-conscious, but so does every other vital interest of human society. The artist, the poet, and the expert mechanic draws upon the sub-conscious region as much as the saint. The sub-conscious self, then, is not in any way the special organ of religion. Religion has no monopoly of this source of insight, inspiration, and skill.

Ideas and Religious Experience

In contradistinction to the old intellectualist psychology, Ames affirms that modern psychology has pointed out that man's life is governed far more by the non-rational factors in his make-up than by the rational. His instincts, habits, desires, and emotions control his conscious processes to a great extent. All ideational processes presuppose impulsive, instinctive activity.

Ames proceeds to show how in every case theological ideas and doctrines are determined as to form and content by the concrete experiences of the individual and society. These ideas always arise out of a social context. In a

most interesting passage Ames illustrates his proposition by showing that everywhere and always the highest interests of man are projected into his God. Among primitive peoples the cereal, the fruit, the animal, these central objects in the life-processes are the gods. In more developed civilizations the gods become anthropomorphic, and the social and political experiences of the people are projected into the gods. Where a monarchial social condition obtains, a God conceived after the monarchial pattern will be found to exist. Where society is under despotic rule, its God will be a despot. Where a democratic condition exists, the spirit of justice and equity which have been developed in the social group will be projected into the Deity. The historic theological theories of the Atonement are determined in the same way, by the economic and political conditions of society.

For Ames, the idea of God simply stands as a convenient generalization for those things which for us are the greatest values in human social experience. The conception of God, then, signifies the totality of human purposes and values. The reality answering to this idea, says Ames, is " all that is involved in the deep instinctive historical and social consciousness of the race. It signifies the justice which government symbolizes, the truth which science unfolds, and the beauty which art strives to express."

Feeling and Religious Experience

James, Starbuck, and Pratt consider that feeling is the central factor in religious experience. As against this position, Ames holds that feeling is not the basic factor in religious experience. The characteristic of human life, he asserts, is adjustment to the physical and social environment by means of hereditary and instinctive tendencies. These non-ideational forces, Ames insists, cannot be identified with feeling. All feelings, emotions, sentiments, thoughts, and ideas proceed from the instinctive teleological activity of the organism. Feeling, then, is a by-product which accompanies the process of adjustment to a given situation in the physical or social environment ; it is annexed to the instinctive neural motor processes which sense perceptions and thought symbols set going. Ames stands for the parasitic theory of emotion.

Now, he says, the most intense affective tones accompany the arousal of the vital instinctive activities; it is these last which give rise to both affective and ideational activity. Intense feeling is annexed to religion simply because it has to do with the vital instinctive interests of the individual and society. Therefore for Ames, not feeling, but the vital instinctive interests of the social group have the place of centrality in religion.

The Psychology of Religious Genius and Inspiration

Geniuses, says Ames, are not unique. The ideas, inventions, and discoveries which make for human progress are the culmination of the work of many men of different grades of talent. Therefore the man who lays the last tile ought not to get the credit of building the whole house and of being a genius.

With regard to the origin of genius, Ames rejects the theories of Galton and Cooley, and advances a characteristic theory of his own. With Galton, genius is a matter of race, and is transmitted by heredity. The emphasis is upon original genius. Cooley admits that genius may be transmitted by heredity, but suggests that education and social environment may favour or hinder its development.[1] Here equal stress is placed upon original genius and the social factors. With Ames, as we might now anticipate, the original native endowment and racial inheritance are considered to be relatively insignificant; the all-important factors in the production of genius are the historical conditions, education, and the social environment. It is these things which create and develop the powers and capacities of great men. Genius, then, with Ames, is a matter of historical conditions, social environment, and education. Great men are created by the social situation, it is the age which creates the genius.

" The geniuses," then, according to Ames, " are those who possess fully the social consciousness and at the same time contribute to its development." The genius is he who precipitates the great ideas held in solution by the popular mind. The great Hebrew prophets can be explained in this way. The prophets were always produced

[1] Cooley, C. H., " Genius, Fame, and the Comparison of Races," *Annals of American Academy*, vol. ix. (1897), p. 317.

by a national crisis. They worked in an atmosphere, and with models furnished by the literature of the writing prophets whose finger was on the pulse of the social and political life of the people and the court.

Ames cites Amos as a typical example. The vices of despotism in the social environment developed the prophetic genius of Amos. He became simply the spokesman of the outraged sense of social justice of his people, and he appealed to the social ideals then current.

Amos, then, was simply a creation of his age and his social environment. His successors had their prophetic genius developed in much the same way by the stirring public events of their own times. Ames's conclusion is that religious genius is not different from any other genius. He is simply an individual of remarkable native ability who is saturated with the social consciousness, and labours to bring this to greater clearness.

With respect to the question of inspiration, Ames's position is that the sense of external control to which the prophets refer is never proof of supernatural control, for hypnotism, suggestion, habitual activity will give the same sense of external control and of being a passive agent. The truth or falsity of the prophetic message cannot be determined by the psychological processes said to be experienced, but by the social and ethical significance of the prophetic message; this is the acid test.

Non-religious Persons

Ames's discussion on non-religious persons is a most vivid illustration of his characteristic point of view. The individual of social attitudes, sympathies, and activities is a religious person. The degree and range of a man's social consciousness is the degree and range of his religion. The religious man is he who enters enthusiastically into all the social movements of his time, *e.g.* Ames instances School Teachers, Philanthropists, Settlement Workers, Patriots, etc. Non-religious persons are those who are unresponsive to the claims of the social order and who lack public spiritedness and ignore community interests. Conscience, laws, symbols, ceremonials, are all products of group life; if then, asserts Ames, a man stubbornly holds that conscience is an individual matter, and that his re-

ligious consciousness is his own private concern, he is an irreligious man. "Non-religious persons are accordingly those who fail to enter vitally into a world of social activities and feelings."

The Psychology of Religious Sects

In primitive society, says Ames, the fact that religious consciousness is identical with social consciousness is plain. In developed societies the same relation obtains, but it is less obvious. The mind of the savage reflects the social mind, and the mind of the educated man of modern civilization reflects the social mind of the set whose ideals grip him. He is indifferent to the attitude of many groups and classes with which he mingles, but there is always one group whose hostile stare is death, and whose sneer is damnation. It is the opinion of that set that matters. This being so, says Ames, the social psychology of particular groups helps us to get at the psychology of individual minds. This is Ames's characteristic approach; for him the individual mind is always the replica and product of the social mind.

Ames asserts that the doctrines of religious sects are simply the products of social movements, and are means of social control. Denominations are determined by economic forces, and by personal leaders who simply precipitate the social ideals held in solution by the popular mind. Social forces are represented by great personalities who embody the will of the people, *e.g.* Luther, Calvin, Knox, Zwingli.

Denominations, then, are social organisms, which win to themselves people who are gripped by their own particular type of social ideal. Ames points out the fact that denominations tend to operate among populations according to definite social strata. He asserts that the different religious sects are just social clans possessed of all the primitive biological clan impulses to preserve the integrity of the group. Hence projects for union with other denominations are always viewed with suspicion. Ames states that the loyalties, antipathies, and methods of denominations are based on race and class inheritances and prejudices, mixed with a little of the religion of Christianity. This clan spirit is specially strong in the official

representatives. Now, says Ames, the conclusion of the whole matter is that the social consciousness of the religious denominations is good as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The modern spirit is against denominationalism. It demands that exclusive group attachments shall expand beyond the narrow denominational boundaries till they comprehend the human race.

The Religious Consciousness in Relation to Democracy and Science

Ames regards democracy and science as having complete ascendancy in modern life, and emphatically states that conventional institutionalized religion must make pretty big concessions to these paramount tendencies of the twentieth century. Democracy must not be understood to be merely a form of government, nor science merely a clearly articulated system of knowledge ; both are powerful community attitudes.

There are in existence to-day democratic ideals and a scientific spirit. Institutionalized religion is warned by Ames that it must make room for these ideals, and that spirit. The alternatives facing religion are either reconstruction or destruction. Democracy demands recognition for its ideals on the part of the Church ; it feels that what it is after is essentially religious, therefore it resents the inaction of the Church and its lack of sympathy with its vast human aspirations. Ames warns organized Christianity if democracy has to win through to its ideal alone, then institutionalized religion cannot hope for anything except decent burial in the near future.

True religious interests and democratic interests are identical, opines Ames. It is here in these empirically demonstrable living interests of the democratic social order, here in the scientifically verifiable facts of conscience, duty, patriotism, and social righteousness that Ames finds the real objective reference of the subjective religious life. Ames holds that when religious consciousness is identified with social consciousness, " religion becomes as natural and vital in a democratic and scientific age as in a patriarchal, custom-ruled era."

Ames asserts that science creates a special temper which may be described as a respect for facts which are experimentally verifiable, and an impatience with the pro-

ducts of imagination. This scientific temper is establishing itself in the modern consciousness, and religion must reckon with it. Ames believes that the view of religion he has maintained takes up into its sweep all that the twentieth-century democratic social consciousness demands, and is able to claim and to receive the respect of the modern scientific spirit.

CRITIQUE

It will be of utility to get a definite idea of what the new Functional Psychology stands for, before passing on to a critical estimate of Ames's work, which is characterized throughout by this functional point of view. Angell gives one of the clearest outlines of this new standpoint in an article written in 1903.[1] Functional psychology, he says, is the psychology modelled on biological patterns. The mind is conceived as an organism, and a mental anatomy and a mental physiology are constructed to treat of the facts of psychical structure and function. Events of consciousness are viewed as being wholly conditioned by the demands made upon the organism by specific environmental situations. The mind then in functional psychology is conceived simply as a favourable biological variation which gives the organism a tremendous advantage in the struggle for existence.

Professor Ames's *Psychology of Religious Experience* is marked by great fidelity to this biological conception of mind. Not only does he bring all the phenomena of the religious life within the compass of this conception, but also every other phenomenon of human thought and activity. With Ames, functional psychology dominates by right the whole field of human life and thought: Art, Æsthetics, Logic, Ethics, Science, Theology, and Philosophy—all these possibilities of human history must do obeisance to this all-devouring functional Moloch. Psychology in its functional form is a trespasser on the domains of all other disciplines.[2] With Ames it even claims the right to pronounce upon metaphysical reality.[3] [4] Curiously enough,

[1] Angell, J. R., "The Relation of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," *Phil. Rev.*, vol. xii., May (1903), pp. 243–271.

[2] Angell, J. R., *op. cit.* p. 270.

[3] Ames, E. S., *Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 25–27.

[4] Coe, G. A., "Religion from Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *Amer. Journ. Theol.*, vol. xv., No. 2 (1911), p. 302.

Ames fails to see that if he were successful in establishing his thesis, Psychology would inevitably become a branch of Biology.

In the second chapter of this most interesting and suggestive book, Ames claims so much territory for functional psychology, and cuts every complicated Gordian knot so facilely with his functional scimitar, that suspicion is aroused as to the soundness of his conclusions. We feel in many cases that he solves complex problems too easily, and that nothing could be quite as simple as he makes the most complex phenomena of the religious life to appear.

In saying this, it must be granted that Ames's functional notion is singularly fruitful when confined to primitive activities and the lower forms of religion, in which impulsive and instinctive action predominates. It must be conceded that the uttering of Ames's functional "sesame" has wonderfully illuminated many of the customs and ceremonials of primitive society. Further, we are prepared to grant that this biological conception when applied to human activities is a useful point of view. In Ames's hands it has certainly proved a powerful methodological device in bringing order out of chaos, and in reducing the multitude of disorganized facts of the life of primitive man to a unity.[1] But it needs to be noted that it is in connection with prehistoric cults, customs, and ceremonies only that Ames's functional method seems to work with brilliant results.

The same success does not attend Ames's application of his method to the cultured minds of modern society, nor to the facts of a highly evolved religious life. Here the functional notion is inadequate. When psychology works with biological concepts, human life is conceived of on the pattern of that of the lower animals, and the functions of the human mind are reduced to the seeking of what will satisfy the primordial instincts of hunger, thirst, and sex.

Now this biological concept may work tolerably well when we have to do with the primitive activities of our prehistoric ancestors, which are largely instinctive and unreflective, but it becomes an inadequate notion, and even an instrument of confusion, when we come to deal with the developed religious consciousness of a cultured age. Ames

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 22.

has ignored the limitations of his method all across. As long as he keeps to the simplest mental reactions which have to do with food-getting and procreation, Ames's concept works fairly well, but this methodological device proves to be inadequate when we are confronted with highly complex reactions, not merely to stimuli, but to intricate and complicated situations of the modern environmental setting of human life.

With Ames, everything in human life, ancient and modern, may be completely explicated in terms of the adaptive biological activities of the psycho-physical organism to the demands of its environment. This challenges controversy. Ames has not sufficiently considered the fact that the mark of mentality in a phenomenon is the pursuance of future ends and a choice of means. Human activity is characterized by the pursuit of ideals which are self-imposed. The idea of an end determines the activities of the man. " The processes with which the psychologist has to do tend to define their own functions or ends, as merely biological processes do not." [1] The man whose activities are guided by the thought of the most distant ends possesses the highest intelligence.[2]

Our environment acts upon us and we adapt ourselves to it. Ames stresses this side of the truth overmuch, but he fails to give sufficient emphasis to the fact that we act upon our environment and make transformations in it to suit our human ends. There are adjustments, but these are made in accordance with a purpose which we set before ourselves and willed by ourselves.

Further, all the adjustments we make cannot be reduced to the activities involved in food-getting and procreation. Ames does not give sufficient place to the fact that in the evolution of the human race, as Coe points out, instincts become sublimated and attain a function which the brutes do not share. This new function is not merely a further extension of the old biological function : a positive transmutation has occurred. With the higher types of our race, love does not mean lust, and the desire is to commune with a personality rather than to embrace a body. Coe quotes the words of a dying man to his wife : " In thine eyes, my

[1] Coe, G. A., *op. cit.*
[2] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 23.

darling, have I beheld the Eternal." [1] Here the sex instinct has become transmuted and has attained a new function in which the brutes and brute-like men have no share. In all such cases the biological concept breaks down ; it is valid only when it confines itself to the organic and instinctive plane of human life.

Ames does not take sufficiently into consideration the characteristics of the developed mind. He fails to notice that here mental activity considerably modifies instinctive activities and impulses, and increases inhibitions to instinctive action.[2] He does not emphasize the important fact that the developed mind creates for itself new orders of value, new objects of desire, and attains to new estimates and appreciations. In a word, Ames ignores apparently the fact that values have changed for developed minds. For primitive man, and for primitive minds among modern men, the values may well be, as Ames asserts, food, sex gratifications, and the safety of one's own skin, and these, Ames asserts, were the values sought in primitive religion. But these are certainly not the values of the developed religious consciousness. To apply the purely biological category here is at once inadequate and irrelevant. Ames's functional standpoint ignores the interests of the developed mind.[3]

Ames does not make sufficient allowance for the fact that "man, as we know him, is a self-conscious being ; that is, he is not merely aware of instincts clamouring to be satisfied, but he is conscious of himself as the centre of ideas, feelings, and volitions, and of himself as the organizer of these. Instead of behaviour determined mainly by the necessitating power of instinct or habit, we have conduct shaped by foresight, the pursuit of ends that are not esteemed desirable till they are judged to be worth what they will cost, conduct guided by ends that are judged to be binding because worthy in themselves. Man, as we know him, can discover ideals and guide his conduct in the light of these. He can live for Truth, Right, and Beauty." [4]

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 24–25.
[2] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 22, 23.
[3] Coe, G. A., "A Proposed Classification of Mental Functions," *Psych. Rev.*, vol. xxii. (1915), p. 2.
[4] Stewart, J. M'Kellar, *What is God?* (lecture published Melbourne, 1920), p. 12.

Now, " this active self, making its judgments of absolute values and pursuing ends which it recognizes as unconditionally good," [1] is something before which mere biological concepts of mental life stand helpless. Ames's error is that he ignores the real difference between human experience at the impulsive instinctive level, and that at the level of a self-conscious active being. A biological explanation of the conduct of developed minds and of self-conscious agents is futile and obviously incompetent. It is plain that here we have a reality with which the biological concept, so useful at the lower instinctive level of life, is incompetent to deal.

Our conclusion therefore is, that the biological conception of function with which Ames works, while it illuminates much that occurs in the primitive life of mankind at the appetitive and instinctive level, entirely clouds the issue when we attempt to apply it to the developed religious consciousness of cultured peoples. The notion of biological function utterly breaks down when it attempts to explicate the conduct of self-conscious agents. Ames seems to ignore all across the vast qualitative distinction between the one range of mind and the other.

Ames works entirely with the notion of " adjustment." This is an utterly inadequate notion when applied to the human mind in its relation with either its physical or social environment. Ames's limitation of the function of the human mind to mere adaptation to environment is unjustifiable in view of the facts. Let us consider the physical environment first. Do we actually adapt ourselves to a given rigid environment ? Is it not a truer account of the facts to say the human mind seeks rather to remould the outer environment nearer to the heart's desire, and to bring about alterations in external conditions, in accordance with purposes it has defined to and for itself ?

" A man went down to Panama,
Where many a man has died,
To slit the sliding mountains
And lift the eternal tide.
A man stood up in Panama,
And the mountains stood aside."

The major portion of civilized man's physical environ-

[1] Stewart, J. M'Kellar, *op. cit.* p. 13.

ment is constituted by the constructions of human brains and human hands, and he lives, moves, and has his being among embodied human purposes.[1] Ames's notion, then, that the function of the mind is simply that of adjustment to the physical environment needs a great deal of extension, for in the form in which it is used by Ames, it simply does not fit the facts.

When we apply Ames's notion of "adjustment" to the social environment its inadequacy is just as apparent. Ames's biological conception of the mind as an organism adapting itself to a physical environment is misleading when applied to an individual in relation to the social environment. There is doubtless a kind of social adjustment, but not in the biological sense of the term. Professor Coe's forthsetting of this issue is particularly clear.[2] He shows that the notion that the function of the mind is that of adjustment to a rigid social order, must not be interpreted as adaptation to other persons of the social group, but as adjustment to an ideal of personality to which they and we alike move.

If the term "adjustment" is to be used at all concerning the individual's relations with the social group it must get a bigger connotation than Ames gives it. It must include the thought of mutual, reciprocal adjustment of others to ourselves, as well as of ourselves to others, a reciprocal accommodation which leads ourselves and others to full-orbed personality. If then the notion of "adjustment" is to be used concerning the individual's relations with his environment physical or social, it cannot be in the mere biological sense of the term to which Ames restricts it.

It is to be noted that Ames's description of this biological concept is full of ambiguity. Mind, with Ames, is simply a valuable variation which gives the human species a tremendous advantage over lower species in the struggle for existence; "it is the most important factor in the survival of the highest organisms." The mind has emerged as a favourable variation in response to the urgent needs of the organism. Further, says Ames, "functional psychology views the mental life as an instrument of adaptation by which the organism adjusts itself to its environ-

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 26.
[2] Coe, G. A., *op. cit.* pp. 27, 28.

ment." Next, Ames makes the statement that " this adjustment occurs through the psycho-physical organism." Again, Ames makes a further statement, namely, the adjustment " is an adjustment in the psycho-physical organism."

Here, then, we have a shifting of emphasis. First, the adjustment is made by means of the mental life. Here the mind is the tool or instrument of the organism. Second, the adjustment occurs through the organism itself. Here the mind is an aspect of the organism. Third, the adjustment occurs in the organism. Here the mind appears as the conscious agent that is doing the work, consciously determining its own ends, adjustments, and purposes.

Professor Coe says in this connection, " When functionalism is taken to mean that mind is a mere instrument, it is as natural as can be that somewhere as we proceed we shall smuggle in the mind, no longer as a mere instrument, but as that which is being adjusted, and eke as an agent that is doing the work." [1] The fact that Ames brings in the mind as more than a mere instrument, is a confession of the inadequacy of the merely biological conception of function.

It is difficult to know why Ames uses the term " religious experience " at all, as it appears to be irrelevant to the discussion. Ames himself is apparently unaware of this irrelevancy, for the reason that he takes morality and social consciousness to be religion. He defines religion as " the consciousness of the highest social values." Ames does not explain what makes social values high as distinguished from other social values. Ames leaves us in the dark as to what facts are comprehended by the term " highest." Therefore the word " religion " as used by Ames is a most indefinite and ambiguous term. Evidently with Ames, social consciousness at any level is synonymous with religious consciousness. He makes no distinction between primitive group feeling and advanced social morality.[2] It is quite apparent that when the term " Religion " is used as Ames uses it, with a connotation so broad and comprehensive that it means everything, it means nothing.

[1] Coe, G. A., " Religion from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *Amer. Journ. Theol.*, vol. xv., April (1911), p. 307.

[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 260.

An inconsistency is apparent in Ames's treatment of the religion of the child. With Ames, as we have already remarked, social attitudes and social consciousness are identical with religion. This is his fundamental position. Now Professor Coe has pointed out the fact, that though Ames emphatically maintains that the savage is genuinely religious, though entirely absorbed in the things of sense and material interests, yet the modern child brought up in a cultured civilization cannot advance beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude to any appreciable degree. Coe asks rightly, What of the social relations of the child with the family ? [1] In family affection, and in the child's relations with its parents and other members of the family, we surely have the beginnings of social consciousness, and there is an outfit, not necessarily elaborate, of social attitudes, and if this is so, then this consciousness and these attitudes, on Ames's own premises, must be religious.

Ames consistently maintains throughout his book the position that religion is just social morality. His chapter on " non-religious persons " vividly illustrates this position. Here he declares that the " non-religious persons " are those who do not have the welfare of society at heart, and who do not interest themselves in civic and public affairs. Sympathetic social service is the hall-mark of the religious person. According to Ames, the typically religious persons are those who possess the civic sense, public spirit, and patriotic enthusiasm, and who take to do with town libraries, benevolent asylums, and hospitals. It is obvious, then, that with this writer, social morality and social righteousness are identified with religion. Whoever, then, seeks the welfare of society is religious. This view, as Leuba points out, fails to recognize the significance of the difference in psychological attitude that separates the adherents of any organized religion from the devoted agnostic or atheistic social worker.[2]

Now though it is perfectly competent for any man to call social morality by any name he likes, even by the term " religion," yet Leuba's criticism seems justified when he

[1] Coe, G. A., " Religion and Functional Psychology," *Amer. Journ. Theol.*, vol. xv., No. 2 (1911), p. 306.

[2] Leuba, J. H., " The Meaning of Religion and the Place of Mysticism in Religious Life," *Journ. Phil.*, vol. xviii., No. 3 (1921), p. 57.

says, " to bestow upon one the appellation religious because he enters thoroughly into the social movements of his time is to cause confusion by juggling with the word." [1] For the majority of thinkers morality and religion are distinguishable realities in human life, and this distinction certainly makes for clarity of thought. Morality and religion are terms with fairly definite general meanings. Morality is generally understood to have to do with the personal and social relations of the individual with society, and religion is understood to imply the relations which man sustains to whatever he may feel to be Divine. Religion is an attitude which is simply not to be identified with any kind of morality.

In the last analysis there may be indeed morality without religion, and religion without morality.[2] The two act and react upon one another, and in the higher religions, especially in Christianity, they are found intimately interwoven. Man projects the noblest ethical attributes, and the highest moral excellence he knows, on to his God, but it is in his relations with his God, and not in his relations with his fellows, that religion consists. Therefore to use these terms as if they were interchangeable seems to be uncritical. Ames says on page 285, if religion is identified with the most intimate and vital phases of the social consciousness the distinction is not real. But religion is not identified with the social consciousness, therefore the distinction is real.

Ames's forthsetting of the claims of the functional psychology is not characterized by excessive modesty. He conceives of this new psychology in a somewhat grandiose fashion, as comprehending art, morality, religion, and all the possibilities of human history. When all's done and said, ethics, æsthetics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are, with Ames, just different forms of functional psychology. Moreover, the new science of the psychology of religion is to so develop as to become the substitute for philosophy and theology.

This is an entirely gratuitous assumption on Ames's part, which stands in need of greater proof than he has seen fit to give it. On pages 26 and 27 Ames argues for

[1] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 53–54.
[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 9.

the proposition that " the psychology of religious experience becomes the conditioning science for the various branches of theology, or, rather, it is the science which in its developed forms becomes theology or the philosophy of religion."

Ames's argument is as follows: if reality is given in experience, then the science of that experience furnishes the reasonable method of dealing with reality, including the reality of religion. He continues: " The philosophy of religion, in its most ultimate problems and refined developments, does not transcend the principles of psychology. The idea of God, which is the central conception of theology, is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applicable to it." Professor Pratt has well said in this connection, Why stop with theology and the various branches of philosophy? Why not swallow everything? Why not reduce also physics, chemistry, and astronomy to functional psychology? The physical sciences, he says, are but formulations of experience, and is not psychology the science of experience? If Ames's argument holds good in the case of metaphysics, it must surely hold good also in the case of physics. Again, if " the idea of God is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas," the same can be said with equal truth of the idea of the solar system. Now, says Pratt, herein lies the fallacy of this pragmatic view. " Psychology studies the idea of God and the idea of the solar system, and stops there. But neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its study to our ideas. They both mean to be objective." [1]

Ames, like Leuba, occupies the arrogant position that the science of psychology covers the whole of reality, forgetful of the fact that it is limited to a special field of facts, and that its function is to describe and articulate the subjective facts of man's life into a coherent system. Within this special field of human experience the deliverances of psychology are entitled to respect, and are to be received as authoritative, but outside this field psychology has no franchise. Professor Pratt represents a much sounder position than Ames when he says the psychology of religion " must content itself with a description of human

[1] Pratt, J. B., *op. cit.* p. 41.

experience, while recognizing that there may well be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer, and with which they are possibly connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science." [1]

With regard to the origin of cults Ames is emphatic that no antecedent religious belief is required to account for their genesis. They originate in practical needs and fundamental instincts. Group activities which become organized into cults are entirely explicated as to origin by these practical and instinctive adjustments to the environment. But while this may be accepted as a solution of the origin of group activities, Ames has not indicated how the religious cult arose.

Ames has set out before us a very feasible theory of the origin of group activities, but he has not told us what makes these group activities religious. All tribal customs and activities cannot be religious. What, then, is the differentia? Here Ames gives a most unsatisfactory reply—namely, Ceremonials are group acts; that which makes them religious is their public and social character. "All ceremonies in which the whole group participates with keen emotional interest are religious." Here, it is plain, Ames makes no distinction between a religious ceremonial and any other form of emotional group activity. All group reactions are, with Ames, religious. Hence a riot, a war-dance, or the organized lynching of a negro, all of which are acts in which the group co-operates with keen emotional interest, are, according to Ames's definition, religious.

The difficulty, then, for us is that we feel the necessity of knowing how social ceremonies become distinctively religious ceremonies. What we would be at is, what makes a social ceremony religious? Certainly this difficulty does not exist for Ames, because for him social public ceremonies as such are religious. But though this question does not trouble Ames, it exists for the serious student of the psychology of religion, who suspects Ames's too simple explanation. We may agree with Ames that all religious ceremonies are social ceremonies, but the converse is not true that all social ceremonies are religious ceremonies. This most vital question, then—How came it that the savage mind formed a connection between his social ceremony and a

[1] Pratt, J. B., *op. cit.* p. 42.

non-human higher power which he felt controlled his life and destiny?—is entirely ignored by Professor Ames in his discussion; he has no satisfactory answer to the question, What makes the social act a religious act? [1]

Ames defines mythology as that body of traditions found in connection with group ceremonials, and since with Ames all group ceremonies are religious, the myths annexed to these social ceremonies are religious also. Cult-lore or myth is, says Ames, an integral part of primitive religion. Now, as against Ames's position, it has already been objected that all social ceremonies are not religious. Cult and myth are doubtless contemporaneous with the beginning of human development, but they acquire a religious character only at a specific time.[2] At the beginning there are magic cults and demon cults, and the mythology abounds in demons and spirits, but neither cult nor myth at this stage can properly be said to be religious.[3] "Pre-religious" and "sub-religious" cults and myths are antecedent to religious cults and myths. This is ignored by Ames, to whom all cults and their accompanying myths are religious. Many myths have no religious significance.[4] Just as we were forced to say not every social ceremony is religious, we also say not every cult myth is religious in nature.

Since Ames has given no differentia whereby we may distinguish a religious cult and myth from a purely magical, demonological, pre-religious, sub-religious, or non-religious cult and myth, we would suggest that cults and myths acquire a religious character contemporaneously with the rise of belief in gods.[5] It would certainly make for clarity of thought if we reserved the term "religious" for deity cults and deity myths only. We shall only flounder in a Serbonian bog unless we keep the term "religion" for those public ceremonies which were connected in the minds of the participants with that higher power which they somehow felt to be Divine and to control their lives and destiny, and for those traditions which grew up along with and out of such religious practices.

Ames underrates the part played by cosmical objects in

[1] Pratt, J. B., *op. cit.* pp. 260–261.
[2] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 416.
[3] Wundt, Wilhelm, *op. cit.* p. 418; see also p. 414.
[4] Höffding, H., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 199.
[5] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 372.

primitive life. He says: " Everything known about the primitive mind supports the inference that to it there is little appreciation of cosmic distances or forces." It is doubtless true, as Ames affirms, that undue importance has often been attached to natural objects when reconstituting the life of primitive man; but Ames has gone to the other extreme in his insistence on the purely social genesis of primitive man's cults, myths, conceptions, and emotions. Too great prominence is given by Ames to the purely social forces in group ceremonials and their accompanying myths. We need to recognize, as Pratt points out, that certain of these group activities have reference to non-human, non-social forces.[1] There are primitive public ceremonies where there is a feeling for a power neither social nor personal.

We must receive Ames's statement with certain reservations. His conclusion that primitive man was susceptible only to the social forces, the influences of the herd, and remained quite insensitive to the awe-inspiring, wonder-provoking phenomena of nature, needs to be accepted with certain qualifications. Dr. Goldenweiser's statement supplies a wholesale corrective to Ames's over-emphasis on the social factor. He says: " Our familiarity with man, modern, ancient, and primitive, leaves no room for doubt that at all times and places man was strongly susceptible to the impressions produced on him by the phenomena of nature, and that such impressions assumed in his consciousness the form of quasi-religious sentiments." [2]

To fail to recognize the significant part played by non-human and non-social forces in the cults, myths, and affairs of primitive men is to ignore one of the principal scientific categories with which modern anthropology and the science of comparative religion works with such fruitful results. This is the conception of Mana, a classificatory term of the widest applicability. Mana is the category that most nearly expresses the essence of rudimentary religion.[3] Modern anthropology sees in this indefinite,

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 263.

[2] Goldenweiser, A. A., " Religion and Society," *Journ. of Phil.*, vol. xiv. (March 1917), p. 116.

[3] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, chap. iv., " The Conception of Mana " ; also introd. p. xxiii.

impersonal, diffused power which does things the earliest religious object.

Ames does not give sufficient weight to the real influence of cosmic objects or the cosmic sense in primitive life, nor can he find a place for this most fruitful conception of Mana, which in modern times has become a scientific category.[1] It is extremely probable that the earliest form of cosmic sense was a feeling for this all-pervading power, which was thought by the savage to inhabit every common activity of man or process of nature, and which the Melanesians call Mana.[2]

Professor Pratt holds that during the last twenty-five years the tendency to put over-emphasis on the social factor in human affairs has become an "intellectual epidemic."[3] This apotheosis of the social is especially conspicuous in the writings of that French School of sociologists of which Professor Emile Durkheim is the most eminent representative. In America Professors Irving King and Ames seem to be inoculated with this view, that what is not social has little or no significance.

Ames's chapter on Genius shows this tendency in a pronounced form. Genius, with Ames, is simply a product of the group life. Ames puts all the accent on the social factor. Now, is not the thing that marks genius off from mere talent, its originality, and the fact that mere social categories are unable to explicate it? Historical conditions, education, social factors, explain much, but they do not explain genius. The genius thinks in his own way, and not in the way socially prescribed. One of the characteristics of genius is that it perceives things in a novel and in an unhabitual way.[4] The ideas of geniuses coruscate, and every subject branches infinitely before their fertile minds. Bain, James, and other psychologists agree that the outstanding fact in genius of every order is a native talent for perceiving analogies.[5] Genius is not a matter of laborious acquisition, and far from being an infinite

[1] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 101.

[2] Codrington, *The Melanesians*; see pp. 118–120 for definition of Mana in its Melanesian use.

[3] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 11.

[4] James, W., *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 110.

[5] James, W., *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 530.

capacity for taking pains, it is the capacity for doing infinite things without taking pains.

With Ames, greatness is always thrust upon men by the social group; he ignores all across the fact that some men are born great. Any view which fails to take into consideration native endowments, congenital predispositions, innate tendencies, and propensities is thoroughly incompetent to explain genius. Ames, in his uxorious regard for the social, ignores the fact of the intellectual originality and the creative power of genius.[1] He fails to recognize that society is as much the product of the individual as the individual is the product of society.[2]

On Ames's view, social progress is left without any rational explanation. Is not social progress itself due to the power of the ideal as it becomes more clearly defined in the minds of rare individuals? The truth seems to be that the individual moral or religious genius gains a deeper insight into the ideal and lifts the community to a higher level. Far from being the mere creatures of their age, as Ames supposes the prophets of Israel to have been, these moral and religious geniuses were miles in advance of their contemporaries, and even opposed current views by ideas that were often revolutionary. We therefore endorse Pratt's view, which seems more in keeping with the facts, that their work is simply not to be accounted for in terms of geography and social environment. Their contribution to the religion of their people was unique.[3]

The genius leaves his mark on his own and subsequent ages. Aristotle and Plato have moulded the minds of intellectual groups for centuries. Consider the influence of the genius Paul on Christendom. Consider the influence of Karl Marx upon millions of the proletariat of the Western World. "Consider the amount of life poured into the veins of humanity by such men as Gautama, Jesus, St. Augustine, St. Francis of Assisi, Luther, Wesley, Booth, and others.[4] But what need have we of further witness? No view can be complete which fails to take account of

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 192.

[2] Fite, Warner, "The Exaggeration of the Social," *Journ. of Phil.*, vol. iv. pp. 393–396.

[3] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 121.

[4] Leuba, J. H., "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. vii. No. 3 (1896), footnote, p. 310.

both the individual and the social factors in human life. Mental, moral, and religious development are accelerated by contact with the social environment, but there would be no development without individual reaction, which is also creative.

It is by no means as certain as Ames would lead us to suppose that religious ideas are solely the product of society. Professor Pratt has shown that the spontaneous origin of religious ideas is a possibility. Pratt quotes the interesting case of Helen Keller, who was blind, and deaf, and dumb,[1] also the cases of Mr. Ballard[2] and Mr. D'Estrella,[3] two deaf-mutes, all of whom were cut off almost entirely from the social environment, and yet had arrived at the idea of God as the result of independent thought.[4] It is extremely probable that, in some cases at least, the reason and imagination if left to themselves would build up a belief in some kind of God.

We may grant that at a primitive stage in human development, religious consciousness was a tribal matter, but as human development proceeds, religious consciousness becomes more and more an individual possession. The general trend of development is from public to personal individual private religion. Ames takes no cognizance of this fact. Ames's extreme social point of view ignores that individual personal religious experience which is the prominent feature of the religious life in its developed form.

At a low cultural level where consciousness of individuality has scarcely begun to be, and where critical reflection of existing social beliefs and institutions has not begun, there Ames's group theory of religion is in smooth waters, for here, as Durkheim says, the individual type nearly confounds itself with that of the race.[5] But the inadequacy of this theory is at once apparent when it is confronted with religion as it exists in the individual at a high level of culture, who has attained a consciousness of

[1] Keller, Helen, *The Story of My Life*, with a supplementary account of her education, by John Albert Mac, pp. 368–370.

[2] Porter, Samuel, "Is Thought possible without Language?" *Princeton Review* (1881), Jan., pp. 104–128.

[3] James, William, "Thought before Language," *Phil. Rev.*, vol. i. p. 31.

[4] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 211–215.

[5] Durkheim, Emile, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 6.

his own individuality to such a degree that he sits in judgment on the customs and the group consciousness of his race. Here Ames's theory breaks down; it cannot deal with religion as it exists in the individual.[1]

Ames's way out is to assert all religion is public: there is no personal religion. A man who knows what religion is will never concede that the experience of God is something which is merely public, and which concerns the community only, in which the individual as such has no direct part. A religious man is one who has a personal consciousness of fellowship with God. Modern religion partakes largely of the nature of a personal experience which verifies to the individual the truth of the essential beliefs of his religious group.

The religious experience of developed peoples is analogous to æsthetic experience which, while it may have arisen in a social matrix, has become relatively independent of social control. It is a notorious fact that all forms of æsthetic expression have become a form of individual self-expression in which social conventions and prescriptions are repudiated, and social control resented more than in any other department of human life.[2] Social categories, then, are valid only of low levels of culture where the consciousness of individuality over against the group is least developed, and where personal religious experience is least conspicuous.[3] Ames's group theory is unable to do justice to individual religion which is exemplified in the lives of the great mystics, saints, and figures of religious history, and which is the cardinal characteristic of modern religious life.

Ames fails to recognize the tremendous part played in religious history by individuals. The great prophetic religions centre round towering figures like Buddha, Mohammed, and Christ. Among primitive peoples, it is true, religion is almost entirely of a social nature, but, in Pratt's words, " as culture and thought advance religion becomes more and more individual, and constantly less dependent on social forms and sanctions." [4] Pratt's sane

[1] Webb, Clement J. C., *Group Theories of Religion*, pp. 61, 131.
[2] Webb, Clement J. C., *op. cit.* p. 182.
[3] Webb, Clement J. C., *op. cit.* footnote, p. 191.
[4] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 12.

conclusion is that "religion is the product both of society and of the individual." This balanced view fits the facts, and holds the scales evenly between the social and the individual factors in the religious life of man. Ames's forthsetting, with its "exaggeration of the social," does not fit the facts as we know them.

CHAPTER VIII

"The Psychology of the Religious Life," [1] *by* G. M. Stratton

EXPOSITION

Professor Stratton's *Psychology of the Religious Life* is a unique contribution to religious psychology. The material, method, and point of view make this book distinctive among the writings of the American School. Stratton's data is drawn almost entirely from ethnological documents and the sacred literatures of mankind. He blazes a trail of his own; his work is almost altogether independent of the researches of other religious psychologists. With Stratton the logical relations, rather than the function of religion, are emphasized. He proceeds throughout on the assumption that in racial archives, in prayer, hymn, myth, and sacred scriptures the psychologist gets the best means of examining the nature of religion. This investigator then lays the ethnic records and sacred literatures of the world under tribute, and upon the data drawn from these opulent treasuries he builds his psychology of religion.

His catholicity is as remarkable as his originality: no race fails to find a place in his treatment of the religious life. The customs, ceremonies, myths, and sacred records of the Australian aboriginal, the Red Indian, the Mexican, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Malay, the Hindoo, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, the Hebrew, and the Arab, all alike are carefully considered. Stratton takes heavy toll of canonical writings, and works up his wealth of material into a complete picture of the interminable varieties of emotions, motives, ideas, and practices

[1] Stratton, G. M., *The Psychology of the Religious Life.* Allen & Unwin, London, 1911.

which play such a tremendous part in the history of religions.

Stratton's method is characterized by objective analysis all across. He groups the outstanding features of the religious life, and works back from these objective manifestations to the mental processes which gave rise to them.

Stratton's purpose throughout is to give the reader a vitagraph of the eternal warfare of motives in the religious life. He vividly portrays the psychic life of religious men as a battlefield on which powerful antagonistic motives strive for supremacy.

Stratton's thesis is that tension and conflict are of the very essence of the whole religious movement, and he supports this position by a plethora of citations from the religious literatures of the world.

Stratton's introduction provides a key to the understanding of his whole treatment. He explains the remarkable contrasts that appear in religion as due to differences in the psychological outfit of persons and races. According to this writer, man is conscious of a conflict in his interior life between the forces of good and evil, and he projects this inner struggle on to nature and the world of spirits. All nature then becomes for primitive man a theatre for the titanic conflicts of the personified phenomena of the world.

Now man is not an indifferent spectator of all this, for the issue is a matter of life and death to him, therefore he takes sides in the combat and watches the outcome with tremulous hope and fear. He becomes a partisan of those powers which further his purposes.

At first the conflict has no moral significance, but it gradually assumes such. Stratton points out that this feeling that life and the world are tense with conflict is not peculiar to religion, for art, philosophy, and political life are also characterized by this phenomenon. But in religion he opines man seems to delight in inconsistencies and paradoxes. Stratton suggests that contradictory statements as to the nature of religious objects may be the rhetorical way of religious minds of representing the inscrutableness of Divinity. He concludes that the religious man is acutely sensible of the warring desires and discords of his subjective life, and that all these inner tensions and

conflicts are projected on to the outer world, or are objectified in his conceptions of Divinity.

Stratton follows the traditional plan of distinguishing between feeling, will, and thought in the psychic life.

1. *Conflicts with Regard to Feeling*

The first thing Stratton observes under this head is the conflict in the realm of emotion between the appreciation of self and the contempt of self. He discerns a self-depreciatory type and a self-glorifying type of mind. These two opposite traits are found both in the religion of individuals and in that of large religious groups.

Next, our attention is drawn to the fact that religion makes for breadth and narrowness of sympathy in the individual and in the religious body. There is an acute opposition of forces in the religious life. There is the narrow limiting caste spirit, and there is the widely sympathetic, expansive, democratic spirit. Stratton sees in Judaism and in Christianity illustrations of this fact. He acutely observes that these two inconsistent sentiments colour the conception of the future life. The Sheol of the Jews is an anti-social conception, while the Elysium of the Greeks, the Valhalla of the Viking, the Paradise of Islam, and the Christian Heaven all reflect the broader range of sympathy. The idea of future punishment is also determined by these opposing feelings. Those of narrow sympathies consign the majority of their fellow-creatures to endless torment, while those of wide sympathies like to think of all men on their way to bliss. Stratton suggests that the size of sects roughly indicates whether the dominant feeling is of limited sympathy or the reverse. Generally the narrow, self-righteous sects are small, while religious groups of wide sympathies are large.

Stratton discovers the explanation of these opposing tendencies in two causes. First, the causes sourced in the nature of religion itself. He finds that sensitiveness to beauty and holiness is often achieved at the cost of human feeling. The contemplation of the Perfect tends to absorption in another realm, and great religious experiences tend to eliminate the sense of need of intercourse with

one's fellows. All this makes for neglect of social ties and forgetfulness of others.

The Divine object, however, moves to contrary feelings, and the contemplation of the ideal has an opposite effect. In the light of the ideal all differences of race, rank, fortune, and culture are forgotten, and man is drawn to his fellows.

This opposition of feeling in the second place may be explained in terms of human nature. This is equipped with an instinctive outfit, and these instincts oppose one another. But, he argues, pugnacity is as necessary as tender feeling in our common social life. For secular social progress there is necessary both imitation and originality. Imitation is connected with sympathy; we copy what we sympathize with. On the other hand, originality is connected up with self-assertion. The reformer must fight against his kind for his kind. Secular progress then is full of conflicting tendencies, all of which are necessary for progress. Stratton concludes all this is just as necessary for religion.

Religion influences our attitude to the world. We have to either turn our backs on the things of the world as rivals to the light, or convert these things to spiritual use. There is thus conflict between the acceptance of the world and its rejection. Religion drives some men to asceticism, while others feel that it requires no severe renunciation of the world. Both types exist in Christianity, and it is Feeling that decides which tendency will triumph.

What, asks Stratton, are the incentives to renunciation? He replies, in primitive society an idea comes into being that evil can be got rid of and good got hold of by various austerities. Again, a nervous excitability is engendered by prolonged and extreme self-denial in the matter of food, drink, and sleep, and this excitability is favourable to the seeing of visions and the hearing of voices. A deep thought lies back of ascetic practices, namely, that if the soul is to grow it must not think too much of the stomach. All wise men must keep their physiological cravings in subjection or these will baulk noble purpose. The ascetic carries this effort to pathological extremes. Yet another motive, Stratton mentions, is the thought that things most precious to us make the best gifts to God. In the ascetic life the world and all its treasures are laid at the feet of God.

Stratton perceives yet a fifth conflict of feeling, namely,

that between gloom and cheer. He distinguishes religions of sadness, such as Buddhism, from those in which joy and optimism are in the ascendancy, such as Christianity and forms of Greek religion. Both types, however, are to be found in any religion, and a single individual may at one time be cheerful and at another gloomy. Some men are naturally melancholy: the sombre mood is their habitual mood. With most persons life oscillates between these two moods. External fortune has nothing to do with it, for physiological and psychical constitution determines a man's religious outlook to cheerfulness or gloom. The ideal acts as a stimulant to some and as a depressant to others. Whole groups and even races may display this difference of constitution, so that there are ethnic displays of gloom and cheer.

With regard to the emotions, Stratton discovers two contradictory practices in the religious life. Man evaluates his emotional life, and he either looks upon it as a thing of worth or a thing to be despised. If he adopts the first attitude, he deliberately intensifies his emotional life by certain practices; if the second, he as deliberately suppresses it. The feelings have been intentionally cultivated by worshippers in all religions, primitive and cultured alike. Emotional excitement is accepted as a guarantee of the presence of the Divine Therefore frenzied feeling has been deliberately aroused from earliest times by various excitants and intoxicants. The ecstasy engendered by such practices is regarded as holy, for it is in the frenzy that the Divine is believed to communicate with men. The vegetable drugs which were used really produced visions of a strange world, hence the narcotizing devices were regarded as aids to worship. The emotional exaltation, together with the hallucinations, sealed the experience as religious. These exciting means of working up emotion are not discarded in our own cultured age. We have only refined the religious instruments of savagery. Religious feeling may be deliberately worked up by the revivalist as well as by the medicine man. On the other hand, strong religious feeling may simply be a phenomenon of the natural rhythm of the psychic life.

Stratton points out that religious sects conspicuous for emotionalism also dislike ceremonial. The reason is

obvious, for ceremonial implies a certain law and order, and imposes a restraint upon the impulsive expression of religious emotions. Stately ritual itself is a symbol of deep feeling, but its very impressiveness tends to tone down extravagant expressions of this feeling.

Stratton stresses the connection between religious feeling and art. All that is said or done in the service of God must have stateliness, dignity, and beauty of form as well as truth. He makes it clear, however, that æsthetic feeling is not religious feeling. Men do not get a new set of feelings when they become religious, but certain of their feelings get directed to new and Divine objects. Only when feelings are evoked by Divine objects can they be said to be religious.

Stratton's position is that man can only take to religious objects the mental equipment and emotional constitution he takes to his business or politics. But that which makes a state of mind or a set of feelings distinctively religious is the Divine object with which they are occupied. Further, religion does not impress all the feelings into its service; the feeling of humour is conspicuously absent from religious sentiments.[1] Only those feelings we esteem as noblest and most generous are utilized in the service of religion.

According to Stratton, feeling is the very essence of religion. He stresses the important place feeling has in human life: it affects not only conduct, but also belief; it determines man's morality, his heaven, and his idea of God. Preference depends on feelings of liking and disliking, and the worth objects shall have for us depends on preference Our ideals are determined by preference and feeling. Thought brings the world and its objects to the bar of the mind, but the verdict in the last analysis is determined by feeling. Emotions then tremendously influence religious conceptions. And when the Divine object evokes the emotions of men, human nature is torn in a hundred directions by contrary feelings and emotions.

[1] Cf. James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 38: "The Divine shall mean for us only such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest."

2. *Conflicts with Regard to Action*

The second section of the book begins with a discussion of the origin and buttresses of ceremonial. Religious acts and rites, according to Stratton, often have a shabby historical origin in magic. The dominant thought in magic is that certain objects and rites have inherent power of their own, independent of the influence and action of spiritual beings. In the history of ceremonial we meet with a transition stage which is half magical and half religious. Here potency is conceived to reside both in the magical rite and in the spirit or god behind it. Stratton holds that not until objects and rites owe their whole efficacy to the power of spiritual beings and gods do we get true religious ceremonial. He points out the fact that a ritual of religion is prone to become a religion of ritual, and that when rites are thought to be effectual in themselves we have an atavistic reversion to sorcery.

Stratton notes that the same ceremonial may have hundreds of different meanings. In illustration of this he cites the Jewish rite of circumcision, which at first was just a sanitary precaution, but which became a most significant religious ceremony with a deeply spiritual connotation. Again, he says, the communal rite of the eating of flesh or cereals, which at first was simply a crude way of getting the power of the spirit or god into oneself by eating him, becomes in Christianity saturated with the sublime thought of the spiritual communion of God with men.

It is pointed out that ceremony is not reserved for religion only, but is used in connection with the opening of parliaments, the coronation of kings, the conferring of degrees and the like. The inner supports of ceremonial are manifold. In the first place, ceremony makes for decency and order. Again, there is the natural desire to give a great occasion a great setting, and further, experience proves that ceremonial creates an atmosphere which frees the mind from trivial thoughts, and fixes it upon the object of the rite.

The communal religious act gets another support in the fact that each participant both gives and gets sympathy and support from the group. Ceremonies tend to unite men, the concrete social act gives outward expression to

an inner common purpose. The occasions of baptism, marriage, and burial are deemed too momentous to be lightly treated, therefore religious ceremonial is usually annexed to such occasions. According to Stratton, solemn rites are part of the search for the succour and protection of the spiritual world which man feels he needs.

With Stratton, myths are either personifications of great nature powers, or projections of the actual deeds of men and heroes, or they are crude attempts at causal explanation. He scouts monogenetic theories of origin of myth or ritual, and suggests that the ritual may be due to the thought of influencing the course of nature by mimetic acts, or the religious rite may be the reproduction of a divine act recorded in a myth. Often the religious rite is simply the projection into religion of the ways of approaching great earthly officials, potentates, and sultans. The acts which in actual experience produce great effects with men are carried over into religious ceremonial.

Now we come to Stratton's characteristic treatment, which finds the conflict principle everywhere present in the religious life. He points out that along with the zeal for religious rites there grows up a feeling of antagonism to ceremonial. The ceremonial itself becomes suspect, and religious leaders begin philippics against external rites as the enemy of real piety and morality. Incense becomes an abomination unto God, and all the emphasis is placed on the religion of the heart.

Antipathy to ritual is sometimes due to the fact that it is felt by certain minds to fetter the freedom of the spirit. Yet again, the radical spirit in man resents what is rigid, and feels that its individuality is being asserted when it ignores set forms, and shatters fixed conventions. Be that as it may, Stratton asserts that there is a natural human craving for ritual, and if this is not met violence is done to human nature which will be avenged.

Stratton points out in his characteristic fashion that there are rival influences on action. Opposing forces war in man's soul. Men have impulses and instincts, and they act from these as well as from deliberation and will. Human action seems to Stratton to be either remarkably unoriginal and fixed by convention, or remarkably original and defiant of convention. In religion, therefore, we have

action that is conservative, and action that is radical. The great leaders in politics or religion, says Stratton, have always defied traditions. But the mass of communicants in any religion are always conservative; they have no creative spirit, and cling to the established ways of thought and practice.

Another conflict Stratton notes in the world of will, is that between the phase of religious life that seeks to express itself in action, and the opposing mood which finds expression in passivity. In the course of religious development, an idea grows up that the passive attitude increases receptivity to the divine influx. The thought comes to dwell in the minds of individuals, that God comes not in busy seeking, but in the stillness to the passive soul. Presently groups rise up within the religious movement who maintain that religion is entirely an inward thing. This contrast between the inner and the outer is found in all advanced religions. Every religion has its externalists, its men of action, and its mystics. This explains the quietists of all ages.

Stratton illustrates this contrast between the passive and the active religionist by reference to Judaism, Christianity, the religions of India, and the religion of China. The *Vedas* stress ceremonial, and the *Upanishads* show indifference to ritual, while the *Bhagavadgita* pour contempt on the action and ceremony of the *Vedas*. The predominant thought of the passive religionist is that access to the Divine comes by detachment, devotion, and meditation, not by action. This contrast is seen in Buddhism. One sect stresses monastic seclusion and passivity as the ideal, another holds up the ideal of a life of active service. In China the same conflict is seen between the ideals of Confucianism and those of Taoism. The Confucian books stress action, but the contrary spirit is seen in the Chinese sect of Buddhists called the Wu-wei, *i.e.* the do-nothing sect.

In his discussion of the motive of passivity, Stratton draws attention to the interesting fact that the differences in religious life we have just noted are annexed to marked differences of mental constitution in men. The distinction is, after all, that which obtains between two great contrasting classes of men—namely, the practical men of affairs,

and the dreamers, the poets, and musicians of our race. This same difference, he acutely observes, is seen in two classes of scientific men. One class is led to those sciences where the principal methods are observation and manual control of apparatus. The other class is led to Metaphysics, where the chief instrument is critical reflection.

Stratton notes that the inclination to lean is strong in human nature. In the passivist the sense of dependence is strongly developed ; he loves to lean on a stronger power, and considers the best action is inaction, while in the active type the love of independence is marked. Stratton indicates the marked difference in human desires. Rest is bliss to some, but intolerable to others ; some desire change, others dread it ; others, again, wish both change and repose. Now, says Stratton, for those who love the changeless, the inner life offers a better sanctuary than the outer, therefore this type of religionist usually withdraws from the world of action. But the active type who yearn for change must mix with action lest they wither with despair.

3. *Conflicts with Regard to Thought*

Stratton affirms, thought is evoked by divine objects as well as feeling and action, and in the primitive myth we have dim intimations of the dawn of religious thought. Although we have here only the uncritical and artless setting forth of thought in crude narratives, yet traces of the intellectual element are present. In nature myths we see the dim beginnings of the scientific spirit and witness the first attempts at causal explanation. This is clearly evident in creation myths.

Our attention is drawn to the fact that thought itself comes to be regarded as a powerful instrument which does things. Early man begins to conceive the idea that if he can get to know the source and nature of the powers in his environment he will be able to control them. Here we have science in embryo, not yet, however, divorced from magic. As mental evolution proceeds, men begin to ponder things more, and a distinction is discerned between laboured thought and effortless thought. Religion at first

regards spontaneous thought as the more significant, but presently a notion swims into man's ken that religious thought must conform to the syllogism. Men then begin to give themselves to logical thinking about religion, and become theologians. The emphasis is then lifted from the emotional and volitional in the religious life, and religion becomes largely a way of thinking. The emphasis is now on correct conceptions and right belief, and religion becomes a matter of reasoning and creed.

Here, again, we have Stratton's juxtaposition of oppositions. He points out that over against those who would thus exalt reason in religion, stands the mystical group whose instincts favour intuitional thought. To all such, the thought that is spontaneous and which appears to dart in from another world ranks higher than that which is the laboured product of logical thinking and critical scientific investigation. Thus there arises a conflict between a whole-hearted confidence in the intellect and an absolute distrust of the same in matters of religion.

Stratton holds that the principal ground of distrust of human reason and science is that it tends to destroy cherished religious beliefs. The mystically minded feel instinctively that science is out to destroy the poetry of life and the religious spirit. It notes that astronomy and microscopy have made many of the old religious ideas seem petty and ludicrous, that the science of literary and historical criticism has made the old ideas of verbal inspiration untenable, and that the doctrine of evolution has considerably qualified theological thought. Therefore in the religious movement we find irreconcilable opposition between the mystically minded and the scientifically minded; the mystics are at enmity with the intellectuals, and the war is one of extermination.

According to Professor Stratton, the question of religious belief is a complex one. He states that in some religions there is belief in gods but no worship. He instances the religion of the Arabs before Mahomet; here Allah was believed to be supreme over other minor divinities, but the lower gods got all the worship. In China also the people believe in the great divinities of heaven and earth, but worship their ancestors. The Roman believed that Jove was the greatest divinity, yet worshipped his household

gods. The Greeks believed Zeus was supreme, but they built their chief temple to Athene.

Stratton explains the fact of religious belief without worship as due to a distinction of the supremest importance, namely, that between belief in existence and belief in value. Both beliefs may co-exist, but one may exist without the other. According to Stratton, then, men tend to worship the gods not simply because they believe in their existence, but because they believe in their value. The high gods seem to man to be too far off to be of use to him, therefore the lower divinities who are close at hand receive his worship. Intellectually a man might be convinced that certain gods exist afar off, but emotionally he needs a god who does not dwell apart in lonely splendour. This mental fact, then, that judgment and feeling require different objects, helps to explain how there may be belief in gods, but no worship.

Stratton is emphatic that religion cannot exist without belief of some kind, but it may, of course, exist without formulating its belief in reality, or value. The official creeds of Christendom are formulations of belief in existence, but not in value. With Stratton, formulæ are precise instruments of education. He affirms that religious bodies have two paramount duties to perform: the first is to transmit the truth already received; and the second is to receive fresh truth, a duty grossly neglected, so much so, asserts Stratton, that the religious organization prefers to encourage secession rather than amend any of its formulæ.

Stratton now leaves the miscellaneous contrasts of thought in the religious life in order to concentrate on one particular class of conflicts, namely, those which have to do with man's representation of the Divine. Human consciousness has many ways of representing the Divine; three modes are outstanding. Man represents Divine Reality by objects of sensible perception, or by images which are symbols only of Divinity, or by a character which outruns human thought and imagination.

Stratton sees two great tendencies in human thought with regard to the Divine. One mood seeks definiteness in its description of the gods, the other proceeds on the view that the nature of the gods surpasses all human description

and can be expressed indefinitely only. These moods of religious thought are opposed, and we have one of Stratton's characteristic conflicts.

We may see these two conflicting tendencies in operation in the religion of Christianity. Protestantism distrusts the definite and precise representations of divine objects in pictures and images, whereas Roman Catholicism delights in definite representations, and revels in the machinery of sense impressionism. With regard to the cause of this vivid opposition between these two tendencies of the mind, Stratton is agnostic.

Stratton points out that as science advances poetry recedes from life, and imagination withers. Nature's way is to withhold one thing when she gives another; this is why religion runs to different extremes, such as over-emphasis on social service at the cost of worship, too great an accent on emotional relationship with the gods at the expense of service, and the striving after a conceptual grasp of the Divine at the sacrifice of imagination and feeling.

In a cultured age the religious mind consciously rejects imagery as inadequate to represent spiritual realities, and begins to use the materials of its subjective experiences to represent the Divine. Sense must furnish the materials of imagination, and so the thought grows that the unseen world cannot be imagined. The transition from sense imagery to the more spiritual mode of representation is marked by acute conflict.

Stratton gives an interesting picture of the conflict between imagination and thought, using as his materials the matter of early religious literary monuments. A strange scene is spread out before us complexed with oppositions, inconsistencies, and contradictions. The fact is emphasized that the idealizing activity of thought outruns the sensuous imagination, and the image becomes inadequate to meet the necessities of thought.

The human mind, says Stratton, with his characteristic emphasis, gives sanctuary to the strongest contradictions; it thinks of its gods in opposite ways, and the works of its imagination contradict the products of its conceptions. Religion has two ways of representing the Divine, namely, thought and imagination. These two modes of expressing

the Divine may exist and conflict within the same religious group, or in the same individual mind.

In the higher reaches of religious thought imaginative pictures of the Divine are found wanting; they cannot express the fulness of the Divine. Men escape from this inadequate sense imagery along three lines: (1) They use sensuous symbols, (2) or they use material drawn from their subjective life, (3) or they seek to represent the religious ideal in terms of pure intellect. All these methods may be used together. Our attention is directed to a fourth type of mind which will have naught to do with any of these three modes, but affirms that God is above all predicates, and can be described by negations only. Here, then, Stratton gives us a view of four contrasting modes by which the human mind seeks to portray the Divine. He goes on to discuss the strange contrasts to be found in the nature of the Divine which is thus portrayed.

He discovers that the Divine is thought of as many, and as one. At a primitive stage in religion man believes in innumerable spirits, but presently a group of divinities stands out from the mass as supreme; then one god is conceived of as supreme over other gods; and finally, a belief arises in one god only. The stages of the evolution are polytheism, henotheism, then monotheism. Monotheism has never been held in any large social way, except by the three great world religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The religious life, then, is torn by a conflict between two opposing movements of thought, one making towards many gods, and the other towards an austere monotheism.

Stratton affirms the polytheistic and monotheistic attitudes are present in modern religious life; it is, he acutely observes, the polytheistic spirit which saves us from pantheism. Historically, then, these two forces stand over against each other and there is conflict. Some minds revel in variations and multiplicity, others are driven to organize the multiplicity of parts into unity and to seek the integrating principle of things. Progress is due to the conflict of these opposing forces. These opposing attitudes run through human life all across, and in the last analysis this marked difference in mental attitude is due to the differences in the intellectual and emotional make-up of men.

According to Stratton, there are two different ways of conceiving the nature of Divinity. God may be thought of as a definite person with definite attributes, or as being vague and indeterminable. God is outlined fairly clearly in the Hebrew religion and in Christianity, but with his usual keen scent for contrasts Stratton finds even in the Hebrew Scriptures an opposite movement where the Divinity is regarded as the mysterious unknown, as in the Book of Job.[1] This mood is still more accentuated in the reflective religions of the Orient, where God is not merely unknown but unknowable; here a conception of God is arrived at which is without form and void. These two tendencies of thought compete with each other in the religious life. Indefiniteness may be reached by affirming everything of God, or by denying everything of God, and so placing God beyond all predicates.

Another contrast in the portrayal of the Divine which our author notes, is the tendency to picture the Divinity near at hand, and the opposing tendency to think of God as far remote from common things. With great erudition he traces this conflict of tendencies from elementary forms of religious life to the religion of Christianity. In Christianity itself he finds this opposition and conflict. The Christological controversies illustrate his statement. Stratton holds, those who stood for the real union of the Divine and human in Christ were fighting for the ideal of a God close to man, while those who denied this stood for a God afar off. Wherever we find personal mediation insisted upon between man and God, we have this idea of awful distance of God from man. This same impulse is found in Roman Catholicism, where Christ is conceived of as too exalted to be approached directly; the Virgin, the Saint, or the Priest are required as intermediaries.

Further, when God is conceived of as afar off in awful sublimity it seems to men to be sacrilegious to ascribe the work of creation to his own hands, hence men conceive the idea of a middle term. The Gnostics found this in a demiurge, and the great distance between God and the world was bridged by a system of effluxes. On the other hand, where the gods are conceived of as close to man, they are the actual creators of material things.

[1] Job xxxvi. 26.

Stratton concludes his discussion of these tendencies which compete for the making of the character of the gods with the deliverance, that the nature of the religious ideal is not fixed by political forms of government, but rather by the differences of desire in groups and individuals. Some men desire a remote Divinity, others, a God closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet.

4. *The Central Forces of Religion*

Stratton gives pride of place to the idealizing act of the human mind as the fundamental process in religion. All of us want to remould things nearer to the heart's desire. In religion the given world of sense perception does not satisfy, hence we want an unseen larger ideal world.

Stratton's position is, briefly, man desires physical and psychic power, hence this is projected into his ideal of God. Man desires to know and explain, therefore the thought of creator is brought into the ideal of God. Man also desires logical completeness; but this desire gets us into trouble at once, for our ideal must be perfect and unlimited. How, then, are we to think of weakness, imperfection, and evil? Logic lumps everything that can be thought into the ideal of the Infinite, all heedless of the fact that in so doing morals are subverted.[1] But, says Stratton, the intellect demands that the ideal of the Perfect must also appear the Perfect when estimated by interests other than the logical; the needs of the moral sense must also be met by the ideal, and also the needs of the æsthetic sense; the ideal must appeal to the whole mind. Moreover, the picture will become coloured by earthly organizations of state, and by human desire for friendship. God therefore becomes conceived of as the great King, Judge, and Friend of mankind. All these things, then, and many more determine of what sort the ideal shall be. In a word, all that men prize most and desire most they put into their picture of God.

With Stratton, then, religion is not, as with Ames, wholly a social matter. The reverence which men show to the Highest does not originate in social feeling, but has come into being because it met and satisfied certain sensuous,

[1] Cf. Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 90–91.

æsthetic, causal, and logical needs, which are as independent of the social consciousness and social imitation as are the native innate likes and dislikes of certain objects, tastes, sounds, and feelings.

Religion has not a social origin, although it may subsequently acquire a social form. The idea of the Divine is fashioned by such a multitude of psychic activities connected with every function of mind and body, that no one activity can be singled out as the sole source of that great response of the human spirit to whatever it feels to be Divine, which we call religion.

There is incessant movement in religion; it is therefore impossible to find the permanent quality of religion in objects that have been worshipped, for they are legion; nor can we find it in the contradictory feelings which have nucleated around this multitude of objects. Religion therefore cannot be identified with the feeling of adoration, for in some religions the worshippers beat their gods. It cannot be identified with reverence or awe, for it is not always a solemn reaction; nor can the essence of religion be found in the feeling of dependence, as with Schleiermacher, for in some religions the gods depend on the worshippers for their strength, and need their sacrifices. Stratton's conclusion is, that there is no special feeling which is religion's specific mark.

His own definition of religion is as follows: "Religion is the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company; it is man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest." This unseen world takes on the colouring of the seen world. The savage mind peoples this unseen order with the grotesque and sinister, for it is the terrible things that stir the feelings most; but the ideas of goodness and kindness are also put into the picture. The picture of the gods formed by the human mind has everything in it that the human mind longs for. But the higher we go the more discontented with our anthropomorphic picture of the Divine we become; therefore, as our power of idealization grows, we paint a picture far too sublimated of the ideal existence. Although this ideal is formed to satisfy man's desire, yet he feels the solicitation and urge of the ideal scourging him upward, and he is troubled with a divine discontent.

Religion, then, is man's whole bearing to whatever seems to him to be the greatest and best; what, then, shall be the criterion of the greatest and best? The ideal will be determined by types of mind, stages of culture, and variety of response. Humanity has recognized a variety of things as greatest and best during its history, but there is a constant impulse to regard the Greatest as conscious, after some animal, or human, or divine manner. If this consciousness fades from the ideal, then the religious object loses its characteristic mark. Religion is our response to what for us is most significant; therefore the thing which appeals to us as of supreme worth need not be a monotheistic God. It may just as likely be a group, a class, a society; it is by no means necessary that the object most significant for man shall also be infinite or divine.

Men think of deity in different ways—what shall determine which ways are better, and which are worse? Stratton's answer to this question leads him from the realm of description to that of interpretation.

Stratton lays down certain standards of judgment of far-reaching importance in the last chapter of his book. First, he says, the pure expression of any single religious motive is undesirable, for if one motive is not opposed by another the religious life is not nicely balanced; but, he adds, though antagonistic motives are necessary one may well be dominant. Accordingly, religion should make a place for every type of human thought, and meet every deep human desire. Second, the assertions of religion as to what is real should be true.

Is religion to passively receive deliverances concerning the truth of its objects from science and philosophy? Stratton replies emphatically, religion is justified in taking active part in the discovery of truth along with science and philosophy, and claims an equal right to report on the nature of reality.

All these three activities of the human spirit affirm that the real world differs from the world of mere sense perception. The scientist approaches the world with a theory of knowledge, namely, that a principle of causality and unity runs through the most diverse phenomena. When the mind gets the results of science in the shape of causal explanations, it is logically restless until it gets a

background for all this phenomena; and therefore the reason is driven on to the conviction that the world of reality is not only causally explicable, but it is also shot through with rationality. Metaphysics seeks to discover this rationality. Truth for philosophy just consists in the progressive discovery of the rationality of reality.

The mind also by an inner compulsion feels the need of beauty. The only world the mind will acknowledge as real must be æsthetically satisfying. Stratton concludes, then, that Beauty, Causality, and the Law of Sufficient Reason are all alike principles of discovery. But there is a deeper need than all these—the need for sympathy and companionship; this brings its own great belief that moral order obtains in the world.

Whatever is absolutely needed to causally explain our experiences is as real for us as the experiences. Profound needs bring their own convictions. The need of science is a causal explanation of the world; the need of art is beauty in the world; the need of science and philosophy is rationality in the world; the need of ethics is moral order in the world; and the need of religion is the conviction that Divinity sustains the world and sympathizes with man. According to our author, that which satisfies the demand of the human spirit in its profoundest desires is the most real world, and is a principle which along with others is a guide to truth.

CRITIQUE

No brief exposition such as has been attempted in the preceding pages can do justice to Professor Stratton's most original book. The work bears the marks of massive erudition. The able author draws on the extant religious writings of the world, and marshals a formidable cohort of factual data, all of which converge on the thesis he seeks to establish, namely, that conflict of emotions, motives, and ideas is the cardinal characteristic of the religious life of savage or civilized man. He demonstrates by an impressive array of citations gleaned from the sacred literatures, that there is in the religious life both appreciation and contempt of self; breadth and narrowness of sympathy; acceptation and renunciation of the world, etc.

If Stratton's aim is to reveal to our wondering gaze the whole panorama of the religious life from a new angle, as a maze of opposing motives, a tangle of desires, and a perpetual war of contrary purposes, he has certainly succeeded in his object. But if his purpose is to establish the thesis that conflict is at once the cardinal and constitutive principle of religion, as a careful perusal of his book leads us to suppose, then we do not think Stratton has made out his case.

A critical examination of Stratton's work reveals the fact that it has the defects of its qualities. Stratton's method is broad based on an objective analysis of the ethnic records and sacred literatures of the different races of mankind. He treats of the objective manifestations of the religious life in various groups and races, and bases a psychological theory of religion almost entirely on these records of the ethnic faiths. Here, then, we have all the advantages of objectivity, but we have all its disadvantages too.

The objective method cannot take us very far in psychology; its chief use, as we have seen in our discussion of methods, is to supply raw material for psychological analysis. The objective or historical method to be fruitful needs to be supplemented by other methods—for example, the questionnaire, and the comparative and genetic methods. As Stratton has not invoked any of these auxiliary methods, his field is necessarily limited and his psychological results meagre. We certainly expect to find more psychology in a book which professes to deal with the psychology of the religious life than Stratton has seen fit to give us in this work. His historical description of the religious life in its objective manifestations is remarkably rich and full. But it is just criticism to observe that Stratton has overelaborated the historical side of his subject at the expense of psychological analysis. The historical treatment of the religious life is too full, while the psychological treatment, at all events for the psychological student, is not full enough. This defect of Stratton's interesting book is due to the method of his choice; it is annexed to the historical method itself. This method, when used alone, can never yield large psychological dividends.

Professor Coe observes that Stratton's attitude to

religion is analogous to that of a musical critic who discriminates the harmonies, discords, rhythmic contrasts, and the various themes of a complex symphony, and then describes what he has observed.[1] As Stratton reads the sacred Scriptures of mankind and the ethnic documents, they reveal to him that the big thing in religion in all its protean forms is conflict. His book, therefore, is severely limited by his point of view to an elaborate description of this conflict principle in the realm of feeling, action, and thought.

Stratton's fundamental thesis is that these conflict phenomena are the preponderating features of the religious life. He says the essence of the whole religious movement is conflict. Has Stratton made out his case? He has certainly abundantly, all too abundantly perhaps, demonstrated the fact that there is a conflict of feelings, desires, and motives in the religious life. But this fact of conflict is not the whole of the religious life, it is one aspect only; therefore we cannot help feeling that Stratton has fallen into the fallacy of mistaking the particular for the general, and the part for the whole. The religious movement has many aspects; the conflict phase is one aspect only. Stratton does not look so much at religion as a whole, as he concentrates on one aspect of its many aspects.

It may be conceded to Stratton that he has made out a strong case for conflict as a very important aspect of the religious life; but we need to be reminded that this life has other aspects, such as unity, reconciliation, harmony, joy, and peace. Not one of these aspects should be emphasized at the expense of others. As against Stratton's position, it is maintained that conflict is not the whole of religious experience, neither is it the principal thing in the religious life. Stratton is clearly guilty of over-emphasis here.

Moreover, his excessive accent on this conflict principle does violence to logic and reason. It is impossible that the organizing principle of religion, art, morality, science, philosophy, or any other of the possibilities of human history can be that of opposition and dissonance, strife and conflict. Conflict simply cannot be the constitutive principle in the evolution of religion.

[1] Coe, G. A., *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxi. (1912).

Stratton appears to underestimate what Levy Brull and others of the French School of sociology greatly exaggerate,[1] namely, the difference between the savage mentality and that of civilized man. He tends to mass his religious facts together, all heedless of whether they belong to elementary forms of religious life or to the religious life of contemporary culture. This fault may be charged to the purely historical method, but for psychological purposes this method must be eked out by the comparative and genetic method.

The primitive forms of religious life cannot become intelligible unless we take into consideration the psychical difference not in kind but in degree between the mind of the untutored savage and that of civilized man. Certain emotions and activities are far more easily evoked and far more often exercised by the savage mind than they are in the case of our contemporaries. Leuba tells us that fear and awe have almost completely faded from the modern man's religion,[2] while Wundt informs us that fear is regnant in the savage mind, and a richly developed set of demon ideas dominates the daily life of primitive man.[3]

Now Stratton seems to ignore this important difference we have emphasized, and to imagine that his conflict principle is adequate to relate the facts of elementary religion with those which belong to advanced culture. But if our criticism, that conflict cannot be the constitutive principle of Stratton's diverse data, be just, then his evident disregard for the mental disparity between the lower and higher stages of human culture prevents him from really unifying his mass of heterogeneous religious facts, for, as we have seen, the conflict principle cannot unify. Therefore Stratton's factual data, drawn from so many diverse sources and from so many different stages of human culture, are left unrelated.

Perhaps no psychologist can avoid utilizing the traditional tripartite division of the mind into thought, feeling, and will. At the same time, great care needs to be exercised in the use of this abstract psychological construct, lest we

[1] Webb, Clement, *Group Theories of Religion*, p. 92; see also chap. vi., "The Theory of Prelogical Mentality."

[2] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 150.

[3] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 81. See also M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 303.

treat these aspects of the human mind as if they were three separate entities. Stratton occasionally transgresses in this respect; sometimes his conflicts of feeling could be just as well described as conflicts of action or of thought. As a matter of fact, all Stratton's three types of conflict overlap. The conflicts are not so sharply defined as his treatment would lead us to believe.

Thought, feeling, will, these three phases of the mind belong to every mental act; at the same time, one phase may predominate in any given situation. Stratton holds that feeling, more especially in the lower stages of religious development, is as central in religion as knowledge and action. Does Stratton claim enough for the emotional element in the religious life? Is not feeling more central than Stratton allows? Jonathan Edwards lays down the proposition that true religion consists for the most part in the affections,[1] and Höffding maintains that religious experience is essentially religious feeling.[2] These statements square with the facts of the religious life much better than Stratton's attenuated admission. Stratton underrates the preponderating part feeling plays in the actual religious life of man.

In his discussion of the place of intellectual belief in the religious life, Stratton makes a distinction which he holds to be of supreme importance, namely, that between belief in existence and belief in value. He asserts that there are cases where we may have belief in value but none in existence; his own words are, "Occasionally we find religion becoming an allegiance to an ideal which is felt to be unreal; there is still belief in the supreme value of the object worshipped, but there is wanting a belief in its existence."[3] We must break a lance with Stratton here; religion simply would not be viable unless there were a conviction of the reality of its object. A conviction of value only is far too slender a basis for any religion; you cannot build a forty-storey building on a one-storey foundation.

¶ As against Stratton's position, we advance this proposition, namely, that a belief in reality without a con-

[1] Edwards, Jonathan, "Treatise on the Religious Affections," see *Collected Works* (1834), vol. i. p. 236.

[2] Höffding, H., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 106.

[3] Stratton, G. M., *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 215.

viction of its value, or a belief in value without a conviction of its reality would certainly not be a religious belief. The religious mind demands that its object shall at once possess reality and value. Professor Pratt makes this fact very clear in his splendid discussion of the subject of prayer. Pratt points out that there is a consensus of psychological opinion that prayer possesses value in the way of subjective effects. But the valuable subjective effects of prayer depend on the conviction of the reality of the objective relation. He goes on to say: "If the subjective value of prayer be all the value it has, we wise psychologists of religion had best keep the fact to ourselves; otherwise the game will soon be up, and we shall have no religion left to psychologize about." [1] Stratton's position that there may be religion where there is belief in value but none in the reality of that which is valued is precarious, since for the religious mind value and reality are indissolubly bound together.[2]

Stratton defines religion on page 343 as "man's whole bearing to what appears to him to be greatest and best." This definition is far too wide, it takes in too much that is other than religion. A definition should be *per genus et differentia*. Stratton has given us the genus but not the differentia. The moral consciousness, the æsthetic, the patriotic, or the public-school consciousness could be defined in Stratton's terms. The definition is so broad that it could take up into its sweep the miser, the gourmand, and the libertine.

When all's done and said, the probability is that this most complex, living, fluid reality in human life we call religion can never be satisfactorily defined. Professor Leuba has collected forty-eight definitions which fall into three fairly well-marked types—namely, the affectivist, the intellectualist, and the volitionist, respectively.[3] None of these is entirely satisfactory; indeed, one eminent student of religion holds it is impossible to define religion.[4] We cannot well censure Stratton for failing to define that which defies definition, but we simply record the fact that

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 336.
[2] Höffding, H., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 117.
[3] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*. See Appendix.
[4] Webb, Clement, *Group Theories of Religion*, p. 59.

his definition is extremely inadequate, in that it does not serve to mark religion off from other things.

No definition can be very serviceable which leaves out what Schleiermacher made the very core of his definition of religion, namely, the sense of utter need and dependence on man's part,[1] and which fails to include an account of a superhuman power which can meet this need, and succour humanity.

On pages 343 and 345, Stratton speaks of religion as being the appreciation of an unseen world, as the awakening to the significance of a special order of facts, and as the sense of value. This is good as far as it goes, but surely religion is all that and more, surely it is more than the sense of value. Stratton puts all the accent on appreciation. Is it not a truer forthsetting of the facts to say that religion is a desire for the things that are valued, and an active striving for the things that are valued as well as the mere sense of value?

In his discussion of the ceremonial and its inner supports, Stratton lays down a proposition which challenges controversy. He holds that the external acts and ceremonial of religion begin in foolish mummery.[2] To thus source the origin of savage ritual and ceremonial in mere mummery is a most inadequate explanation; it really leaves the genesis of magical and religious rites unexplicated. Stratton's explanation is reminiscent of the old Hindoo cosmogony, which explained the world as resting on the back of four great elephants, the four great elephants on the back of a huge tortoise, and the huge tortoise on nothing.

Stratton's causal explanation of the beginnings of savage ceremonial is much less convincing than Professor Ames's theory which postulates a vital connection between primitive ceremonial and utilitarian acts. Ames shows that far from being mere mummery, primitive rites really duplicate biological processes which are felt by primitive man to be momentous for the life and integrity of the group. The primitive ceremonial is then, at the outset, a group act intended to secure practical benefits to the tribe, such

[1] Schleiermacher, F., *The Christian Faith in Outline*, trans. D. M. Baillie, p. 15.

[2] Stratton, G. M., *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 133.

as food, children, protection from enemies, victory in warfare, and the like. Birth, puberty, marriage, and death, these events stand out vividly before the savage mind, because they are vitally linked up with the life of the individual and his tribe. It is these concrete situations which evoke specific reactions on the part of primitive man which become organized into ceremonial.[1] Let us take one savage rite as an illustration. We refer to the ceremonial connected with the Plum Tree totem of the Australian Aborigines.[2] Here we have a ceremony which re-enacts the drama of growth and fruition. The aboriginal depends on this tree for food; it means his life, therefore the rite connected with this means of his subsistence is of vital significance for him; it is no mere mummery. Savage ceremonial is bound up with concrete environmental situations which have significance for the life of the individual and his group. Here, then, we have a theory of origin of savage rites and ceremonial, which certainly fits the facts which anthropology has revealed. Stratton apparently ignores these concrete situations which Ames shows play such an important part in the genesis of tribal ritual. As a theory of the origin of social ceremonial, Ames's view is to be preferred to Stratton's; where Ames is disappointing is in failing to show how the transition from mere social ceremonial to religious ceremonial is made.

These defects we have indicated do not detract from the value of this rare contribution of the American School; indeed, most of the defects we have noted are the inevitable accompaniment of the historical method when used in isolation. This method can hardly do other than describe primitive magical or religious ceremonial as meaningless mummery, for this is precisely how it appears to the investigator who approaches it from the objective point of view.

We must concede that Professor Stratton has given us in this notable work a fresh presentation of the facts of the religious life; it is in this new point of view that his originality consists. The book is characterized all across by a sympathetic understanding of the religious life. The place

[1] Ames, E. S., *Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 73–74.
[2] Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 320.

and function of the new psychology of religion are estimated with rare moderation and sanity. This most scholarly and sympathetic attempt to describe the significant features of the religious life marks the author as belonging to that school of rare spirits who possess the reverent type of advanced mind.

CHAPTER IX

"A Psychological Study of Religion,"[1] *by* James H. Leuba

EXPOSITION

Professor Leuba's *Psychological Study of Religion* is one of the most thought-provoking books which has emanated from the naturalistic wing of the American School of Religious Psychology. The propositions of this book are definite and perhaps dogmatic. Dr. Leuba has made generous use of the materials furnished by anthropology, sociology, and psychology; he has also extensively utilized private documents and the questionnaire. The method with which Professor Leuba has worked in this study, is that which he has used in all his writings on this subject, namely, the comparative and genetic method.

1. *The Nature and Function of Religion*

Leuba begins with the proposition, it is natural for man to attempt to use every power he thinks is active in the world to secure his ends, and there will be as many methods of control as there are thought to be forces amenable to control. "Three sorts of behaviour conditioned by the conception of three kinds of power are found among all peoples." The first is Mechanical behaviour, distinguished from all other kinds by the presence of an implicit notion of quantitative ratios between cause and effect, and by the absence of any reference to personal powers. The second species of behaviour is the Magical; here there is no recognition of quantitative proportion between cause and effect. The unseen forces, impersonal or personal, are

[1] Leuba, J. H., *A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future* (1912), Macmillan Co.

thought of as powers to be concussed into doing man's will by means of a certain technique. The third variety is what Leuba calls Anthropopathic behaviour. This is that mode of behaviour which obtains among men in their relations with animals and society.

Here, then, we get at Leuba's differentiation of religion from the rest of life. Religion cannot be distinguished by any special emotion or instinct; its distinctive mark is a specific mode or behaviour. Religion, then, is a species of anthropopathic behaviour. The aim of religion is to get into touch with a power conceived of as psychic and superhuman, by the methods of human intercourse, in order to use it in the struggle for existence. Leuba insists that religion must be defined in terms of behaviour, not of feeling or purpose, and that it originates in the desire to live, and to live well.

Religion has no supernatural origin. Belief in gods arises naturally in the human mind. All the gods, from the most primitive to the Christian Father, are mental creations. The continuance of belief in "non-existent gods" is explained by the advantages such a false belief brings. Man thinks he gets control of nature with the help of the gods: he believes the gods will make rain for him; will ward off the lightning; and guide his arrow to the heart of his foe. Belief in the gods has a moralizing and socializing influence; it generates confidence, hope, optimism; thus it has dynamic value. Therefore, on the whole, belief in gods which do not exist produces results which make religion a factor of biological importance.

Man seeks in religion the satisfaction of his needs and cravings. In primitive religion these all have to do with self-preservation and self-aggrandizement interpreted in terms of the tribe. Religion then begins as a purely utilitarian method of behaviour, which the savage adopts in order to get superhuman aid in his struggle for existence.

Leuba criticizes current conceptions of religion. He says we can't define religion in terms of the intellect, or in terms of feeling, or in terms of will alone. None of these serves to differentiate religion. Intellectualist, affectionist, and volitionist conceptions of religion are all alike

erroneous.[1] Religion, then, with Leuba, is the concern of the whole man.

Psychology inquires, What is the function of religion in the human life? It finds religion has originated and continues to exist, because something is to be either gained or conserved by it. Man makes use of the gods in his struggle for life and development. Religion is the expression of man's will to have life and to have it more abundantly.

Religion exists, then, because of its biological value. Every human emotion and sentiment may appear in religion, but none is the mark of religion. That which marks religion off from other forms of human conduct is the kind of power on which dependence is felt, and the kind of behaviour which this power evokes. The power is psychic and superhuman, but not necessarily personal, and the behaviour is of the anthropopathic type.

2. *The Origin of Magic and Religion*

In this section Leuba begins by asking what are the mental requirements for the appearance of magic and religion? Dr. Leuba discovers, by the comparative method, that the coercitive and the religious species of anthropopathic behaviour are absent from the animal world, whereas mechanical and non-religious anthropopathic behaviour are present in rudimentary form. This points to certain mental powers in man which are not possessed by the animals. These are the presence of free ideas, and the ability of these to issue in action. The ideas of animals are tethered to sensational objects, but the ideas of man can function in the absence of the objects to which they refer. The animal's universe is made up of what is sensed only; man's universe is all this, plus what is thought and imagined as well. In magic and religion man acts as though unperceived objects were actually present, because of his power of imagination, and his susceptibility to suggestion.

With respect to the origin of the idea of impersonal

[1] In Appendix, Leuba gives forty-eight definitions of Religion, illustrating the three attitudes—Intellectualistic, Emotional, and Voluntaristic—with critical notes, pp. 339–363.

powers, Leuba affirms active experiences gave rise to ideas of unseen agencies. These ideas evoked modes of behaviour both magical and religious. In this connection Leuba lays down an important proposition, namely, belief in non-personal powers is prior to belief in personal agencies, and has absolutely no genetic connection with animism, which appeared second in order of time. The two beliefs have independent origins.

Primitive man conceived of this non-personal power as an active force. In its presence the savage stood in dread and awe. He sought to concuss it by magical devices. Leuba asserts that Tylor's *Animism* was antedated by this conception of nature which he calls "Dynamism." This is a conception of impersonal force having as its constituent idea, active power.

In dealing with the origin of ideas of unseen personal beings Leuba castigates all monogenetic theories of origin, and advances the theory of a multiplicity of origins. There are three chief sources from which these ideas take their rise. First, dreams, trances, and similar phenomena give birth to the notions of ghosts and spirits in human form, with human attributes. The second source is the spontaneous tendency to personify natural objects. In the third place, the problem of creation gives rise to belief in some maker or makers.

All these sources of ideas of superhuman beings may have operated either simultaneously or successively; any order is possible. Leuba affirms, "The conceptions out of which the gods arise are of individual origin." These ideas fructify in the minds of specially gifted individuals, and through them become the possession of the community.

Now the ghosts, unseen personal beings, and makers in whom primitive man believes, are not necessarily gods. All are connected with the life of the tribe, but some only possess the potentialities of divinity. Those beings only who are felt by the savage to have to do with his fundamental needs in his struggle for life become gods. It is the will to live that drives man to commerce with the unseen powers. Primitive gods are economic gods, they are "meat purveyors" to the tribe.

Now it is impossible for man to believe in such gods without attempting to avoid their anger or to seek their

favour. Practices, therefore, arise to do one or other of these things. This is the origin of cult.

Leuba draws attention to the fact that recent anthropological researches are reinstating the opinion that in the lowest savage races a belief in a supreme being can be discovered. This belief, however, does not point to an original monotheism, nor to a special revelation at the beginning of religion. Leuba opposes Lang, who propounds the theory of degeneration from a relatively high and noble religious belief at the origin of society.[1] Leuba says these "High Gods" and "All-Fathers" are usually negligible quantities, and are not worshipped. All the worship is given to inferior gods and spirits, over which the "high god" has little or no control. Why is this? Lang says, because we are viewing a degenerative state of religion, these lower beings are degraded high gods. Leuba holds, on the contrary, that the inferior deities are not thus related to the high gods. Man comes to the idea of superhuman beings by many routes. He gets his god-ideas from dreams, apparitions, and from his personification of startling natural phenomena. But "the high gods proceeded from an independent and specific source; they were originally the makers." This, says Leuba, agrees with the two deliverances of modern anthropology, namely, "that there exists among the primitive people now living the notion of a Great God high above all others, to whom is usually assigned the function of creator"; and second, "that these same people also believe in a crowd of spirits and ghosts."

Now the host of inferior gods and spirits take too much to do with the affairs of men. Often they are conceived of as malevolent in intention, therefore it is they who are feared and propitiated. The "high god" is conceived of as benevolent in intention, but he has become dimly conceived, and is too remote from man's practical life to be of any use; therefore he doesn't matter much either way, and hence receives no worship. Religious rites and cults begin in connection with gods conceived of as being close to man and his vital interests.

Leuba holds, religion does not originate in the emotions; no specific emotion is the mark of religion. He scouts the

[1] Lang, A., *The Making of Religion*, 2nd ed. preface, p. xvi.

theory that fear gave rise to religion, though he concedes that "fear is the most conspicuous emotion of primitive religious life"; but Leuba adds, other emotions are also present, the savage is not in a chronic state of fright. Leuba contradicts W. R. Smith who, in his *Religion of the Semites*, maintains that the propitiation of evil spirits is not religion.[1] As against this Leuba argues, since it is an anthropopathic relation with unseen beings, it is religion.

Professor Leuba emphasizes the fact that there is emotional progression in the evolution of religion. Fear gives place to awe, and awe to reverence. Then later come the sense of the sublime, gratitude, and the tender emotion. Leuba asserts that in modern times fear is being banished from religion, and awe is following in its wake.

Four reasons are given for the decline of fear in modern Christianity: intellectual criticism of the old doctrines of eternal torment, phenomenal increase in the knowledge of the physical world, modern intellectual and moral instruction. These three modern influences have robbed the old doctrines of their terrors. And lastly, the realization that the instinctive fear reaction is generally the worst way to meet an emergency. The old ideas of an angry God, judgment, hell, and the devil, have ceased to terrify, therefore, not only because men have ceased to believe in the proofs of these doctrines, but because to-day men are not so easily frightened.

Professor Leuba now takes up the subject of magic. He restricts the term to those practices designed to secure definite gain by coercitive measures. Two things mark magical practices: first, they ignore quantitative ratios between cause and effect; and second, they disregard anthropopathic methods in dealing with the mysterious powers. Frazer's classification is criticized as being too narrow. With Frazer, the whole system of magic rests on two principles—the law of similarity and that of contagion.[2] These laws are seen in operation in two classes of magic—imitative magic and contagious magic.

Leuba asserts that though much magic may be brought

[1] Smith, W. R., *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 55.
[2] Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough* (1923), abridged edition, p. 11.

under Frazer's two classes, his classification does not take cognizance of several important varieties. Leuba draws attention to the fact that there is a species of magic based on the principle of repetition. The savage gets it into his head that something that has happened once is likely to happen again. "The hook that has caught a big fish once will do so again." Now, says Leuba, "the magic based on the simple conviction that what has happened once is likely to happen again finds no place in Frazer's system." The most important species of magic which is not covered by Frazer's two principles, is what Leuba calls "Will Magic." This is based on the belief that the exertion of the will of the magician is effective at a distance. Here belong spells, curses, and incantations.[1]

Magic and religion are with Leuba two kinds of behaviour absolutely antithetical, which man adopts in the presence of exigencies which arise in the course of his struggle for life and aggrandizement. If he believes in the existence of mysterious unseen non-personal powers he will probably try to concuss them. It is this fact of coercion which is of the essence of magic. If the savage believes in the existence of personal powers he will generally attempt to conciliate them, by anthropopathic methods, and this makes his behaviour religious. He may conceivably hold both beliefs at once, then his behaviour will most likely be both magical and religious. Man may even try to coerce the personal powers; if so, this is magic, and this is why magical practices may continue even after belief in personal powers has been established. The differentia of magic and religion is not, then, the nature of the powers believed in, but the nature of the behaviour.

Leuba now turns to the origin of religious practices, which he dismisses in a few words. The sources, he says, are obvious: First, certain magical practices are taken over by religion—*e.g.* the magical ceremonies used in rain-making get transferred to religion when rain is recognized as the gift of the gods. Second, practices observed in human intercourse, such as approaching a potentate, are carried over into religion. Third, friendly offices towards the dead become transformed into religious rites. Fourth, when god-ideas appear, non-religious social feasts become

[1] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 53, 71.

part of religious ceremonial. And lastly, the occupations, customs, and principal interests of a people become embodied in their god-ideas and reflected in their religious rites.

In connection with Leuba's discussion of the nature of magic and religion and their relations to each other, he lays down a most important thesis. He asserts magic and religion are independent in origin; neither has genetic connection with the other. In this connection Leuba breaks a lance with Frazer. Frazer's theory is, briefly, that the finer spirits of the community began to recognize the futility of magical procedure to influence the course of nature, and that in their despair they were led to conclude there were superhuman beings behind the screen of nature to whom they turned for succour.[1] In some such way Frazer conceives primitive man making the transition from magic to religion. Leuba scouts Frazer's thesis; he argues, Frazer's theory of the genesis of the gods is superfluous, since they are already accounted for by a more valid hypothesis—namely, that in dreams, trances, apparitions, the impulse to personify natural phenomena, and in man's curiosity as to a creator of things, we have the manifold sources of god-ideas.

Again, Frazer's assumption that men lost faith in magic when they found it abortive is improbable, for the magician would at once ascribe his failure to the counter-influence of another rival in his art. He would not therefore doubt the efficacy of magic. His one aim would be to get much more of it to defeat the machinations of his rival. Again, primitive man does not write down his failures with a broad brush. Leuba says, Frazer ignores the psychology of credulity. It is easy for primitive man to account for his failures without giving up belief in magic.[2] Leuba holds, religion did not arise on the ruins of magic, but the two do react on each other. Magic, being prior to religion, would tend to retard the religious method of securing the same ends. Leuba makes a concession to Frazer when he declares, "Had magic satisfied

[1] Frazer, J. B., *The Golden Bough* (1923), abridged edition, pp. 57, 58.

[2] Leuba, J. H., *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 178. Here Leuba gives a splendid illustration of modern credulity in connection with Spiritualism, which retains its hold in spite of thousands of failures.

man's desires, he would have paid scant attention to the gods." "for it is mainly in times of trial that man turns to them." Leuba seems to admit that the inadequacy of magic was felt, and that the despair of magic, while it was not the origin of religion, certainly assisted its development. Leuba holds that magic antedates religion.

Leuba maintains that, though magic and religion are often found together, it is always possible to distinguish them. It is the feeling attitude and the consequent behaviour which constitute the touchstone.

Leuba holds that magic falls into disrepute sooner than religion for two reasons. "Since the power with which magic deals is not personal, it cannot provide the comfort found in communion with a loving All-Father, and it cannot serve as a stay and inspiration of the moral life." The second reason is that the principles of science are opposed to magic. "Science is built on the principle that a quantitative relation exists between cause and effect. As soon as this notion found lodgment in the human mind, magic became on logical grounds radically unacceptable."

Just as emphatically as Leuba contends religion is not derived from magic, with the same heat he argues magic is not the matrix of science. Magic is absolutely opposed to scientific procedure. The clear recognition of the principle of quantitative ratios between causes and effects pronounces the doom of magic. Thus is Leuba's proof that magic and science are not genetically related.

3. *Religion in its Relation to Morality, Mythology, Metaphysics, and Psychology*

With Leuba, morality has a non-religious origin; it is a spontaneous human product issuing out of ordinary social relationships. The appearance of moral consciousness and conscience have no genetic connection with religion. Ethnological discoveries prove the existence of social values among savages, without religious sanctions. Customs come into being and are enforced by the tribe to save it from disintegration. Punishment for violation of custom comes not from gods, but from the elder men. The struggle for existence gives rise to two codes of morality —one which regulates the conduct of members of the tribe

to each other, and another which has to do with the behaviour of the tribe towards members of other tribes. Here, then, we have, in Spencer's language, "the ethics of amity" and "the ethics of enmity." To kill a fellow-tribesman is a crime; to kill a member of a hostile tribe is a virtue. Reflective morality succeeds this customary morality, and men attempt to outline an ideal social order. But both customary morality and reflective morality are the outcome of social experience. Ethical values are established without the assistance of religion. Though morality is not sourced in religion, religion is concerned in the maintenance of tribal morality. The gods come to be thought of as the custodians of moral values. Man has moral needs and cravings; he therefore endows his gods with the moral attributes which will satisfy these needs. Religion, says Leuba, always supports the accepted moral customs of the community. In one country it places its ægis over polygamy; in another, it sternly condemns it. Religion is an instrument of morality, but an instrument of which morality is becoming increasingly independent. The gods may be used as devices to assist in the attainment of moral ideals.

With regard to religion and mythology, Leuba agrees with Andrew Lang that these arise from two different moods.[1] Religion takes its rise from the earnest and serious mood, while the humorous and fanciful is the source of mythology. Leuba affirms that the nature of the gods will depend largely upon man's moods. When in the æsthetic mood, man will model his gods in marble, and his attitude will be that of an artist; when the humorous and fanciful mood is on him, man becomes a maker of myths; when man speculates as to the origin and nature of the gods, he becomes a philosopher; but it is only when man is terribly in earnest about his relations with the superhuman powers that he is religious.

In the chapter on Theology and Psychology, Leuba turns his artillery on the Ritschlian position. An attempt has been made, he says, in modern times by Theology to reject metaphysics and science, because it is afraid of their criticism. Along with this distrust of metaphysics there has been a scrapping of the old metaphysical arguments

[1] Lang, Andrew, *The Making of Religion*, 2nd ed. preface, p. xii.

for the Being and nature of God. To-day belief in the existence of God rests on an inner experience which is considered to be an immediate revelation of God. Now, says Leuba gleefully, since this is the position of modern theology—namely, that the existence of God is an inference from subjective experience—religion and theology are delivered into my hands. Leuba states that as long as theology was reinforced by metaphysics, her metaphysical deity was immune from attack by psychology; but since theology proclaims that subjective religious experience is the proof of the Divine nature of religion, and that its Divine objects are inductions from experience, then "the gods of religion are empirical gods, and belong to science."

While the subject of religious experiences remains within the subjective sphere, his experiences are inviolable. Science accepts these as facts of consciousness which cannot be denied. But the moment the religious man asserts that these subjective experiences have an objective reality corresponding to them, then the science of psychology may pronounce on the question of the validity of this reality. We do not deny, says Leuba, that the religious man has certain experiences, but only that his construction of these is true. Whatever appears in consciousness is fair game for psychology. If superhuman factors are at work in consciousness, psychology would be able to find them, or, at all events, to discover some mental phenomena for which natural causes cannot account. But there is no phenomenon of the religious life which cannot be explicated in terms of psycho-physical laws. Man's subjective religious experiences have no objective reference. There are no Divine realities corresponding to the religious man's experiences. There are no gods.

Why, then, do the majority of sane men in modern times believe in God? Because, says Leuba, the wish is father to the thought. Men believe in God by an act of faith. They have the conviction that religion conserves the things of supreme value for their life. When faced, therefore, with the scientific account of religious experience, and the theistic version, by an act of the will to believe, they choose the unscientific account. Faith in God is based not on reason but on human needs, emotional and

moral. Men actually find these needs satisfied with the gods of religion, and these urgent needs defeat reason.

It is important to note Leuba's conception of the task and scope of the psychology of religion. Leuba asserts that religion consists in relations maintained by man with superhuman powers of a psychic kind. If these relations take the form of sensations, images, conceptions, sentiments, and emotions, and issue in activity, then they, like other departments of conscious life, are the legitimate study of psychology. The task of the psychology of religion, then, is to observe, compare, analyse, and determine the conditions and consequences of these facts.

What of visions, revelations, the imperative sense of obligation, and the definite feeling of being wrought upon by an external power? Do not these phenomena require a transcendent explanation? Leuba says they do not; everything in the religious life can be covered by the laws of general psychology, the psychology of suggestion, and the psychology of the sub-conscious. Leuba cites William James in support of his assertion. James, he says, in his *Varieties,* explained everything from conversion to mysticism without needing to posit an extra-human cause.

Finally, Leuba meets the objection that in order to understand religious experiences one must have been the subject of them. This, he appears to think, is a frivolous objection. " It is not necessary," he says, " to be a soldier in order to understand military life, nor mad in order to make researches in mental alienation."

4. *The Latest Forms and the Future of Religion*

The last section of Leuba's interesting and incisive work treats of the latest forms, and the future of religion. Five things are conspicuous in the environment of modern religion. First, pantheism is pushing its way into modern religious thought. Pantheism has triumphed in philosophy, says Leuba, because of its logical consistency, as witness, the " God " of Spinoza and Schelling, the " Regulative Idea " of Kant, the " Absolute Ego " of Fichte, and the " Absolute Idea " of Hegel. Pantheism would also sweep all before it in religion were it not that it fails to meet certain human needs, which Christian Theism satisfies.

Second, modern theology is attempting to use both the conceptions of Theism and Pantheism with a fine scorn for logical consistency. Here Leuba points to the heavy accent placed on the idea of immanence in modern theology. The attempt to reap the advantages of both Pantheism and Theism results in a fusing and a confusing of two contradictory conceptions.

In the third place, Leuba draws attention to the phenomenal rise and development of psychotherapic cults in modern times, of which Christian Science, Mind Cure, and New Thought are conspicuous examples. Now the metaphysics of these movements defies logic and even common sense, but these cults give simple formulations of a non-theistic philosophy tinctured with the absolute idealism of modern metaphysics. They also popularize the truisms of psychology concerning the influence of mind over body; further, they play on the great human need for deliverance from moral and physical miseries. These cults, however, do cure a number of cases, and to the masses now as always the most impressive thing about a cult or a religion is its power to heal the body. All the cures that result take place in accordance with psychological laws, mental suggestion playing the chief rôle.

Leuba emphasizes, in the fourth place, the fact that "the one essential respect in which the religious situation is changed is the general absence of a *bona fide* belief in personal divinities." "The leaders in Philosophy, Science, Literature, and even in Religion, as well as increasing numbers of the rank and file, reject openly or secretly the traditional Christian belief in a Divine Father in direct communication with man." These, then, are the most conspicuous features in the religious life of modern times, according to Leuba. Another movement presents itself to Leuba as he looks out over modern life, and this is a tendency towards a religion of humanity after the manner of Comte.

Modern men still want help to achieve their moral ideals, their needs are still clamant, and the struggle for life still exists. Therefore they must have a religion of some sort. Leuba now attempts to outline the kind of religion which will be seriously considered by the present and future generations.

The notion that belief in God or in a moral purpose at the heart of things is necessary to moral feelings and judgments will have no place in the new religion, but in spite of this ethical and humanitarian values will stand firm. Leuba insists a personal God will not be tolerated in the future religion; such a God is not even believed in by the thoughtful men of the present generation.

Again Leuba asserts: " The religion of the future will have to rest content apparently with the idea of a non-purposive Creative Force making of the universe neither an accidental creation nor one shaped in accordance with some preconceived plan." Leuba suggests that man would find all he wants in Bergson's idea of " a power describable as an impetus coursing through matter, and drawing from it what it can—a power appearing in man in the form of striving consciousness." [1]

Along with this last fact Leuba states that " the great mass of enlightened men " can get along without the personal God and immortality, but they agree with the following utterance: " These three ideas—the idea of righteousness, the idea that justice will gain the ascendancy, and that there is a sublime purpose in things—these I would not give up." Hence room must be made for these apparently indispensable ideas in the new religion.

Leuba inclines to the view that a religion is possible in which " the idea of Humanity would play a rôle similar to the one given it in Comtism. Humanity idealized and conceived as a manifestation of creative energy possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of religious inspiration. In Humanity each person can regard himself as a link in the chain connecting the hosts of the past with the hosts that are to come. The recognition of this vast relationship would give a sense of fellowship and unity, a feeling of responsibility and dignity; it would make a world worthy of one's best efforts."

In Professor Leuba's opinion, " the sense of weakness and imperfection, the need of comfort and encouragement, the desire for the final triumph of good," can all be met by the proposed new religion of humanity. Such a religion, nucleating about humanity, " conceived as a Force tending

[1] Bergson, Henri, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 248, 251, 261, 265.

to the creation of an ideal society," is for Leuba and " the great mass of enlightened men " the coming religion.

CRITIQUE

If any religious man fondly imagines that the psychology of religion is to be the handmaid of religion, and is to constitute the modern apologetic for Christian Theism, a perusal of Professor Leuba's definite and dogmatic book will speedily disabuse his mind of that idea. The Professor protests, evidently in anticipation of the possible panic of the pious reader, that " he has retained a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of religious life." [1] All lovers of religion, who read Leuba's interesting study, will certainly lay down the book with a profound wish that the able author had a little less of this sympathetic appreciation, which strongly resembles the friendship of Brutus for Cæsar, whom he slew. Leuba's friendly regard for the religious life is like a boa-constrictor's sympathy for its victim, which is slimed before it is swallowed. Those religious leaders, who trusted it had been Psychology which should have redeemed Israel, should ponder well this important book, which is probably the most formidable and subtle attack on religion which has been published in recent times.

Leuba's book is a study of origins. It is a genetic treatment of magic and religion from the standpoint of a naturalism whose thoroughness leaves nothing to be desired. Dr. Leuba's book covers such a tremendous field that a detailed critical estimate is impossible here. Certain of Leuba's statements, however, specially challenge criticism ; to these we will now turn our attention.

Leuba insists that belief in impersonal forces preceded belief in personal powers. This statement challenges controversy. It has already been stated that Leuba works with the comparative and genetic method. He takes the consciousness of a modern child living in the relatively cultured atmosphere of an American city as his norm of comparison ; then, by the process of deduction, he argues from the analogy of the mind of the modern child to the mental state of prehistoric man. Leuba's confident

[1] Leuba, J. H., *The Psychological Study of Religion*, footnote, p. 275.

pronouncements are made on this basis. This surely savours of recklessness.

Leuba asserts that the child views anything that has self-movement—such as clouds, wind, and smoke—as alive, but not as personal. Now, Leuba argues, primitive man will conceive the phenomena of the natural world in the same way. He gets hold of the idea of something acting and doing things, but the thought of person is far from his mind. It is natural that this notion of impersonal force should appear first, says Leuba, because "this idea of forces capable of self-movement, or of producing movement and change, is simpler than the concept person." Is this last assertion accurate? Surely the conception of a dynamic power, non-personal and causal, is far more involved than the idea of person, and, as M'Dougall says, it is extremely probable that primitive man was devoid of the conception of mechanical causation.[1]

Again, the statement that this rudimentary scientific notion takes precedence of the thought of personal powers in the average child's mind needs to be accompanied with more proof than Leuba has thought fit to give. Even if it were true of the modern child, it is a hazardous inference to argue that this is also true of the mentality of prehistoric man.

Leuba's thesis that primitive man begins his thinking about natural phenomena in terms of non-personal physical forces, and only afterwards thinks these phenomena in terms of persons, contradicts a formidable phalanx of social psychologists, of whom William M'Dougall may be taken as a typical representative. The fundamental doctrine of this school is that all human thought begins with persons and in terms of persons, while the conception of the phenomena and forces of nature as impersonal powers belongs to a relatively late development. Self-consciousness is a social product arising from the interplay of the self with other persons.

M'Dougall asserts that at first the child does not distinguish between persons and inanimate objects. "In the first months of life his attention is predominantly drawn to persons, at first merely because they are the objects that most frequently move and emit sounds, later because they bring him relief from hunger and other dis-

[1] M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 303.

comforts." Along with this, M'Dougall points out that very early from the experience of effort the child comes to assume in the objects of the external world "the capacities of feeling and effort, of emotion and sympathetic response, that he himself repeatedly experiences." Inanimate objects are at first conceived after the same pattern as persons, and only in the course of some years does he gradually learn to distinguish clearly between persons and things, divesting his idea of inanimate things little by little, but never perhaps completely, of the personal attributes, the capacities for feeling and effort, which he recognizes in himself."[1] The untutored savage likewise does not picture nature as a system of impersonal forces, but rather as manifesting conscious will and personal agency.[2]

We do not think that Professor Leuba's argument for the priority of belief in impersonal powers is strong enough to cause us to repudiate the deliverance of modern social psychology. Leuba here has apparently fallen into the snare of the psychologist, and has projected a sophisticated view of nature into the mind of the unsophisticated savage. The order of the development of child mind seems to have been at first merely sensational, then thought in terms of persons, and later thought in terms of impersonal powers. Durkheim holds that the powers of the physical world are at first conceived in connection with the ideas of authority and domination, which are socially created ideas. "The first powers of which the human mind has any idea are those which arise in human society."[3]

Leuba maintains throughout this study that three types of behaviour can be sharply differentiated, "even in the most primitive tribes": the mechanical, the coercitive, and the anthropopathic. Leuba's differentiation seems too clear and arbitrary. Professor Ames says that Lewis H. Morgan in his *Ancient Society* suggests "that if 100,000 years be assumed as the measure of man's existence upon the earth, the first 60,000 years must be assigned to the period of savagery and only the last 5000 years to civilization."[4] Leuba places the differentiation of magical,

[1] M'Dougall, William, *op. cit.* pp. 183–184.
[2] Frazer, J. G., *The* [illegible] (1913), abridged edition, p. [illegible].
[3] Durkheim, Émile, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. [illegible].
[4] Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 34.

religious, and scientific modes of procedure at far too early a period. The majority of anthropologists hold it is next to impossible to fix severe boundaries between morality, philosophy, poetry, art, magic, religion, and science in primitive life.[1] Especially are magic, science, and religion blent in an inchoate mass. In primitive life we do not have three well-marked modes of behaviour: the magical, the religious, and the scientific, but just a protoplasmic mass of human activities and potentialities which gradually become differentiated and make themselves articulate. The mechanical type of behaviour which, Leuba says, "implies the practical recognition of a fairly definite and constant quantitative relation between cause and effect," must have developed at a relatively late period. Leuba's picture of man's primitive life seems drawn out of perspective. There is a strong presumption that primitive man lacked almost completely the conception of mechanical causation.[2]

All through this interesting study, Leuba is concerned to prove that magic and science are not related in any wise. He is emphatic that science is not latent in magic. The two things are most disparate, are absolutely independent in origin, and are sworn foes. This is practically a *petitio principii*, for Leuba does not satisfactorily explain the origin of science. He dismisses this most important issue with the few barren words, "Science is built on the principle that a quantitative relation exists between cause and effect. As soon as this notion found lodgment in the human mind, magic became on logical grounds radically inacceptable."

Leuba's thesis is that embryonic science is resident in the mechanical type of behaviour, but not a germ of science is to be found in magic or religion. Leuba is antipathetic to the idea that magic had to do with the beginnings of science, apparently because he regards it as an inferior kind of behaviour. He cites the case of the savage adjusting his bow to the strength and direction of the wind. This mechanical behaviour, Leuba says, is nearer to the scientific spirit, and is superior to the magical behaviour manifested in the burning of an effigy. Can we so clearly differentiate

[1] Ames, E. S., *op. cit.* p. 33.
[2] M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 303.

the mechanical and magical modes of behaviour at this primitive stage of culture. If the arrows of the savage have been subject to a favourable magic incantation, will he not adjust and draw his bow with greater confidence? Again, Leuba himself has shown that man's superiority to the brute creation lies not in this kind of adjustment to a perceptual situation but in the possession of untethered ideas, which make magic and religion possible. Therefore, we opine, the savage adjusting his bow to the wind is not performing an act superior to the burning of an effigy, for this involves the use of free ideas.

In order to obviate the necessity of giving magic the honour of being the matrix of science, Leuba posits mechanical behaviour as its progenitor. When distinct types of behaviour, corresponding with different conceptions of power, emerged from the undifferentiated mass of primitive human activities, it is unlikely that the mechanical type which, on Leuba's showing, implies the recognition of definite quantitative ratios between cause and effect, was prior to magical or religious behaviour. The view which best fits the fact seems to be that whatever consciousness the savage had concerning quantitative ratios between causes and effects, was part and parcel of his magic consciousness.

Evidence is not lacking to show that in primitive magic a great deal of crude science was seeking to become articulate. Magic and science have a great deal in common. Both are practical in aim and seek to control natural forces. Magic is the expression of man's desire to control the forces of his environment, while he is yet ignorant of their nature. As civilization advances magic becomes science.[1] It is most probable that magic was the trail-blazer of science. Professor Wundt says: "The causality of natural law, as we know it, would hardly have been possible had not magical causality prepared the way for it."[2] Frazer points out that the fundamental conception of magic is identical with that of modern science. "Underlying the whole system is a faith implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature."[3] Frazer

[1] M'Dougall, William, *Social Psychology*, p. 306.
[2] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 93.
[3] Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough* (1923), abridged edition, p. 49.

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brings out the fact that the magician can wield his power only so long as he strictly conforms to "what may be called the laws of nature as conceived by him." "The fatal flaw of magic lies in its total misconception of the nature of the particular laws which govern the sequence of events." [1]

Leuba adduces two facts, which he holds supports his view that science is not the precursor of magic. First, he points out they are so disparate and unlike. But unlikeness is no disproof of genetic connection. Lepidoptera are most unlike the grubs from which they take their rise. The second fact Leuba mentions is that science is at enmity with magic and that the war is one of extermination. But enmity does not disprove blood relationship, the most bloody wars are civil. The fact that magic is driven out of existence, as science advances, does not prove that these two things were never related. If magic were faulty science, and there is good reason to suppose with Frazer that magic was the mental discipline which prepared men for the scientific method,[2] then Leuba's proposition only means that crude formulations of the forces of nature, and methods of control reeking with error, must go down to the grave unwept, unhonoured, and unsung, when better formulations and better methods appear. In a word, bad scientific notions must give way to better. Copernican science pronounced the doom of the Ptolemaic, but this did not disprove their genetic connection.

Leuba asserts that as soon as the notion of quantitative ratios found sanctuary in the human mind, magic became "radically inacceptable." Does not psychology place on record the interesting fact that contradictory notions may dwell peacefully together in the same mind, their inconsistency hardly ever being perceived by the person who harbours them. A trained scientist may accept the mechanistic explanation of natural phenomena, and at the same time, as a devout Roman Catholic, hold the doctrine of transubstantiation which contradicts the laws of chemistry and physics. This strange phenomenon of the human mind is referred to by Macaulay in his essay on Samuel Johnson, of whom he says, "He began to be credulous precisely at the point where the most credulous

[1] Frazer, J. G., *op. cit.*

[2] Frazer, J. G., *op. cit.* p. 92.

people began to be sceptical." Johnson rejected with fine scorn accounts which were not fully authenticated even when they were congruent with the laws of nature, but listened respectfully to the wildest stories relating to the invisible world. Leuba's assertion then seems to be untrue to these facts of human psychology. It is hard to believe that the notion of quantitative ratios destroyed magic as instantaneously, or as magically, as Leuba's statement makes out. On the whole, we think Leuba's argument for the absolutely independent origin of science is not proven.

In connection with the question of the origin of the gods, Leuba's criticism of monogenetic theories of origin seems in the main just. It is singular, however, that in his enumeration of the various sources of god-ideas he completely ignores the fruitful conception of "Mana." Modern anthropology finds in "Mana" the protoplasmic mass which afterwards becomes individualized into gods. Durkheim may be taken as a typical representative in this connection. Speaking of "Mana," he says: "This is the original matter out of which have been constructed those beings of every sort which the religions of all times have consecrated and adored. The spirits, demons, genii, and gods of every sort are only the concrete forms taken by this energy or 'potentiality,' in individualizing itself." [1] "Mana," then, in the opinion of the majority of modern anthropologists, is the most primitive conception of the supernatural which we have yet discovered. It is a conception which is universal among savage peoples. It is known by the name of "Oudah" among the Pygmies in Africa.[2] The Sioux call it "Wakan." Among the Iroquois it is called "Orenda." The Shoshone tribes name it "Pokunt," and among the Algonquin it is called "Manitou." [3] In Melanesia this conception is known as "Mana." Anthropology has taken this term over into its vocabulary as the one best fitted to denote that diffused, amorphous, ubiquitous power which the Melanesian authority, Codrington, says "is a power or influence, not

[1] Durkheim, Emile, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 199.
[2] Wright, W. K., *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 27.
[3] Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 192–194.

physical and in a way supernatural; but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses. This Mana is not fixed in anything, and can be conveyed in almost anything. All Melanesian religion consists, in fact, in getting this Mana for oneself, or getting it used for one's benefit." [1]

This concept "Mana," then, is that with which modern anthropology works. The genesis of many of the god-ideas may be traced back to this primordial conception. This conception, which has the imprimatur of anthropology, is the working hypothesis of not a few of the eminent psychologists in the field of religion. Professor Coe speaks of "Mana" as "the taproot of god-belief." [2] Professor Pratt holds "that the earliest religious object was in all probability that impersonal and superhuman power which the Melanesians called "Mana." Pratt inclines to the view that both magic and belief in spirits grew out of the "original concept of Mana." [3] This theory of a protoplasmic mass which has been subsequently individualized into gods, a theory which has the backing of a great number of eminent anthropologists and psychologists, deserves more recognition than Leuba has seen fit to give it. In fact, Leuba has ignored it completely in his discussion of the origin of god-ideas.

In his study of religion, Dr. Leuba seems over-eager to discount the part played by emotion in the genesis of religion; especially is he concerned to point out that religion did not originate in the emotion of fear. In view of the fact that there is much evidence to support the view that fear was the primary and dominant emotion at the inception of religion, Leuba's assertions in this connection need to be accepted with reservations. Though it is doubtless true, as Leuba reminds us, that the savage is not in a chronic state of fright, yet the objects of his terror were the first objects of his attention. The regular rising and setting of the sun, moon, and other usual operations of nature probably gripped primitive man's attention as little as it does our own.[4] But it was otherwise with the

[1] Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 118.
[2] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 90.
[3] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 310, 311.
[4] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 92.

irregular happenings in his experience, such as disease and death, flood and famine, the lightning's flash, and the thunder's roar. These were the events upon which his mind pondered, and his imagination constructed terrible powers to account for these fearful events. The savage was therefore frequently in a state of fright, and instinctively tried to avoid giving offence to these awful powers. M'Dougall suggests that the gods have had an emotional and instinctive origin. His view is that the objects of primitive man's terror were also the objects of his curiosity. His imagination under the influence of fear pictured terrible powers back of the phenomena, immediately the instinct of subjection was evoked with its emotion of negative self-feeling. Further, primitive man, finding himself in this submissive attitude before these terrible powers, which is a personal attitude arguing a personal relation, was led to project on to these powers the personal qualities of power and wrath which are the natural stimuli of this instinct among men. Thus primitive man evolved personal gods from the instincts and emotions excited by the objects of terror in his environment. Man began by fearing and wondering in the presence of these powers; he ended by humbling himself before them. This is the beginning of religion.[1]

M'Dougall's theory of the emotional and instinctive origin of religion is supported by Wundt. He indicates that fear plays a larger part in the life of primitive man than Leuba is inclined to allow: "A richly developed set of demon-ideas dominates the daily life of primitive man." [2] Wundt points out the fact that belief in magic and demons is the most conspicuous feature of primitive life. This belief in demons is the product of terrifying situations. The terrifying phenomena of death and sickness are the main sources of belief in demons. Magic comes into existence as a method of protection against the power of the demons; by its means they can be propitiated or restrained. This demonology prepares the way for religion proper.[3] With Wundt, religion does not really begin till gods emerge.

[1] M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 305; see also whole chapter on "Instinctive Bases of Religion," pp. 302–321.

[2] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 81.

[3] Wundt, Wilhelm, *op. cit.* p. 284.

The god is a fusion of demon and hero. The point here, however, is, that these demons which dominate the life of primitive man are products of the imagination excited by fear and terror. This characteristic belief of early man is the product of emotion. To speak, therefore, of religion as originating in the emotions may not be ruled out of court as easily as Leuba imagines.[1] Leuba's assumption that the emotions have no part in the genesis of religious ideas is questionable, as is also his attempt to depreciate the tremendous part the emotion of fear plays in primitive life and religion.[2]

Leuba's opinions on the relationship of morality to religion are clear-cut. Morality has a non-religious origin. Religious motives are not associated with morality from the dawn of civilization, as is often supposed Religion is by no means the original source of moral inspiration, though it may be, and has been the custodian of morality. Since ethics and morality have come into being without the assistance of religion, and now are of age, they don't need religious props any more. Morality to-day is absolutely independent of superhuman beliefs. Leuba says: "Anchored in this assurance and fortified by a sense of human fellowship, man is prepared to surrender if need be the assistance which cruder generations have found in superhuman beliefs." Let us set over against this *ex cathedra* utterance the considered opinion of Benjamin Kidd, who affirms that the function of religious beliefs in human evolution is to "provide a super-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual, necessary to the maintenance of the development which is proceeding, and for which there can never be, in the nature of things, any rational sanction." [3]

Social psychology indicates a closer relationship between morality and religion than Leuba will allow. One of the most eminent representatives of social psychology in modern times emphasizes the closeness of the relationship between morality and religion. The two were not at the beginning separate, and then later fused together; they have from the first been vitally connected. Religion, from

[1] Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough* (1923 ed.); see preface, p. vii.
[2] Höffding, H., *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 261.
[3] Kidd, B., *Social Evolution*, pp. 107–108.

its embryonic beginnings, enforced by supernatural sanctions the modes of conduct prescribed by primitive custom. Leuba's confident opinion that the withdrawal of the religious sanctions from the ethical life of modern society would make no difference to the body politic is not shared by social psychology. Professor M'Dougall holds that in connection with this question of religion and morality "we must recognize that a firm and harmonious relation between them has been in every age a main condition of the stability of societies." [1]

We remember that George Eliot's ethical ideals crashed when unsupported by religious sanctions, and we do not think the generality of men will be more successful. Professor Pratt, in this connection, records the significant fact that in answer to his question, "If you became thoroughly convinced that there was no God, would it make any great difference in your life, either in happiness, morality, or in other respects?" The majority of his respondents affirmed it would certainly weaken their morality. Pratt, commenting on this result, says the thought of a Divine Friend who cares does support the feeble virtue of most of us, and the categorical imperative of Kant would not have the same helpful power.[2] We believe that a dissolution of the vital union which yet obtains between morality and religion will be fraught with disaster to both.

Leuba's *ex cathedra* utterance, that the morality of modern times is absolutely independent of religious sanctions, is a theory which has yet to be tested. At present we must regard it as an assumption that awaits proof. History teaches that decay of religion and moral decadence are bound up with each other in a singularly sympathetic and vital manner.

Leuba's constructive work is the most unconvincing part of the book. His account of the projected new religion of the future leaves an impression of confusion behind. Clearly, Leuba is more successful at casting down the walls of Jerusalem than in rebuilding them. He places a heavy accent on the fact, that ethical principles and moral practice are absolutely independent of theistic

[1] M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 314.
[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 268.

beliefs and Divine sanctions. Man can get on quite well without belief in God, or in the moral purpose at the heart of things. " The religion of the future will have to rest content, apparently, with the idea of a non-purposive Creative Force, making of the universe neither an accidental creation nor one shaped in accordance with some pre-conceived plan." Elsewhere Leuba indicates that though " the great mass of enlightened men can get along without the personal God and Immortality," they hanker after three ideas which had better be included in the new religion. These ideas are—the idea of righteousness, the idea that justice will gain the ascendant, and that there is a sublime purpose in things.

Again Leuba says, the coming religion will be centred about humanity conceived of as a manifestation of force tending to the creation of an ideal society. Now these two ideas—that of " a non-purposive Creative Force " and " a sublime purpose in things," and that of a teleological force which creates an ideal society—could scarcely exist in one and the same religion without collision.

Again, as a substitute for the God of Christian Theism, Leuba proposes our great and noble ancestors. Theistic worship is to be replaced by a modern form of improved ancestor worship. Leuba has uxorious affection for a religion in which " the idea of humanity would play a rôle similar to the one given it in Comtism." The great and noble men of all ages conceived of as embodiments of a Creative Force working in mankind and the universe are well qualified to generate the emotions which the theistic conception now evokes. Strength and satisfaction of moral cravings are to be got by means of prayers addressed to this ideal society. By the use of a little imagination Leuba suggests, a cult with appropriate symbols would arise on this atheistic foundation. It would seem as though Leuba has underrated the amount of imagination required in this connection. One is inclined to say, " I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." This is Leuba's religion of the future, but if observation, history, and experience teach anything it will not be the religion of mankind.

We can appreciate the difficulty of Leuba's position ; it was the same difficulty which beset Comte. The problem

to which Leuba addresses himself is, after having shown that ethics and moral practice and progress are absolutely independent of religious beliefs and sanctions ; and after declaring the impossibility of Theism, how to make a religion out of the non-religious fragments that remain. Leuba has done no better and no worse than any other man who attempted the solution of the same problem. We do not think Professor Leuba has solved this problem, and we do not think any other man can.

To a psychologist of such logical ruthlessness as Dr. Leuba, this ought to have been apparent. Leuba has demonstrated to his own satisfaction the groundlessness of all religious ideas. There are no gods to swear by, and none to pray to. Further, he has emphatically declared that all man's moral, æsthetic, and intellectual values are given him by his race, and all his sublime inspirations, and the sense of being wrought upon by a power not himself which makes for righteousness, come from no Divine source, but are the auto-suggestive products of his own human consciousness. Since these are Leuba's convictions, it would seem that all that remained to do after assassinating religion in the interests of science and humanity would be to give it a decent burial and usher in the enlightened age of the psychologists. But this is not so. Professor Leuba is too shrewd a psychologist not to see that in exterminating religion he has failed to extirpate the religious needs and moral cravings of mankind. All he has succeeded in doing is to apparently destroy the natural satisfaction of those needs.

Leuba can quite clearly see that when he has taken away the people's bread their hunger still remains. Here, then, are urgent desires, and clamant needs and cravings. Leuba's problem, therefore, is to convince men that if they were enlightened psychologists they wouldn't cry for this bread that has been destroyed, but would swallow a new tabloid food that he and other psychologists deem more suitable for the men of this and coming generations.

This tabloid contains a great deal of the Cult of Comte, some of the best features of the naturalistic Ethical Culture societies, and selected elements of Eddyism, Mind Cure, New Thought, and other similar Therapeutic associations. Now, this syncretism is certainly not a religion, and will

never be accepted as such by the majority of "the enlightened mass" of mankind. Leuba's religion, so called, like Comte's, lacks the philosophic background which alone can give it the breath of life. A philosophy or a system of ethics may be reared on a purely naturalistic and atheistic basis, but a religion cannot be. We cannot agree with Leuba that the question whether a religion could be built on a consistently naturalistic view of the world is purely academic. On the contrary, we believe this question is a practical one, and that if Leuba had seriously considered it, he would not have written this last chaper of his book. There can be no religion without Theism in a rudimentary or developed form. If Buddhism be cited as a contrary case, the reply is that Buddhism in its inception was not a religion. It became a religion after the death of its founder, when theistic factors were smuggled in.[1] Whenever a philosophy, a body of ethical teaching, a therapeutic association, or a Comte-like cult of humanity manifests religious symptoms, it is always because these brave cults discover that without certain purely religious ideas their proud superstructures would crash. They therefore smuggle in in a clandestine fashion the theistic elements which are vital to their existence. These plagiaristic cults do not scruple to incorporate vital elements of Christian Theism without acknowledgment. "The dishonest shifts to which traditional Christianity is now driven," we remind Dr. Leuba, are not the monopoly of theology.

In spite of Leuba's asseverations to the contrary, "the mass of enlightened men" know they cannot lift themselves up by tugging at their own boot-laces. Men must have a religion of Divine succour or none. It is said that Heine went once to look at the statue of Venus de Medici, but when he saw it, he wept, because the statue had no arms. In the worship of humanity there is no succour. When Heine was asked, as Leuba asks us, to worship humanity as God, he said he thought men were very different from God, and very dirty, therefore he would have to fall back on Another. Science can make a good soap, but it cannot cleanse the human heart from conscious guilt. Humanity can build Forth Bridges, and cleave continents in twain, as at Panama, but fails when it comes

[1] Tiele, G. P., *Outlines of History of the Ancient Religions*, p. 137.

to the making of character, the comforting of the bereaved, and in the presence of death.

The weakness of Comte's religion of humanity, which Leuba himself so clearly exposes, is the same weakness which vitiates his own projected religion, namely, the absence of a philosophic background which can make a religion possible. We therefore have no hesitation in saying Dr. Leuba's new religion is not viable.

Professor Leuba is on firmer ground when he asserts, in another connection, that if we eliminate metaphysics, religious experience can give us no sufficient ground for faith in God. Leuba's strictures on the Ritschlian attempt to eliminate metaphysics from theology are on the whole just, but he needs to be reminded that Ritschl himself never succeeded in this attempt, and that in any case Ritschl's type of thinking is not the genus theology, but only the species Ritschlianism. Many Christian theologians have criticized Ritschl's attempt to land theology in pure subjectivism.[1]

Since Leuba's assumption that modern theology has discarded metaphysics is mistaken, his inference is erroneous also, namely, that theology minus metaphysics is only an articulated system of propositions about religious experience, and hence is reduced to a branch of psychology. Theology repudiates this accusation. It does not confine itself to the study of religious phenomena and their observed behaviour. This is the business of a psychology of religion, and one might add, its whole business. Theology is more than a science of religion, it goes beyond the psychological and historical data and faces ultimate questions, and attempts to explicate these in propositions which are intellectual in form. Far from thinking with Ritschl that the supreme way of commending theology to men is to affirm there is no reason in it, modern theologians proceed by processes of inferential thought and theoretic judgments.

Modern Christian thinkers do not hold that a sound theology can be reared on judgments of value alone. It is true that religion ignores logic and the methods of sciences. Religion proceeds by subjective estimations of spiritual

[1] Orr, James, *Ritschlianism: Expository and Critical Essays*, pp. 18–20.

preciousness, and solves her problems by intuition. The propositions of religion are expressed in poetic forms of thought, but theology is not religion. Theology has originated in response to a practical need for a rational explication of the content of the Christian Revelation and religious experience. Theology is the discipline whose deliverances have to do with the metaphysical implications of the facts of religious phenomena.

Leuba affirms, if we eliminate metaphysics, theology becomes a branch of psychology, and religious experience can give us no ground for faith in God. But theology does not eliminate metaphysics; it is not a branch of psychology. Theology is the metaphysics of religion.

A colossal *petitio principii* runs all across Leuba's treatment of religion. Leuba takes for granted the fact that Theism has become an absolutely impossible position. Clearly such an important assumption as this stands in need of proof, and must appear rather as the conclusion of a process of demonstration than as a self-evident axiom. We agree with Leuba when he says, "The task of psychology in respect to the group of facts constituting religious life is to observe, compare, analyse, and to determine the conditions and consequences of the appearance of these facts." It is quite legitimate for psychologists to deal with the experiences of the religious subject, and make the following deliverances: these are the facts our methods reveal; this is the way they happen in human consciousness; these are the modes of their connection as ascertained by our methods. But in all our investigations, we have been unable to find in human consciousness anything of the nature of a supernatural cause. These, we hold, are the legitimate deliverances of the science of psychology.

The case is other, however, when the psychologist passes from his legitimate task and makes confident ontological pronouncements. Leuba is specially guilty in this respect. He declares religious consciousness has no outer reference in reality. There is no superhuman origin for anything in man's religious consciousness. There is no such thing as Divine causation in religious experiences. Now these ultimate references of religious consciousness are questions with which psychology has nothing to do, and with which it is not competent to deal. These dicta

of Leuba are not psychology. They are just the dogmatic unauthoritative ontological assertions of a psychologist who has laid down the tools of his own department.

Leuba defends his attitude by saying every transubjective reference falls under the criticism of the intellect. Leuba is quite right in arguing, that because an objective reality stands outside a subjective experience it is not on that account exempt from scrutiny of the critical intellect. But he is wrong in thinking that this critical intellect must always be that of the psychologist. There are many physical sciences and metaphysical disciplines within whose special departments such transubjective references lie. It is the prerogative of psychology to make authoritative reports concerning human consciousness and its experiences; but the pronouncements of such a science, affirmative or negative, as to the real existence of the ultimate causes, and realities corresponding to subjective experiences, are as gratuitous as they are valueless.

In spite of these defects which have been briefly touched upon, Professor Leuba's psychological study of religion is a book which no serious student of the subject can afford to neglect. It is destined to determine in its main outlines the methods and munitions of modern apologetics.

CHAPTER X

"The Psychology of Religion," [1] *by* George Albert Coe

EXPOSITION

Professor Coe's book represents a new and an inevitable phase in the history of American religious psychology. Prior to its appearance psychologists had confined themselves to special lines of investigation, and had given their attention to particular portions of the field of religion. In Coe's book we meet with one of the first attempts to comprehensively survey the whole field. The book essays to outline the various problems that have emerged in connection with the scientific study of religion, and an effort is made to co-ordinate the results which have been achieved.

This psychologist deals with almost every important phase.

Three outstanding features mark this book. The first is the remarkable candour with which the author states his own religious predilections, and the frankness with which he puts us in possession of his position with regard to the psychology of religion.

The second thing of note is the fine alphabetical and topical bibliography which is annexed to the book. This large but carefully selected bibliography is of great value. The student will find in it an apparatus of utility in following through the various problems raised by the psychology of religion.

The third important feature which gives us the key to Coe's psychology of religion is his heavy accent all across on consciousness as personal, functional, and social. According to Coe, the psychology of religion only becomes

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion* (1916), Univ. Chicago Press.

significant when it repudiates the old structural mechanistic mosaic psychology which describes mental states as static unities. The psychology of religion must recognize that each sensation, feeling, or other element of structural psychology is simply a specific aspect of a self-realizing life; in other words, it must go beyond mental states and mechanisms and deal with persons. With Coe, then, the psychology of religion must view its data from the functional point of view.

Now the notion of mental function involves the thought of adjustment; but this does not mean with Coe adjustment to the physical environment, for the mind moulds the outer environment to suit its inner requirements. If we adjust ourselves to anything he says, it is to our social environment; but even here we must considerably qualify our notion of adjustment, and rid the term of its purely biological connotation.

Religion with Coe consists in the progressive discovery and organization of values. Needs change, and new values are discovered, as a matter of fact and history. Religion, then, according to Coe, is a solemn or joyous reaction in which the individual or group seeks life in the shape of any values whatever. Coe maintains, wherever men intensely identify themselves with something as their very life, there you have religion. Any reaction, then, may be considered religious that seeks the conservation of any values whatever. Coe is emphatic that religion does not create any new value; religious values are not distinct from ethical values or any other values. Religion is an immanent movement within all our valuations; it influences and operates upon all our appreciations. The function of religion, then, is limited to that of unifying the scattered values of life.

Professor Coe maintains that religion is first a public matter, and only latterly a private matter. The beginnings of religion, therefore, are to be sought in the primitive social group. This group is entirely dominated by customs which are enforced by the sanctions of social scorn and disabilities, and by fears of unseen beings. Primitive religion is a body of customs which receive blind obedience from the individuals of the tribe.

The interests of the primitive group are narrow and

non-intellectual. The savage lives an emotional rather than a thought life, and his crude picture-thinking nucleates about food-getting, birth, initiation, marriage, war, sickness, death, and protection from beasts, elements, and the like. Such interests are back of primitive religious customs and all other customs. At this stage religion, morality, law, science, art are an undifferentiated mass, life has not become departmentalized. At this stage the variant great man is swallowed up by the group. The course of evolution, according to Coe, is away from instinctive action, through custom, to personal reflection. In primitive life the instinctive impulses of the individual are controlled not by his own reflection but by the social pressure of his group.

Now, says Coe, early tribal ceremonial has religious significance, and all the ancient rites, religious and magical, alike represent two things: first, the social organization; and second, current ideas as to how the values of life are to be secured. The values recognized by primitive man are utilitarian; they consist in an abundant food supply, success against all human foes, beasts, the elements, and the preservation of the integrity of the tribe.

The various ceremonies of savage life are the measures primitive man takes to conserve these values. Coe holds that primitive man seeks three things: (1) To fill out values; men here seek plenty. (2) To conserve values; here men seek to produce a stable social order which shall be in favourable touch with the powers that be, upon whom values depend. (3) To unify values; here the aim is to produce automatic subordination of individual desires to social standards. According to Coe, then, religion exists in primitive life because the savage believes it does things for him, not because intellectual belief or ideation prevails. Religion gets him food, gives him victory, and makes the group strong. It springs, then, from instinctive behaviour, and grows out of the social instincts which are back of custom and social organization.

Coe maintains, though religion started in the company of magic and spiritism it tends to grow apart from these. He holds that theriomorphism preceded anthropomorphism; the totemic animal ancestor was first, and only afterwards were the gods thought of as having human form. Coe

points out that there is a transition stage when we can see theriomorphism passing over into anthropomorphism; here we find the gods are conceived of as part animal and part man. He insists, however, that anthropomorphism is present in religion from the very beginning; all through the savage reads the qualities of men into his totemic animal ancestors.

Coe's position with regard to magic is in substance the same as that of Irving King. He cites and rejects the view of Frazer that when magic was found to fail, religion was tried as a substitute.[1] He rejects Leuba's view also, that magic and religion are absolutely distinct in origin and principle.[2] Coe holds that Magic and Religion have a common root, but afterwards become differentiated.[3] Religion organizes life's values and seeks them socially, but magic fixes upon a particular value, and seeks it independently of the larger social order.

Coe affirms that in discussing the origin of the idea of God at first there were simply inchoate conceptions; then objectifications of man's unorganized impulses in the shape of vague and shifty spirits, and a belief in Mana, the diffused power that does things; then finally man arrived at the idea of the gods.

In answer to the question—What are men about when they combine such elements into a god-idea?—Coe warns us we must beware of the psychologist's fallacy. It is necessary, he says, to put ourselves in the environment of primitive man and ask ourselves, How would we act with the primitive man's psychological outfit and knowledge? The savage's thinking is emotional thinking; he transfers the glow of his mind to the objects of his thought; therefore to him objects become living things, positively friendly or unfriendly.

Coe maintains that there was a preanimistic stage in religion, and that animism is not the origin of religion. Animism is a stage of religious evolution, but not the first stage. The original factor in the whole process is the self-projection of emotional situations into objects, which personalizes them and makes them positively friendly or

[1] Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough* (1923), abridged edition, pp. 57–58.
[2] Leuba, J. A., *Psychological Study of Religion*, chap. ix.
[3] Cf. King, Irving, *The Development of Religion*, p. 176.

unfriendly; here he holds we have the real origin of spirits.

Now, says Coe, we cannot rigidly mark off the gods from spirits. Both alike are projections of what men felt in themselves when they were emotionally excited. But gradually certain spirits came to represent the more valuable things of society, and were approached by group ceremonies, while the inferior spirits came to represent the anti-social elements of society. These last, instead of being worshipped by the group, were thought of as subject to the control of the individual, and thus magic became identified with spiritism, and religion with gods. Coe discounts the wonder theory of the origin of god-ideas. He objects, the striking phenomena of nature are really not so striking after all; the sun, moon, stars, lightning, and thunder are too common to evoke wonder. Again, the religious ceremonies in which natural phenomena figure are precisely the ceremonies which have to do with the food supply of the tribe. In a word, the source of the god-idea is organic and social need, it is hunger and not wonder.

Coe's conclusion, briefly, is that primitive man has an underived conviction that the food supply, protection from enemies, success in war, and the integrity of the tribe are the most precious values. Second, along with this conviction of values there grows up another conviction that an extra-human power resides in ancestors, nature powers, and spirits, which can help him to have and to hold these values for himself and his group. This spontaneous underived conviction is the beginning of the god-idea.

Religion, according to Coe, is much the same everywhere in its primitive stages, but great differences are discernible in its more developed forms. Coe's explanation is that religion is not a separate interest with a unique character, but simply a principle which organizes the values that are recognized at any given stage of culture. Religion is a way of dealing with values or interests. If, then, we can get at the factors which condition the interests of a people, we will get illumination with respect to the rise of species of religion, as distinguished from the genus. Coe indicates seven such factors: (1) Geographical situation; (2) Economic development; (3) Social and political

organization; (4) Interaction of peoples; (5) Cultural influences such as Philosophy, Science, and Art; (6) The institutionalizing of religion; and (7) The influence of great individuals.

Coe's treatment of the three main types of group conduct is most illuminating. Crowd action, according to this writer, is action that results when inhibitions have been narcotized by suggestion. Now crowds have certain functions which Coe indicates. The massing together of men in a crowd satisfies the gregarious instinct; it engenders the pleasant feeling of freedom from perplexity, the loss of the feeling of responsibility, and gives the sense of power; it offers opportunity for indulgence in instinctive impulses, and this massing together of human energy gives the feeling of enhanced efficiency.

Now the crowd group as such has severe limitations. The crowd can enforce standards but can never reconstruct them, for this needs thought and deliberation. The crowd is cruel, immoral, and anti-social; these are its characteristic marks. The crowd may indeed be led by a morally discriminating person to social ends; but this is purely accidental, for it may just as easily be led by an unscrupulous rascal to anti-social ends.

The second species of group conduct is the sacerdotal; here we have the specialized control of group conduct. Organized tribal religions, national churches, and all churches that attempt to enforce as final a particular form of doctrine, worship, or polity are instances of sacerdotal group conduct. The unity is brought about in the sacerdotal group, not as in the crowd by desultory suggestion, nor as in the deliberative group by deliberation among the members, but by systematized suggestion in the shape of ritual, sacrament, sacrifice, and a code of commands and prohibitions. Pictures, statues, processions, and the like are all instruments of suggestion used by the sacerdotal group. These things do not promote reflection but bring the attention back repeatedly to the same point, and so renew the control of the worshipper's mind.

Coe indicates, in the second place, that this group is bound together by commands and prohibitions which deal with matters of belief as well as conduct. Here, again, we have suggestion in the direct forms of command. Per-

petuity of control is sought through diligent instruction of the young. This instruction is not intended to stimulate individual thought and reflection; it simply provides for the repetition of the past, and consists in three things: the drilling of formulæ into the pupil's memory, the moulding of habits of thought on the basis of direct command, and the strict predetermination of the conclusions of reflection. The sacerdotal group recognizes well enough the individuality of its members, but it seeks to control these personalities and bring them into subjection to its authority. It enforces its will by means of sanctions in the shape of rewards, pains, and penalties.

The sacerdotal group performs certain functions which are of value to the tribe and nation. For example, it makes the warrior more confident, and his obedience more sure in time of war. In time of war each army is encouraged by its national church to think that God is on its side. Now Coe shrewdly points out that the effect produced by the sacerdotal group is not due to reflective thought but to pure suggestion, since the national point of view, right or wrong, is sure to be backed by the sacerdotal group. Sacerdotalism, says Coe, has a true kinship with the military type of social organization.

The third species of group conduct Coe indicates is that of the deliberative group. Here the conduct is greatly different from the types we have already observed. Before each common act this group pauses to reflect. Is there any further discussion? is the question always asked before an act is done by this group, and individual initiative is encouraged with a view to the reorganization of the group. This group performs certain important functions. It brings the satisfaction of weighing and criticizing satisfactions, and the evolution of society itself is due to the criticism and reconstruction on the part of members of the deliberative group.

Now it is plain that a religious group may be considered under one or other or all these categories—namely, the crowd, the sacerdotal group, and the deliberative group. When a church partakes of the nature of this last, we find that the worship is designed to stimulate the worshipper to thought and reflection. The sermon plays an important part, and the minister in prayer tries to voice the aspira-

tions of the group. Coe shows that the ideal of the deliberative group influences the idea of God. The Divine Being is not looked upon as a King, but rather as the gracious Power back of all aspiration and achievement, the Power which inspires the ideals by means of which we judge all things. God becomes the inner pressure which causes the questioning of standards.

Coe brings out very clearly the vast difference in the methods by which the various groups achieve unity. The crowd achieves unity by doping inhibitions and thus preventing its members acting as rational and responsible individuals. The sacerdotal group, by prescribing in advance how the individual shall act; it manipulates its individual members, while the deliberative group heightens the individuality of its members by encouraging reflective thought, discrimination, and free discussion. It organizes the self.

From religion considered under the aspect of group conduct, Coe passes to religion as individual conduct. According to Coe, neither society nor the individual are static things, but are both in the process of becoming. Society does not control the individual any more than the individual controls society. We cannot, therefore, say that religion is an individual phenomenon any more than we can say it is a social phenomenon. The truth is, says Coe, that in the evolution of both society and the individual, religion has played an important part.

Coe holds, the individual cannot become a developed personality without the help of society. With Coe, society and the individual are simply two indissoluble aspects of the same great human movement. Social consciousness and individual consciousness arise together; the idea of self and the idea of socius come into being together and are never after separated. Coe holds, individuality may be spoken of as a social phenomenon, for it is the social environment which really sharpens the outline and makes for the individualizing of the self. Now religion acts in the same manner; it makes men more conscious of themselves as individuals. According to Coe, then, religion on the whole is an individualizing process.

Coe asserts that the fact that religious self-realization takes place within a social medium is firmly established,

and that when this self-realization is attained abruptly, and is accompanied by intense emotions, we have the phenomenon of conversion. Coe's analysis of conversion yields four features: (1) the subject's very self seems changed; (2) the change seems wrought upon the subject by an outside agency; (3) the change takes place in the attitudes that constitute character; (4) there is a positive sense of attaining to a higher life.

Three observations are made here. First, the fact of abruptness is not peculiar to religious conversions; it is seen in spheres other than religion. Second, conversion travels the same way as gradual religious growth as regards process and content, and at the end of the day both achieve the same general results.[1] Third, conversion is not co-extensive with religion, for the conversion of parents brings religion into the home, and tends to produce in their children a natural non-catastrophic religious growth through nurture.

Coe observes that there are four outstanding elements in the structure of the conversion phenomenon. First, we may discern traces of mental reproduction of the individual's own earlier experiences; the subject is converted to something, the idea of which he has already met at home, church, Sunday school, or in his reading and reflection. Therefore the ideation factors in his conversion are simply reproductions of his antecedent experiences. If, says Coe, the subject of conversion belongs to a Christian community, he is converted to the Christian idea of God; if to a Brahmin group, he is converted to a Brahmin idea of God, and so on and so forth.

We may, however, discern certain sensory elements in the conversion phenomenon, such as the tone of the preacher's voice, the rhythm and melody of revival songs, the sight of others doing religious acts, and the whole physical tone, particularly fatigue. Coe inclines to the view that sensory factors may be one of the chief determinants in religious conversion. He also emphasizes the part which the instincts play in conversion. Those most prominent are the gregarious instinct, the instinct of self-abasement, and the sexual instinct.

According to Coe, the connection between adolescent

[1] Cf. Starbuck, E. D., *Psychology of Religion*, p. 319.

conversions and the sexual instinct is an established fact of religious psychology. The connection is both indirect and direct. Indirectly the general state of restlessness, due to the intrusion of a new set of organic sensations, makes it relatively easy for the adolescent to acquire new interests of any kind; while directly, the developing sexual instinct fixes attention on persons, oneself and others, and extends and deepens tender emotion.

Coe explicates the conversion phenomenon psychologically in terms of the law of suggestion, the law of subconscious incubation, and the law of habit formation. According to this investigator, all the sensations, ideas, motor tendencies, and instinctive desires are integrated by the process of suggestion. A preparatory process always precedes cataclysmic conversion. The convert's experience is that of an explosion into his consciousness of new feelings, ideas, and points of view which are fully matured. New points of view mature unconsciously in accordance with the principle of sub-conscious incubation. A suggestion would not result of itself in the precipitation of the crisis of conversion unless some maturing of motives had already taken place. Wherever the convert makes good it is because he is confirmed in the new life by the law of habit formation, resulting from the religious social fellowship that follows the conversion crisis.

It is well to remember that the functional psychology of Coe passes no ethical judgment on the values it investigates; it simply asks what is it in any situation that makes it of value to the man who finds it so?

The following are the values which are obtained by the subject of conversion: (1) new values, together with a new standard of values; (2) a changed attitude to life, and a heightened realization of the self; (3) a new desire for mutual self-emancipation and fellowship with men; (4) the world and the idea of God become the realities they never were before.

All these are subjective facts which cannot be gainsaid. But, says Coe, the subjective impressions of an individual cannot be the criterion of absolute reality, therefore psychology cannot be invoked to support the religious man's deliverances that in his experiences he is in touch with Divine reality, or that his sense of Divine communica-

tion has ultimate validity. Science cannot recognize private facts, for it knows no unshared truth. Coe argues, since the spiritual world, and the Divine reality with which the religious man asserts he comes in vital contact, cannot be empirically verified by a number of scientific experts working independently, these objects of the religious man's faith cannot rank as scientific facts.

Coe's treatment of the mental traits of religious leaders is most interesting. At the outset he warns us that to characterize religious leaders as neurotics or sex-maniacs is to fall into the fallacy of the psychiatrist who seizes on a few specimens of the genus religious men which fall within the range of his own scientific speciality. Coe points out that there has been an evolution of religious leadership, and that three broad types are distinguishable—namely, the Shaman, the Priest, and the Prophet.

The Shaman corresponds to the modern psychic medium. The typical procedure is the trance or auto-hypnosis induced by dancing, monotonous music, or the use of drugs. In this trance the Shaman sees visions of the gods, or the culprit, or the issue of the impending battle. To the tribe the Shaman is leader because of the Mana that is in him. First, there is the actual impressiveness of the trance phenomena. The Shaman is a neurotic with an aptitude for trances, which at this stage of religious evolution are actually helpful to his religious influence. Second, the Shaman shrewdly does the thing the people wish; he knows how to avoid crucial issues, how to surreptitiously gather information, and how to utter ambiguities which can be interpreted in accordance with the event. Third, the Shaman gains real wisdom from habitual dealing with public affairs. His automatisms are thought to be due to dealings with the superior powers; he thinks this himself, but when he finds he can help things out a bit, he becomes a conscious trickster.

The second type of leadership is priestly, whose function is that of conserving power over the group by means of institutions. Historically, Shaman and Priest shade into each other, the Shaman type yields in time to the priestly type. The priesthood sees to it that ceremonies are duly observed, and that traditions are handed down. The characteristic of the priestly mind is the ever-present

assumption of the validity of the past. The influence of the priestly type makes for the stability of the social order, and trains men in the idea of law.

The third type of religious leadership is the prophet. Coe confines this term to the religious leaders who go directly to the sources of religious life, as contrasted with the priests and their system. This going directly to the sources, while superficially resembling Shamanism, really contrasts with it, and transcends it. Coe takes as his examples the great prophets of Israel. These religious leaders, says Coe, break with institutionalism, and go to the primal sources of religious feeling. Here, then, we have a type of leadership which regards ethical conduct as the true service of God, ethical fervour as the mark of Divine inspiration, and ethical communion with the Divine Being as the essential religious experience.

According to Coe, it was the prophetic element and not the priestly that attracted Jesus, that formed His character, and became the basis of His message. Coe points out that the Apostle Paul had the qualities of all three types ; he had the visions and trances of the Shaman, his training and natural bent of mind built priestly qualities into his life, but the prophetic spirit of Jesus practically extirpated these shamanistic and priestly qualities.

Coe criticizes the neurotic hypothesis which has been advanced to explain the influence of prophetic leaders. This view, he says, is extremely shortsighted ; Buddha and Jesus cannot be proven neurotic in the scientific sense of the term. Only when processes common to us all are so excessively prominent in certain subjects as to interfere with the carrying on of life's business in co-operation with others can we speak of them as psychopaths and neurotics. The ultimate test of mental morbidity is one's ability to fulfil one's functions as a member of society. Neither Buddha nor Jesus was made inefficient by automatisms, nor trafficked in them, nor relied upon them to buttress the principles He taught ; on the contrary, both rested the authority of their teachings upon an analysis of life and the practical self-evidence of basal ethical ideals, and both dissented from the existent religious social order in the interest of a deeper sociality.

Coe repudiates the notion that religion was invented by

priests and imposed on the masses by priestcraft. This, he says, is entirely unhistorical, for a leader does not make religion; it is a spontaneous process which is more or less guided by individual action. According to Coe, the religious leader may do three things: he may focalize a standpoint for his people by bringing it to conscious definition; he may bring one or two competing attitudes of society to victory by means of superior definition, or by an emotional appeal, or by organizing a party; and in the third place he may see something that his predecessors did not see, or what his contemporaries do not see, and may tell what he sees in a plain way. A religious genius or an ethical genius then not only articulates the deep desires and needs of his people, but gives to society an original contribution of his own; he not only focusses existing light, but emits an original ray.[1]

The question of the relation of the sub-conscious to the religious life is raised by such phenomena as visions, voices, vivid impressions of a presence, unexpected insights, involuntary muscular reactions giving impression of external control, glossolalia, and the like. Can we, asks Coe, bring these experiences which apparently transcend the powers and functions of the conscious self under known psychological laws? He replies, first, these phenomena are not the unique possession of religion, but occur outside its realm altogether. The common deliverance of the poets, musicians, and artists as well as prophets is that ideas are given rather than achieved, and that they are wrought upon by a power other than themselves. Must we posit a sub-conscious realm with laws of its own to account for these experiences?

Coe's position with regard to the sub-conscious is guarded; he holds, it is not yet an empirical fact, but only an inference, and points out that there are three types of sub-conscious theory. The first is the neural theory, which states that all alleged sub-conscious deliverances are due simply to re-stimulation of brain tracts that have been organized in a particular way by previous experience. On this view there is no sub-conscious incubation at all, but only simple reproduction of the brain records of antecedent experiences.

[1] Contrast Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. xviii., "The Psychology of Religious Genius and Inspiration."

The second is the penumbral theory, which asserts that the field of attention includes a penumbra as well as a focus. The penumbral items of experience can be integrated while remaining at the periphery of the conscious mind; then when the attention becomes directed to them, the mind gets a shock of surprise at the organization of the penumbral items which has taken place during its preoccupation with other ideas.

The third species of theory is that of a definitely detached sub-consciousness. According to this theory, each of us has an understratum of psychic life apart from ordinary consciousness with powers and a nature of its own.

Coe holds, the neural theory explains much that is often ascribed to the definite sub-conscious theory. The main mass of ideas attributed to the sub-conscious are phenomena of the memory process. Inspirations are just reproductions of previous experiences which have been registered on the brain records. Coe shrewdly points out that only those who study and practise music get musical inspirations, and mathematical solutions come by inspiration to none but mathematicians.

Now Coe is convinced that the penumbral theory explains much. Perceptions, he says, may be organized into idea systems without the cognizance of the conscious mind, because it has been busy with something else; therefore when the focus of attention shifts, it perceives an idea system in full panoply. This completed product seems to the mind to be something new, and to have been injected into the consciousness, whereas all can be explained in terms of the shifting of the focus of attention. Coe holds that most of our opinions and prejudices are integrated in this region of dim attention, and many of the thoughts we think are not our own come from this penumbral region.

The doctrine of the detached sub-consciousness is popular, says Coe, with those who are fascinated by the occult. The medical mind also favours it; moreover, religious men make a last stand for supernaturalism here. It is held that it is here that divine communications come.[1] Coe holds that though the facts of multiple personality and alternating personality seem to buttress this type of theory, we need to note that the secondary personality

[1] Cf. James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 484.

always uses the language, understanding, and memories of the primary personality. As a matter of fact, says Coe, we are not dealing with two individual consciousnesses at all, but with one individual consciousness that has become disintegrated. The fact that sometimes the primary consciousness is unable to recall the experiences of the secondary does not prove the existence of two individual consciousnesses, but simply the loss of memory; there may be complete amnesia, partial recall, or full recall. It is evident that Coe is not enamoured of the theory of the detached sub-consciousness; his position seems to be that the neural theory, supplemented by the penumbral theory, are together adequate to cover the facts.[1]

Coe maintains that the proposition, human nature is always the same, is true of the structure only of the human mind, not of its functions. There is an evolution of mental functions throughout man's history. Nutrition and sex are probably the most significant instincts and motives at the beginning of human evolution, but they are not so all across. Human development, according to Coe, does not consist in finding new satisfactions for old nutritive and sexual wants, but in achieving new wants. As evolution proceeds, preferences change. There is then, with Coe, an evolution of functions.

All this has an important bearing on the psychology of religion, for, according to Coe, religion seeks to change men's desires, and to make them want the right values. These values are revealed and these new desires are created by great religious geniuses of the race who call upon the masses to like what they do not like. These prophets are stoned by their own generation, but a later one builds them monuments. All this shows that the later generation has changed its desires and has come to appreciate the true values. This, then, according to Coe, is the process that lies back of true creative evolution. He maintains that over and above the appetitive wants and instinctive desires of primitive man, we men of a cultured age have acquired a crowd of new wants that press for their own satisfactions. Religion seeks to complete, unify, and conserve these values which have arisen in the course of human development.

[1] Cf. Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, chap. iii.

Coe's important proposition in this connection is that religion is not only the insistence of the human spirit upon having enough of what is desired, but it is also the criticism of desires, *i.e.* religion's function is the revaluation of values. Religion's most significant characteristic, then, is this process of re-estimating values, and it defines the supreme value in terms of personal-social self-realization.

When it is held that the essence of religion is desire for value and the criticism of values, does not this reduce religious experience to mere subjectivity? Coe replies, this is not so, for when we speak of religion as being concerned with value, we mean by value a discriminated satisfaction taken as the mark of an objective reality. Dynamic views of mental life dominate psychology to-day, says Coe, and to modern psychology the mind is the name of an entity consisting of both potential and dynamic psychic energies which are imponderable. The mind, therefore, itself has actual existence in the real world order; it is objectively real—the mind, in a word, is reality. Mental process, with Coe, is the process of the real in relation to the real.

Religion, says Coe, is a root that goes on living when doctrines have been withered by criticism, because it is an original acquaintance with the real. Religion, with Coe, is never a by-product of, but always a live issue in, human culture. Coe holds society is more than the mere aggregation of individuals; it is an organization of persons mutually conscious of, and recognizing one another as such. The recognition of the sacredness of human life, the rights of man, and the worth of the individual is, according to Coe, a modern discovery. Now since religion, with Coe, contributes no new value of its own, but merely organizes the emergent values of social evolution at any given stage of human culture, it now simply reintegrates this discovery of the value of persons in terms of personal-social self-realization. Religion, therefore, is not only the desire for value and the revaluation of values, but it is the discoverer and organizer of values. The supreme value which religion has discovered is that of the worth of persons.

Coe maintains that historically this growing social self-realization is bound up with the development of faith in Divine beings. The God-idea of men is always the

articulation of what men have discovered concerning the worth of persons. The movement is away from impersonal to personal gods. The earliest worship is not directed to personal gods. Mana, the earliest object of veneration, is not personal but simply the misty diffused power that does things; the spirits are not persons but are merely unstable undefined powers; even the gods at first have no personality. The personal God, then, is a late conception, for men must think of themselves as persons before they can think of God as personal, and this appreciation of the worth of the individual is a late discovery of social evolution.

Religious experience, with Coe, is social experience. Spirits and gods are differentiations of the immediate social consciousness. According to Coe, to indulge our highest social impulses is to be religious, and the common-will for the common-weal is God in us and society.

In connection with the subject of mysticism, Coe begins with a clear analysis of the structure of the typical mystic experience. He discovers five constitutive elements: (1) There is a perception of objects not physically present; (2) there is a sense of external control of the thought and muscles; (3) there is an intellectual seeing without an intellectual process of thought or reasoning; (4) there is an ecstatic climax to the whole experience, and (5) the whole experience is incommunicable.[1] As a result of the indescribability of his experience the mystic resorts to symbolic language and the most contradictory paradoxes.

Coe subjects the phenomena of mysticism to severe scrutiny. Many of the facts, he asserts, can be grouped under the heading of hallucination; others may be described as sub-conscious phenomena. What seems to the subject to be the opposite of self-control, Coe suggests, may really be the result of habitual acts previously performed. Former activities and achievements explain much; therefore, the impression of the mystic that he is not the author of the ideas that dart into his mind is not a sufficient proof that it is as he thinks. Coe argues, poetic inspirations come only to persons who have previously read, studied, and practised poetry; mathematical inspirations come only to mathematicians, musical inspirations to musicians; in the

[1] Cf. James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 380.

same way, mystical inspirations come to mystics only. Therefore, he concludes, the mystical experience simply reproduces the teaching the mystic had previously received. Coe is certain that the mystic is never released from his own past, and that the content of his experience is socially determined. He affirms, the mystic brings back from his trance the sort of ideas he took into it. Coe's illustrations are apt; he says the Christian mystic feels the presence of Christ, the Roman Catholic the presence of the Virgin or the Saints, but the Mohammedan or Hindoo mystic never does; therefore, each religion confirms its own teaching through its mystics. This sense of real presence which looms so large in mystical experiences is due, says Coe, to auto-suggestion; complete self-hypnosis is sometimes induced.

As against the argument that here in the mystics we have religious experts equipped with a special mystical sense which immediately apprehends truth and reality, Coe points out the great discrepancy in the deliverances of the mystics of different types; the Protestant differs from the Roman Catholic, and the Hindoo from both. Which, he asks, is right? There is a general agreement upon the noetic quality of the experience, but this sense of insight and illumination has a psychological cause, not a supernatural; it comes not by solving the difficulty but by becoming blind to the problem. Ordinary drunkenness and certain anæsthetics will give the same feeling of illumination; all difficulties vanish, and everything is possible.[1]

The mystic bliss can be explicated in a similar fashion; it is due to relaxation of tensions and the removal of mental inhibitions, which yield a sense of satisfaction, and, together with all this, there is in the mystic the expectation of a condition of rapture got through the long mystical tradition which suggests the state of ecstasy. This experience can also be paralleled in anæsthetic cases. The phenomena of levitation and the mystic's experience of being out of the body are due to suggestive anæsthesia. Coe points out that hypnotic experiments have frequently induced the phenomena of functional anæsthesia, and that this phenomena is induced in the mystical subject by auto-

[1] Cf. James, William, *op. cit.* p. 387.

suggestion. He also indicates that nervous instability will favour automatisms, and that this may be inherited or induced. There is, he says, close relation between the mystical condition and hysteria, epilepsy, or delusional insanity. The individual's own psycho-physical constitution, therefore, is a most important factor, together with certain incidental conditions, such as hunger, fatigue, and sexual longing.

Now this mystical experience has certain functional aspects which Coe outlines. One might expect to find in this connection that the private nature of the experience would lead to variation from existing social ideas and standards, and that automatic control would lead to reinstatement of instinctive pre-moral modes of behaviour; but these things, Coe says, do not occur; instead, the mystical experience simply focusses some existing social idea or standard which is already part of the subject's mental make-up. The mystics give back as new discoveries of truth the old teachings with which they have been indoctrinated. Coe's conclusion is that mysticism has not contributed much to the world's thought; it merely conserves what is already approved; and it is no special instrument of discovery. Its fascination lies in the fact that it produces a delightful delusion of knowing what lies beyond the hill. At the same time, Coe concedes that the tendency of mysticism is towards serenity, poise, and an organized will.

In his discussion of the future life, Coe lays down two propositions: first, the instinct of self-preservation does not in itself denote desire for continuance of personal life; second, the idea that one's double frequents the place where one is buried existed before any clear notion arose of personal life. Primitive man's belief in survival rested on this simple basis. According to this author, in a more cultured age men begin to acknowledge the validity of the principle that personal life as such is sacred; and this at once puts the notion of survival in a new perspective, for now death appears to be the destroyer of what men hold to be of supreme worth, and hence the fact of death must be squared with the notion of a system of personal-social values. Coe asserts that the personal-social relationships men value most they desire to see perpetuated. When

men reach a high level of social regard they desire immortality for the socially worthy, if not for themselves, and the kind of immortality desired is that of indissoluble fellowship between persons.

Coe defines prayer simply as talking to a god; structurally it does not differ from conversation except that the divinity is invisible. Prayer has developed out of earlier anthropomorphisms, which at first were nothing more than exclamations of naive emotion that involved a sense of friendliness or the reverse in any extra-human object which was felt to be significant. The language of prayer need not be confined to supplication; it may partake of the nature of praise, flattery, the expression of fellowship, or that of submission to a superior will. Now, says Coe, there is absolute belief on the part of the worshipper that prayer has two termini—man and God. Coe points out that the dreams, visions, auditions, etc., which the worshipper interprets as responses to his prayers are relatively infrequent; therefore, the worshipper's anxious interest attaches meaning to any unusual phenomena whatever. When an event turns out in accordance with the specifications of the prayer, this is at once construed as a direct answer, but if the event does not happen in accord with desire, the devout say, "God knows best what is good for His children."

Coe interprets the religious man's experience of Divine response to prayer in terms of auto-suggestion.

Psychologically, then, prayer is conversation, both sides of which are the mental states of the one who prays. These movements of the worshipper's own thought are interpreted by him as immediate communications from the Divine Being. Coe's position, like other psychologists, is that the presence of the supernatural factor in human life cannot be proved by the science of psychology; as far as it is concerned, there is nothing at the other end. God for psychology is simply an ideational construct of the religious subject's mind, and all religious experiences have subjective significance only.

Nevertheless, the practice of prayer performs certain very valuable functions. Prayer has therapeutic effects: it calms the distracted mind; it gives poise and power; it is a way of pulling oneself together. Moreover, new

insights are gained, because in prayer the mind becomes more capable of sustained attention.

Again, Coe points out the great value of confession to another who understands and sympathizes. The Freudian method of relieving mental disorders is to bring into the light of day the most secret desires of the soul, and the mere exposure of these things often brings relief; in this respect, says Coe, prayer is of infinite value. Yet again, prayer is a method of cultivating the conviction that no value will perish; it is a process in which faith is generated. For these and similar reasons Coe holds that prayer performs functions of great value to the individual and society, in spite of the fact that psychologically it is nothing more than beneficent auto-suggestion.

In connection with the discussion of the religious nature of man, Coe lays down the proposition that religion lies wholly within the natural psychological order. There is no evidence that a religious intuition ever arises in a man's mind without having a derivative connection with his own accumulated experience and the history of his people. Psychology knows of no religious instinct or mystic sense as such. No set of objects apart from previous experience can evoke an original religious reaction.

There is, further, no evidence that all men experience a discontent and longing which only faith in a Divine Being can satisfy. As a matter of fact, any interest may absorb man's whole attention from love to business and from scientific research to golf. No specific attitude toward the Divine or the human can be attributed to all men; attitudes are not given ready made: they are acquired, and evolve out of every sort of instinct.

Coe's conclusion, then, is that we cannot posit an original religious instinct. For all this he holds strongly that religion is deeply rooted in the nature of man. All normal men organize their experience in terms of what to them are the ideal values, and nucleate their other interests about the dominant one. This, says Coe, is the distinctive mode of mental organization by means of which we meet the conditions of life, and this is one of the roots of religion in the nature of man.

In the development of human nature the social instincts tend to become the pre-eminent ones, and the interests

which have to do with these tend to become the controlling interests around which others are organized. This distinctive tendency, according to Coe, constitutes the second great root of religion in human nature. Religion itself, with Professor Coe, is a living movement which brings no unique value of its own into human experience; but instead discovers and organizes all the values which emerge during the history of social evolution.

CRITIQUE

Professor Coe's *Psychology of Religion* is, on the whole, a most admirable forthsetting of the psychological thinking of the present time with respect to religious origins, the relations of society and the individual, conversion, mysticism, the sub-conscious, and cognate problems, which have become clearly limned as the result of the application of the principles of psychology to the religious life.

Among the many illuminating discussions with which this book abounds, that of religion, considered under the aspect of group conduct, is particularly fine. Coe's distinction between the three types of group conduct is extremely useful. We are clearly shown the characteristics of the religious crowd, the action of which results from suppressed inhibitions, and the unity of which is achieved by desultory suggestion; then we are introduced to the sacerdotal group, where the few command and the many obey—"theirs not to reason why." Here unity is brought about by deliberate suggestion through sacrifice, sacrament, ritual, and codes of customs and taboos; finally, we are shown the deliberative group, where unity is achieved by the free variation of thought and desire on the part of its members.

Coe's treatment of the mental traits of religious leaders is particularly helpful. He classifies them as Shamans, Priests, and Prophets, and shows that all three types may inhere in one individual. Coe expresses unqualified admiration for the prophetic type. He finely brings out the fact that the fundamental trait of the third type of leader is "a broad and intense sociality that transcends mere institutionalism because it individualizes men as objects of love. The leader is now in a high ethical sense the lover, and he is able to lead because he loves, and therein re-

presents God. This is the open secret of Jesus' influence upon men." [1]

Coe's argument for the validity of the functional standpoint in the psychology of religion, in the form in which he states it, is sane and convincing. He utterly repudiates the merely biological view of function, which would reduce psychology to a branch of biology. In common with most modern psychologists Coe breaks with the traditional structural psychology.[2] He holds that the dynamic functioning point of view is alone profitable,[3] and that therefore the psychology of religion must view its data from the functional point of view. Coe's accent on the preferential nature of psychological function, as distinguished from merely biological function, is timely. He says rightly, we cannot understand the nature of a religious experience by simply reducing the complex to its elements; we must go from our analysis, which yields us the elements of a complex, on to a psychology of values and functions, if we are to get at its meaning.

According to Coe, functional psychology must be a psychology of personal self-realizations—in short, a science of selves. The life-seeking functioning self is the subject of psychology. Mental function, with Coe, is mental action directed towards the furtherance of life, but where Coe breaks with Ames is in his emphasis on the preferential nature of psychological as contrasted with biological function. We go all the way with Coe when he affirms, human life cannot be construed by purely biological categories in terms of food and sex, and that we must recognize that in man highly evolved self-consciousness is annexed to the instinctive outfit he has in common with the brutes. We endorse Coe's conclusion that these instincts which, with animals, have a biological function only, in man acquire new functions and fresh values, and become sublimated.

A function, says Coe, must be defined by reference to the value towards which the process moves, and value signifies an advantage, or anything thought of, or experienced as satisfying. The mind then seeks the preferred thing,

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 186.
[2] M'Dougall, W., *An Outline of Psychology*, preface, p. viii.
[3] Prince, Morton, *The Unconscious*, preface, p. xv.

and the object of the preferential function is always value. We are in entire agreement with Coe when he says, to think of human mental functions as merely complex cases of subhuman function is to endanger the functional point of view altogether.

The most serious criticism that can be directed against Coe's book is against that section of it in which he defines religion in terms of value. All other parts of the treatise are conspicuous for clarity of thought and expression, but here Coe is irritatingly vague. With Coe, as we have seen, the mind is always exercising a preferential function, and the object of this function is always value, and value is that which satisfies conation. Now Coe is emphatic that religion is not a value in itself and that it creates no new value; it is simply a movement of valuation of all the values that emerge in the course of human history.

Coe's forthsetting of religion as valuation is most ambiguous; his definition is too wide, and does not serve to mark religion off from other things. This leads Coe to assert that wherever men enthusiastically identify themselves with something as their very life, there you find religion. To Coe any reaction is religious which seeks to fill out, organize, or conserve any values whatever. Such a loose description would embrace the voluptuary, the gambler, the bridge devotee, and the golf maniac; all these would be religious according to Coe's definition.

Coe's description of the religious consciousness, like Ames's [1] and Stratton's,[2] gives us no *differentia* whereby we may distinguish it from the ethical consciousness, the æsthetic consciousness, or any other form of consciousness. Now Coe virtually concedes that this is so; he says, "If it is asked wherein religious value is distinct from ethical value, the answer is that it is not distinct from ethical or any other value." [3] To thus make religion connote every kind of valuing consciousness is simply to make the term scientifically useless. This is why Coe cannot discern the real difference between religion and morality, and why many psychologists identify religion with social righteousness.

[1] Ames, E. S., *Psychology of Religious Experience*, preface, pp. vii-viii.
[2] Stratton, G. M., *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 343.
[3] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 74.

The simple truth that religious experience is differentiated from all other forms of valuing consciousness by its object is ignored by a number of psychologists of religion, hence the perpetual confusion of the patriotic, social, ethical, or æsthetic consciousness with the religious consciousness. Coe has here attempted to construe the religious life without recognizing the great *differentia* which marks religion off from all other possibilities of human history. All such attempts are foredoomed to failure.

Coe's description of religion is certainly better than Stratton's. Stratton made religion consist simply in the appreciation or sense of value.[1] Coe takes us further, and says it is the active discovery of values, and it is the attempt to unify values. Religion, however, is not defined until, with Leuba, we add: to be religious is to enter into dynamic relation with an unseen superhuman company because we appreciate that the outcome of this relation will be the conservation and augmentation of the values we seek. That, then, which differentiates the religious from the secular life is the kind of power with which we have to do, and the anthropopathic nature of this commerce with the unseen powers.[2] Höffding's classic definition of religion as consisting in the conservation of value is subject to similar strictures. Conservation of existing values is not the sole function of religion, for religion also augments values; it is not merely the organizer of the existing values of society, as Coe maintains. All living religions create new values; this last fact has been ignored by Coe.

With Höffding, the core of religion is the conviction that no value perishes out of the world.[3] Now to the genuinely religious man this is not the core but the corollary only of religion. The core of religion is the absolute certainty that God lives and reigns, "that behind the dim unknown standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above His own." It is because of this certainty that the religious man infers as a necessary consequence that no value can be destroyed; for him it cannot perish, because it is linked to reality. Coe seems to leave out of his reckoning the fact that the religious man sees in God the Divine

[1] Stratton, G. M., *Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 345.
[2] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 52.
[3] Höffding, H., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 6.

source of all his ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness, and that to the religious man God is at once the origin, the consummation, and the eternal guarantor of the supreme values.

Psychologists apparently need to be reminded that religious experience, whatever it means to the scientist who stands outside his facts, is for the religious man experience of God, and that religious consciousness is not ethical consciousness, social consciousness, or any other kind of consciousness, but simply God-consciousness. To define religion as Coe has done, simply in terms of value, is to define religion by one of its aspects only; that which makes religion unique among all the other possibilities of human history is left out. Without attempting a formal definition, we suggest that any definition that leaves out the unique object of the religious consciousness is utterly inadequate.[1]

Generally speaking, religion is that psychological phenomenon of life and movement in the history of mankind which is indissolubly bound up with the conviction that unseen superhuman power or powers exist and control the destiny of the individual and the race, to whom man may look for succour and help to conserve the values he deems most precious, and with whom he may have fellowship. We hold with Wundt that, strictly speaking, religion comes into being only with the rise of the god-idea.[2] A definition of religion need not adjust itself to pre-religious conditions.

The object of religious consciousness is always a power or powers conceived of as greater than oneself, with whom one maintains personal relations. The religious interest differs widely, we reiterate, from all other human interests in that "it centres about a being whom it has never seen nor heard, seeks communion with Him, speaks to Him, and waits for His answer." Religious men yearn for God, not, as Leuba suggests, because he is their "meat purveyor,"[3]

[1] Not only is the Object of religious consciousness *sui generis*, but the feelings evoked by this Divine Object are qualitatively distinct from all other human feelings. This qualitative uniqueness of religious feeling receives a powerful forthsetting at the hands of Rudolf Otto in his remarkable book, *The Idea of the Holy* (1923), Oxford University Press.

[2] Wundt, Wilhelm, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 369.

[3] Leuba, J. H., "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *The Monist*, vol. xl. (1901, July), p. 571.

but because they have an affinity for God. Men seek not merely to exploit God, but seek fellowship with God for its own sake. Both Leuba and Coe ignore a most important side of religion—namely, the mystical root. Men yearn for the friendship of God Himself, and long to have communion with God because they have an affinity for Him. Psychologists of religion seem to ignore all across the simple fact that a religious man is one who has fellowship with God, and is conscious of that fellowship.

Coe denies the existence in the nature of man of any religious intuition, instinct, or specific longing for the Divine. The position of nearly all the American investigators is that psychology knows nothing of a mystic sense or a religious instinct. This agnosticism would not in itself disprove the existence of such endowments, for there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in psychology's philosophy. But what shall we say to these things?

If no tendency is to be called an instinct unless it is an inheritance from our subhuman ancestry, then of course we cannot speak of a specific religious instinct. But though we cannot speak of a specific instinct, we can and do affirm that religion has an instinctive basis.[1] M'Dougall has shown conclusively that religious emotions and impulses are sourced in various instincts. He especially singles out the instincts of flight, self-abasement, and curiosity, with the accompanying emotions of fear, subjection, wonder, and tender emotion.[2] Is it not true that man has an instinct so that, when looking at the gorge, the torrent, and the volcano's glare, a feeling of awe and reverence is evoked independently of previous experience?[3]

Whether there be a religious instinct or not, a study of man in his reactions to the objects of his physical, social, and mental environment shows that he is governed by a principle the outworking of which is analogous to those instinctive processes which he shares with the animals. Man, as we know him, possesses an æsthetic endowment, an ethical endowment, and a religious endowment. These powers, it is true, belong to an advanced stage of human

[1] Marett, R. R., *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 10–11.
[2] M'Dougall, William, *Social Psychology*, chap. xiii.
[3] Marett, R. R., *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 14–15.

development, and if only that which goes back to the animal plane of existence and to our brute ancestry can claim the title of instinct, then these are not instincts, though it is hard to see what other term can be applied to them which fits their nature.[1]

M'Dougall's definition of instinct is that it is an "innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessors to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." [2]

Is it not true that man as man is so constituted that he can perceive beauty, truth, and goodness, and that in the presence of these realities an emotional and volitional response is evoked spontaneously by reason of his very nature? It is here maintained that just as man has an æsthetic endowment which enables him to say when he perceives a picture, "That is beautiful"—just as he has an ethical endowment which enables him to say of an ethical action, "That is right or wrong"—so he has a religious endowment which constrains him to utter in the presence of certain objects, "This is Divine." There is a power in man which can recognize the Divine when he sees it.[3]

These æsthetic, moral, and religious endowments belong to man's constitution; they are *a priori* elements in his make-up. Because, like the unwise Virgins, these powers arrive late in human history, psychologists will not allow them to enter in and take their place beside the other instincts. This seems a somewhat arbitrary procedure, since in all respects, excepting that of subhuman lineage, they have all the characteristics of genuine instincts. Though psychologists will recognize as an instinct only that which goes back to the animal plane of existence, we must take man as he is; and, as he is, he has moral and religious instincts which start into action in the presence of the appropriate objects. These instincts are his by nature,

[1] Pratt, J. B., *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 294.
[2] M'Dougall, William, *Social Psychology*, p. 29.
[3] Otto, Rudolf, *The Idea of the Holy*. See chap. xviii., "The Manifestations of the 'Holy' and the Faculty of 'Divination.'"

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though they are susceptible of great development by nurture.

The universal conviction of the reality of God is significant in this connection; even among the masses there is this instinctive belief. Now universality constitutes one of the characteristics of an instinct. Religion is a universal phenomenon of humanity;[1] this, at any rate, constitutes a presumption in favour of a religious instinct in man. Man prays because he can't help praying, it is an instinctive activity;[2] and man is religious because, constituted as he is, he can't help being religious. As long as man is man he will seek to know God, his instincts will compel him.[3]

On page 91, Coe makes a distinction between magic and religion which closely resembles that of W. Robertson Smith, who holds that religion is essentially social in its nature, while magic is distinctly individual and private.[4] Coe says, magic is practised in secret and by individuals, whereas the religious ceremony is, above all things, a group act for group ends. Again he says, religion organizes life's values and seeks them socially, but magic fixes upon any particular value and seeks it individually, and independently of the large social order.

Coe's distinction here is unsatisfactory and practically useless, since no such rigid distinction between the social and the individual exists. The assured results of anthropological research make such a distinction between magic and religion untenable. Magic practices may be and often are group acts of a public and social character. Frazer has given abundant illustration of how the magic art may be employed for the benefit either of individuals or of the whole community; it may be either public or private.[5] Ames has massed together a great number of instances of collective magic which are clearly group acts for group ends.[6] Coe's distinction simply cannot be maintained in the face of the overwhelming mass of extant contrary anthropological evidence. Coe apparently has taken this distinction as self-evident without sufficient

[1] Tiele, G. P., *Outlines History of Ancient Religions*, p. 6.
[2] James, William, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 316.
[3] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 28.
[4] Smith, W. Robertson, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 263.
[5] Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough* (1923), abridged edition, p. 61.
[6] Ames, E. S., *Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. v.

examination ; only such a hypothesis explains his failure to note the plethora of negative instances.

The only scientifically useful differentia between magic and religion is that which is expressed in terms of attitude.[1] The object of both magic and religion may be and indeed often is identical. Since magical and religious practices connect up with the same superhuman powers, we cannot, therefore, distinguish magic from religion by saying magic has to do with the impersonal forces, while religion has relation with personal powers. Magical practices may be linked up with the idea of personal powers or gods as well as with the thought of impersonal powers. Hence it is impossible to distinguish magic from religion by reference to its object, the distinction must be set forth in terms of behaviour.

Magical behaviour differs from religious behaviour in that in magic man attempts to concuss and coerce whatever powers there be to do his will by a certain technique, and by devices which are conceived in some way to possess inherent power to bring compulsion to bear upon the impersonal forces or personal beings, and so force them to give man his desire.

In religion man seeks the fulfilment of the same desires, and conceives of the existence of the same impersonal or personal powers, but his behaviour is diametrically opposed to the magical attitude. In religion man, in Marett's laconic phrase, passes from " bluff to blandishment " ; [2] he beseeches, he implores, or he attempts to flatter and to cajole the powers that be to do his will.

Magic and religion often are found mingled together ; they frequently overlap, but the two can nearly always be separated from each other by the use of the above distinction. Professor Leuba has coined two useful terms in this connection. Magic, he says, is marked by the coercitive type of behaviour, while religion is characterized by the anthropopathic type of conduct.[3]

In his treatment of the subject of mysticism, Coe follows in the wake of the majority of American investigators who have dealt with this aspect of the religious

[1] M'Dougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 306.
[2] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 30.
[3] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, chap. i.

life. The mystic is considered simply to be a religious person who is specially expert in the art of auto-hypnosis. The typical mystic process is held to be the same as that of ordinary hypnosis, and the typical mystic trance is held to be identical with a state of hypnosis.

The explication of all mystical phenomena in terms of auto-suggestion seems to be open to the charge of over-simplification. We may concede to Coe that the acquirements of experience, social education, and the theological prepossessions of the mystic may account for the idea of God upon which he concentrates his attention. But the important question arises, How does this traditional idea of God become transformed in the mystic's experience into the vivid sense of the presence of God Himself?

Again, the common deliverance of the mystics is that this sense of the presence of God possesses tremendous intensity.[1] What accounts for the extraordinary intensity of the mystic's experience? The mystic's answer is, the presence of God Himself. The psychologist's answer is, auto-suggestion. The mystic's answer more adequately fits the facts. We may admit that the factor of suggestion is present, but we do not concede it is the sole factor, nor do we feel inclined to grant the gratuitous assumption that suggestion must necessarily work in the direction of error and falsehood; there may be true suggestions.

The second striking thing most psychologists overlook is the great dissimilarity between ordinary hypnosis and the mystic state. The two are not to be identified. In ordinary cases of hypnosis the hypnotized subject on waking remembers nothing that took place while in the hypnotic state; in remarkable contrast to this is the mystic's vivid remembrance of the experiences of his mystic state. This point of contrast deserves more notice than it has hitherto received.

Coe is not very enthusiastic over the contribution of mysticism to the life of society. He holds that it simply conserves what has already been approved; it is not a method of mental invention, and is not a tool of discovery. Yet Coe admits that mysticism has a positive function in the realm of mental therapeutics. Mental strains, he says, may find relief in mystical practices. Mysticism organizes

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 451.

human life, unifies a discordant self, and its whole trend is away from distraction and disintegration to serenity, poise, and an organized will. Surely this in itself is a valuable contribution to human life, and if mysticism did no more than this, its title to existence would be justified, for this would be a tremendous contribution to the happiness and sanity of society.

Mysticism seems to fall under Coe's censure because it does not usurp the functions of science and philosophy; but such usurpation is far from its intention. In Professor Wright's words, "mystical states are chiefly of value, not in the discovery of new truths, but in engendering enthusiastic devotion and consecration to values already recognized. In this respect mysticism has been of inestimable value to religion." "Where there is no vision the people perish." "Where there is no mysticism, religion decays and stratifies in dead legalism, formalism, and dogmatism." [1]

If the real values of life are not to be set out in terms of £ s. d., or economic productivity, then mysticism has a contribution of its own to make to human life and culture. In addition to the therapeutic value of the mystic life, Professor Pratt points out, the mystics in their entirety have contributed a very great deal to the loftiest religious literature of nearly all the great religions. "Scarcely even the most hard-minded philosopher could read over a well-chosen collection of mystical writings, and then study the subtle influence which such expressions, as a whole, have exerted upon the thought and feeling, the courage and happiness, the daring and the humility of the race, without recognizing that mysticism has contributed something that the world would miss." [2] This appeals to us as a far juster estimate of the contribution of mysticism to human life.

[1] Wright, W. K., *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 303.
[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 468–469.

CHAPTER XI

"The Religious Consciousness," [1] *by* James Bissett Pratt

EXPOSITION

Professor Pratt's study is probably the most thorough and comprehensive book that has yet appeared in connection with the new science of religious psychology. It is a general work, no important aspect of the religious life is ignored, and the range and variety of its data are unique.

The author speaks with first-hand knowledge of the religious facts not merely of the Occident, but also of the Orient. The book indicates an extraordinary appreciation of diverse types of religious beliefs and practices. This investigator attempts with great success to get into the very mind of the religious subject he studies, and is consistently a sympathetic, just, and candid critic of the religious life in all its protean forms.

His method is purely descriptive and empirical. Pratt holds that the most fruitful procedure is to gather up the results of three methods—namely, the questionnaire with safeguards, the biographical, and the historical—and to subject these data to critical study.

It is worthy of note that the material with which this author's works is drawn almost exclusively from the highly developed religions.

Religion

Pratt begins by criticizing all theological and sociological definitions of religion as being too narrow, and submits as his definition that "serious and social attitude of individuals or communities towards the power or powers

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness* (1920), Macmillan Co.

which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies." [1] He claims for his definition that it is at once workable in psychological analysis, and broad enough to take in all the phenomena of primitive and civilized life usually thought to be religious, and yet narrow enough to differentiate religion from morality, theology, philosophy, and science.

This psychologist is careful to point out, that while religion is a subjective response of the self, it is a response to something, it is an attitude towards powers in whose ontological existence one believes. The religious consciousness always considers its religion objective as well as subjective.

Pratt, unlike Ames, clearly distinguishes between religion and morality. In all well-developed religions we are able to distinguish between an attitude to the controller of destiny, which is religion, and a system of teachings about the conduct of life, which is morality; these two things are not identical.

This author with fine moderation holds the scales evenly between the individual and society. As against Ames's exaggeration of the social, Pratt holds that religion has often been in part the product of the individual, as witness the great prophetic religions. He rightly says: "Buddhism without Gautama and Christianity without Jesus would resemble strikingly *Hamlet* without Hamlet." According to this writer, as culture and thought advance religion becomes more and more individual and constantly less dependent on social forms and sanctions. Pratt lays down the proposition here, that religion is the product of both society and the individual, and gets itself expressed in both.

In discussing the various aspects of religion, this author adds another typical aspect to the three with which his first book, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, made us familiar. Pratt now divides religious types into four—namely, (1) the traditional, which is controlled by the authority of the past; (2) the rational, which wants to break with traditional authority and to base itself purely on reason and verifiable experience; (3) the mystical, which appeals to an experience which is peculiarly sub-

[1] Pratt, J. B., *op. cit.* p. 2.

jective and not scientifically verifiable; and (4) Pratt's new type, the practical or moral, which puts the accent on conduct rather than on belief or emotion. Pratt shows that the ideal is the harmonious development of all four aspects of the religious life in one individual, but the ideal is not the actual.

The Sub-Conscious

There are three chief ways in which the term "sub-conscious" is used in contemporary psychological literature: (1) as the fringe of the conscious mind; (2) as a purely physiological neural process; (3) as an intricate psychical mechanism which does complex mental work without the cognizance of the conscious mind, to which the term "co-conscious" has been annexed.

Pratt casts his vote for the first two of these conceptions; he holds that the sub-conscious may be interpreted in terms of both the fringe region and the nervous system, and that the sub-conscious in this sense is what virtually makes us what we are. The evidence is not strong enough to force us to postulate a sub-consciousness in normal persons, the mental phenomena of whom can be sufficiently explicated by the fringe of consciousness, automatic nervous processes, and the accepted laws of psychology. But the case is other with pathological subjects; here evidence for the existence of a sub-conscious mental life is strong.

Pratt's conclusion is: first, the sub-conscious is either non-existent or negligible in normal persons; and, second, in abnormal subjects it is always limited and inferior to the conscious self. The term "sub-conscious" with Pratt covers the physiological neural processes which connect us up with our past and that of our race, the fringe region of the field of consciousness, and the co-consciousness in those who possess it.

Pratt emphasizes the part the physiological factor plays in human life: it links us up with our own past, and that of the race; it preserves to us our instincts and habits; and it enables us to use our memories automatically and so to unconsciously utilize past experience. A man's religion, then, is not simply a matter of his own conscious processes; it is bound up with his psycho-physical organism

his racial history, and his individual history. He comes into the world with an original outfit of instincts, needs, and ways of reacting, of such a kind as to make him incurably religious. Again our individual history is shaped by our social environment, and this, in combination with our racial inheritance, makes us religious.

The great source of the content of the sub-conscious with Pratt is the conscious experiences of the individual and the race. All the past experiences of the race and of the individual find sanctuary in the sub-conscious, and when all the burial-places of memory give up their dead in the shape of impulses to do things, fixed ideas, sudden inspiration, visions, automatisms, etc., these things seem so unaccountable to the subject that he immediately assigns all this sub-conscious phenomena to a supernatural cause.

The prophets and mystics of all ages have been influenced by sub-conscious up-rushings into consciousness of meanings, insights, and ideas which they interpreted as direct messages from God. The supernatural hypothesis is unnecessary to account for these messages since they are simply the explosion into the prophet's consciousness of the highest ideals of the nation which had been smouldering in the region of the sub-conscious. Pratt pertinently asks, Why should God communicate with a split off consciousness rather than with a conscious mind? He asserts that what is highest in the religious genius is to be found in his conscious states, not in some form of insensibility. The highest type of man in the religious life as elsewhere is the unified and rational self.

He maintains that his view does not rule out of court the fact of Divine inspiration, or of communion with God, but merely discredits the theory propounded by James that inspiration, etc., must come in clandestine fashion through the sub-conscious into consciousness.[1]

Society and the Individual

In connection with the vexed question of whether religion is an affair of society or of the individual, this author holds that religion is both a social and an individual

[1] James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 484.

product. Pratt raises the question, How does the individual get his religion? His answer is, in the first place, because the individual's psychical constitution makes him incurably religious, and, in the second place, because of the experience the individual gains by intercourse with his fellows.

He emphasizes two individualistic factors in religion. First, there is the reason and intellect by means of which the individual appropriates social experience, and, second, there is the psychic outfit of tendencies and instincts which determines what sort of attitude the individual will adopt to religion; both factors are purely individualistic and independent of social influence. Reason, then, and the original psychic equipment can account for a religious attitude apart from the influence of society.

In the last analysis, religion is an individual matter; each man must take up his own attitude, and this is a subjective, personal, and private thing.

But, says Pratt, the religious life has matter as well as form. The form is determined by the individual; the matter is given by society. Men do come to think and feel religiously in ways influenced by society. There is, therefore, in addition to the individual's psychic equipment the important factor of the social contribution to religion. The individual cannot be studied in abstraction from society nor society apart from the individual. We come into our section of the world and find it worshipping and believing in specific ways. We imitate these ways, and so assimilate the customs of the social group. Religious ways of thinking, feeling, and acting are ingrained by one generation into the mental background, even into the nervous system of the next. These ways become in us habitual reactions, and this is explanation of conservatism in religion.

Two things found in religion are due to society—namely, its authoritative nature and its traditional elements. Pratt makes the interesting observation that conservatism of customs is stronger than the conservatism of beliefs. The reasons advanced are: first, beliefs are subject to rational criticism and refutation in a way in which customs are not; second, a breach of religious observance is patent to the whole social group; therefore, it arouses more

indignation than an heretical idea; third, customs are more ingrained into the nervous system; it is therefore easier to change ideas than habits.

Two reasons are adduced for the authority of religious customs and beliefs: the one is simply force of habit; the established paths of the nervous system determine the order of our doings; the other is the impressive source from which they come—namely, parents, teachers, and priests. In a word, these customs and beliefs are forced on the individual by society; this is the only authority we can empirically verify.

Pratt refers to a second kind of imitation which, unlike the first, which makes for the conservation of old ways, really initiates new customs. Here the individualistic factor becomes significant. He shrewdly observes that we believe differently from our grandfathers, not because of greater originality on our part, but because we imitate the more advanced of our contemporaries.

Two psychological causes of change in belief are indicated: the first is the fact that man is a suggestible being, and the second is that he is a rational being, and is liable to become inoculated with new ideas. But rational ideas destroy traditional beliefs, not simply because they are rational, but because men of prestige teach them. It is this fact that gives them their hold over the popular mind. Pratt asserts that theology is more conservative than religion. The religious genius, he says, is always the innovator, and his appeal to individual conscience and to immediate personal relation with God is against the traditional doctrines of the age.

The Religion of Childhood

The discussion of the religion of childhood is illuminating. With Pratt, the infant is a little animal fitted out with senses, reflexes, instincts, and incipient intelligence; the world into which he comes is a social world full of people stamped with ways of thinking and acting, who insist on stamping upon him the same ways. There is an innate tendency to imitation in the child; he therefore imitates the models he finds, and literally absorbs the customs, attitudes, and ideals of that part of the race to which he belongs.

The child is incipiently religious, in the sense that he has a vague attitude to the powers that determine his destiny. For the child these powers are embodied in the immediate social circle, and hence his first exhibitions of love, trust, dependence, and reverence are directed to actual persons, *e.g.* mother, father, or nurse.

Our attention is drawn to two important presuppositions of religion's becoming explicit—namely, the development of self-consciousness and the development of social consciousness. These two lines of development are chronologically parallel. According to Pratt, three main factors form the child's God-idea: (1) the indirect influence of the actions of older people; (2) direct teaching on religious subjects; and (3) the natural development of the child's mind.

The most significance is assigned to the first factor, because here the powerful law of imitation or ideo-motor action operates. The child is interested in people, observes what they do, imitates their actions, and so comes to indirectly share in their mental attitude and feelings. Pratt draws the pedagogical inference that wherever children are growing up, the outward expression of religion is simply not to be replaced by anything else. Family prayers and grace before meat have therefore psychological significance.

In connection with the factor of direct teaching, Pratt explains that the heterogeneous mass of religious ideas often found in the child's mind is a resultant of three factors: first, the indiscriminate instruction of parents, servants, teachers, preachers, playmates, books, and pictures; second, a misunderstanding of much that is taught; and, third, the child's own imaginative contribution.

The third factor in the formation of the child's theology is, according to Pratt, the child's own development. Pratt begins pointing out that the instinct of curiosity makes the child a walking interrogation point. Very soon the child's problems cannot be solved in terms of father, mother, or the social circle; dependence on parents is no longer felt as ultimate, and there is a sense of a farther power beyond, on which they, too, with him depend. Theology, says Pratt, is the child's first science; his questions drive his parents back to God as the ultimate explanation of most things,

and on the whole the child finds this the most satisfactory solution of his questions. The developing mind of the child seeks an adequate cause and reason for things; hence the causal and teleological categories become necessary.

Authority is the dominant characteristic of the child's religion. Two things mark the child's mind at this stage —namely, unquestioning acceptance of what is presented and, second, intense suggestibility. The critical faculty is at first dormant, but the day comes when a new idea collides with some old belief, the critical faculty awakes, and doubt begins.

The doubts of childhood are sourced in two causes: they either result from conflict between authoritative theological teaching and the child's own growing experience, or from conflict between authoritative theological ideas taught and his own growing sense of justice and morality. It is egregious folly to teach theology which the child's own experience can refute, and to teach a kind of God which his growing sense of righteousness finds insufferable. The defect of religious instruction, according to Pratt, is neglect of emphasis on the fact of the indissolubility of religion and morality. The fact is stressed that there is a time when primitive credulity is replaced by critical understanding, and that the kind of instruction then given is decisive for life. Pratt suggests that one of the causes of atheism is religious instruction of the wrong kind.

Adolescence

Adolescence, for Pratt, is the flowering time for religion and most other things in human life. The adolescent makes three new discoveries: he comes into possession of all his bodily functions; new vistas open up to his intellect and imagination; and he discovers new and terrifying intensities of emotion and desire.

Pratt criticizes Starbuck's classification of the religious life of adolescence as being suspiciously definite, and asserts that here we have actually a blurred picture only.

This psychologist's observations on sex and religion are wise and timely. His position is that, while the sex instinct manifests itself in religion, so do other instincts; the importance of the sexual factor in religion is over-

emphasized, and whatever influence it has is largely indirect and unconscious. Religion has not one but many roots, hence it is unscientific to assign a purely sexual cause for the storm-and-stress period of adolescence.

The lofty aspirations of youth and the physical weakness attendant on rapid growth can account for much of this religious turmoil in which an exaggerated sense of guilt appears. Pratt believes that certain theological prepossessions, in which adolescents have been trained, account for much of this morbid sense of guilt which is such a striking phenomenon of adolescent religion. He finds that, in the religious lives of Roman Catholic youths, the adolescents of the religions of India, and those of the great national churches, this morbid phenomenon which characterizes the youth of denominations trained in a narrow theology does not occur.

Pratt accepts the view with which Starbuck has made us familiar—namely, that a period of doubt follows the period of storm and stress. He assigns this phenomenon of adolescent doubt to three causes. The first is a physiological one; obscure physical conditions, having little to do with intellectual matters, impel the adolescent to doubt everything in general and nothing in particular. Pratt endorses Starbuck's deliverance that adolescence is for men generally a period of doubt, while for women it is a period of storm and stress.[1]

The second cause is both intellectual and moral. Pratt instances species of this; for example, new studies at the University are found to be inconsistent with the religion taught in childhood; a growing sense of goodness, justice, and truth makes some old dogma seem unworthy; faith in prayer becomes shaken because of failure to get the answer one's childhood training led one to expect; or, again, the evil lives of professing Christians may destroy one's early faith.

Pratt diagnoses the pain symptom of religious doubt as due not merely to a fresh apprehension of logical inconsistency, but to a conflict of desires. There is a desire to be true to a dearly loved faith and a desire to be loyal to truth, and the struggle between desires involves mental suffering.

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 241.

Pratt advances a third cause for adolescent doubt in the fact of mass suggestion. He shrewdly observes, a conventional notion is abroad that youth must go through a period of scepticism, and youth tries to live up to the expectation. With many young men doubt is a matter of imitation; it is thought smart to doubt; one's set doubts, therefore one doubts; hetero-suggestion passes into auto-suggestion. The natural phenomenon of doubt is abnormally extended by suggestion, and its prevalence is exaggerated.

Pratt states that the violent religious emotion of youth subsides in the post-adolescent period. Here doubts, if there be any, are intellectual, and struggles are less intense. One's theology may alter, but one's religious attitude is settled.

Last comes the period of old age, which is marked by two things. The first feature is that active interests lose their hold on life, and the second is the contrasted fact that religious interests intensify. Pratt indicates three reasons for this: first, the earliest memories and interests endure when the more recent fade away; second, the critical faculty weakens, and it becomes difficult to assimilate new ideas, therefore old age is less susceptible to the influence of the critical spirit; and, finally, because religion becomes more precious as death draws near, life's other interests become dwarfed by comparison. The conviction deepens in old age that religion conserves the real values.

Two Types of Conversion

In his treatment of Conversion, Pratt corrects details in the interpretations of Starbuck and James. These investigators confined their attention to the ultra-evangelical type of religious subject, and therefore exaggerated the importance and frequency of the catastrophic species of conversion.

Pratt interprets the term "conversion" in the broadest sense as the whole process involved in the making of a moral self. He defines the moral self as a group of powers united in the service of a system of purposes. A moral self is one determined by purposes and ideals, but in the lives of most of us purposes conflict and ideals clash; man's

task, therefore, is to subordinate the less loved ideals to the best loved. When this process of subjugation is complete, the moral self is formed and the man ceases to be a divided self.

With Pratt a divided self is one torn between conflicting loves; before a man can will one set of ideals before another, he must come to love that set best, hence the all-important thing is the emotional value we give to anything. New ideals must come to be loved better than the old before they can displace the old. In the majority of cases new ideals silently displace the old by a subtle modification of values, and at the end of the adolescent period the young man finds himself a fairly united person. But there are exceptions, due to either temperament or environmental conditions. These exceptional forms of conversion have great psychological interest, but are not ethically superior to the quieter types. Pratt's position is, that for psychology conversion is entirely a natural phenomenon which is independent of supernatural interference; the conventional religious conversion, falling in love, and the process of counter-conversion all follow precisely the same psychological course. The proposition is maintained that conversion is generically a process of unification of a divided self, and that it is psychologically the same in all religions.

Two types of conversion are illustrated by Pratt. He adduces four typical cases of the volitional species of conversion—one from Roman Catholicism, two are taken from Hinduism, and one from the Russian Church. Pratt then takes John Bunyan and David Brainerd as illustrating the conventional Christian conversion of the self-surrender type. He attaches special significance to Bunyan's case for two reasons: first, because Bunyan's religious experience is probably the most vivid example extant, of how pre-conceived ideas of conversion determine the process; and, second, because Bunyan's conversion has set the fashion of orthodox conversion ever since in ultra-evangelical circles.

The Factors at Work in Conversion

Pratt asserts the whole course of a conversion of the Bunyan-Brainerd type is predetermined by naively accepted

theology, the cardinal ideas of which are that intellectual insight, good deeds, and voluntary effort are useless for salvation. Hence a gradual process of moral development is unthinkable, and conversion and salvation must be due to the supernatural factor alone, and be catastrophic in nature. Pratt affirms, the attempt to force human nature into this theological mould was signally successful with Bunyan and Brainerd, and has been more or less successful ever since with those who have been brought up in this theological tradition.

Starbuck and James are criticized here for concentrating on this self-surrender type at the expense of the moral and volitional type. This type of conversion experience fascinated Starbuck and James, says Pratt, because it is more startling, and the sub-conscious effects are more abundant. He points out that there is no good evidence for Starbuck's assertion that conversion is a process of struggling away from sin, rather than a striving towards righteousness.[1] This, says Pratt, is true only of the Bunyan-Brainerd type, and imitators influenced by these cases. Pratt maintains, as against Starbuck and James, that in most cases of conversion the process is just the reverse. It is a process of struggling towards something new as the result of a fascinating glimpse of the possible new life, and not a process of struggling away from sin at all. He asserts that the phenomena of intense conviction of sin, and that of self-surrender, so prominent in conventional cases of conversion, are artificially induced by a particular theological theory, and he accuses Starbuck and James of unlawfully using psychology to buttress this arbitrary theology.

As evidence that the conventional conversion experience of ultra-evangelical circles is due to the influence of their peculiar traditions, and to the suggestion of a specific theology, Pratt submits that religious persons of the great national churches do not have this type of conversion experience. On the whole he makes out a convincing case for the proposition, that the theological training and prepossessions of the religious subject determine the fact and mode of the conversion process. This psychologist holds it is a crime that the artificially induced misery of

[1] Starbuck, E. D., *op. cit.* p. 64.

the Brainerd type, and the pathological morbidity of the Bunyan type, should have become the standard of the conversion experience for earnest Christians.

Pratt corrects the exaggerated emphasis which both Starbuck and James placed on the self-surrender factor in conversion. He affirms that the only surrender in the matter is the surrender of the old values because new values have become more desirable. Effort is supremely important, says Pratt, when one's purpose is to give up evil habits, to acquire new insight, and to effect a revolution in one's ideals, values, and character; therefore to advocate cessation of effort is a dangerous theological fallacy.

Pratt is careful to point out that mere effort is not enough; a man must want to live the new life before he makes the effort, hence the great thing is to create the desire. Now, says Pratt, there is no forcing of desires or tastes, but when these are got, effort inevitably follows. There must be not only desire, but that which is desired must appeal to the man as possible before he will indulge in effort.

According to this investigator, the majority of cases of conversion can be explained in terms of ordinary mental laws; but there are certain aspects which belong to the violent type of conversion which transcend the field of ordinary mental occurrences, and psychology seeks to explicate these more striking phenomena in terms of the sub-conscious.

Crowd Psychology and Revivals

Religious revivals are explicated by Pratt in terms of the law of rhythm, and those of crowd psychology. According to our author, the law of the pendulum is a fundamental characteristic of the human mind. He illustrates how the rhythmic needs of man are recognized and met by the great historic religions in recurrent periods for meditation and spiritual refreshment. He draws attention to the fact that emotions are more intense in groups of individuals than in an individual isolated from the group, and that this has been recognized by all religions. Revival methods are a deliberate means of arousing group emotion.

Pratt lays down here an important proposition that the

psychology of the crowd is not essentially different from that of the individual. All the phenomena of crowd psychology characterizes the individual out of the crowd as well as in it. What the crowd does is to heighten the suggestibility of the individual and to intensify certain of the factors which were already his before he entered the crowd. The crowd then does not create suggestibility, but it accentuates it particularly in two ways—namely, by destroying inhibitions and by getting for some one idea the whole attention. The members of a crowd are, therefore, more suggestible and primitive in their reactions than they would be in isolation from the group.

Now, says Pratt, all these psychological characteristics of crowds in general are found in the revival meetings. The creation of these characteristics is the *sine qua non* of a successful revival. There are four things a revivalist must have before he begins: first, like-mindedness; second, great suggestibility; third, emotional excitement; and fourth, the absence of inhibitions. It is necessary, says Pratt, that a state of mental strain, expectancy, and subdued excitement should be induced throughout the community before the arrival of the revivalist. When this is done it is not an ordinary crowd that meets the revivalist but a psychological crowd.

Having got a crowd prepared psychologically, the revivalist does not need logic; the critical faculties have abdicated, therefore his address is an appeal to the emotions, especially to those of love and fear.

Another means of suggestion is the frequent use of repetition of significant words and phrases. The climax of the whole thing is the appeal for direct decision. Evangelists are unwilling that their hearers should go home and make their decisions in a cool hour. "Decide now," is their cry. Hymns are then produced such as, "O Lamb of God, I come," which is a masterpiece of auto-suggestion. Between each verse the speaker says in tender tones, "Come now," "Will you not come?" Then the audience sings, "I come, I come." This is the most obvious case of auto-suggestion that could be found. The most suggestible subjects start the procession to the inquiry room, and the procession itself is a powerful suggestion to others.

The effects of revivals are both good and bad. The

revival is the centre of enormous power, and this has often worked mightily for righteousness. It has transformed character, and has led in many cases to lasting reformation of life, especially, and note Pratt's qualification, in centuries before our own. But, says Pratt, the effects are not always to be desired, for frequently revivals let loose a tremendous power which breaks down inhibitions in connection with emotion. It is a bad thing when an appeal is made to the emotions upon questions where reason and evidence alone are relevant. It is here, asserts Pratt, that we get the deceptive statistics of the revivalist.

Again, inhibitions to action are frequently broken down, with the result that various motor impulses get out of control. Here we have the phenomenon of Glossolalia. Here, too, belong the bodily effects, such as the rolling exercises, jerks, and barks, where overwrought nerves and great suggestibility have caused the entire loss of control over nerves and muscles.

Yet again, the third and worst result of revivals is the breaking down of inhibitions in connection with belief. Many revivalists are able to change a man from a rational being into an impulsive animal, and to reduce audiences even of high intelligence to a state of primitive credulity. The worst result of revivals is insanity; weak minds roused by the abnormal excitement of the revival simply go to pieces. Pratt's conclusion is, briefly, revivals of religion, morality, patriotism, and ideals are necessary because of the fact of rhythm in human life, but that the day of the old-fashioned revival is done with its inhibition of reason, of free and responsible action, and its forcing of emotions and convictions by semi-hypnotic methods.

Belief in God

Pratt holds that cult, private prayer, and belief are the three important phenomena of religion, and that all three originated and developed together. He lays down as the general condition of belief that the proposed object must square either with our perceptual universe or with our conceptual universe before we will believe in its reality. The two great objects of religious belief are God and the Future Life.

The idea of God is determined by three definite influences —a sociological, a psychological, and a conceptual or logical factor. The influence of society is an important factor in moulding one's idea of God. The place the senses and imagination play in belief has much to do with the determination of the notion of God. Again, when men live in a conceptual age the need is felt for a less anthropomorphic and a more rationally satisfying God-idea. It is this logical factor that has made the older ideas of God incredible.

According to Pratt, three elements may be discerned in the God-idea—an imaginative, a conceptual, and a pragmatic. Pratt pertinently criticizes Leuba, King, and Ames, all of whom have pressed this pragmatic element to the point of absurdity.

Pratt's four religious types which he defined at the outset are now illustrated in his analysis of the reasons why people now believe in God. Pratt discovers by statistics percentages which point to the existence of these four types of belief—namely, belief on authority, reasoned belief, emotional belief, and volitional belief.

Now the nature of belief in God does not so easily fit into Pratt's four categories. He indicates that in many persons belief in God centres about imagery; in others the belief is more conceptual; while for many both images and concepts are thought to be symbolical of some deeper reality for the expression of which they are both alike inadequate. Pratt's position is, that while pragmatic motives are present they are not as strong as Leuba asserts, nor do men think of God as Ames and King suppose, merely as a projection of human ideals and values. For religious men God is a symbol of ultimate and independently existing reality.

Belief in Immortality

Pratt finds that the people who believe in Immortality also fall under four categories, but here he indicates that rational arguments have far less influence than feeling and volition. He notes an important difference between belief in God and that in immortality—namely, belief in God is taught, while belief in immortality is not; it is ours naturally and implicitly.

Pratt emphasizes the fact that belief in survival is due, not to reasoning but to feeling and desiring. Men have an instinctive feeling they are not to be obliterated. This conviction is based on the feeling of the worth of personality, which is connected with the instinct of self-assertion. The best argument for immortality, in Pratt's opinion, is that based on the essential differences between consciousness and its processes and the material world and its processes. Pratt discovered from his reports that the "Will to believe" class was the largest here, and holds that this desire for survival is linked up with instinct, as witness the fact that it is seen in all grades of mental and spiritual development.

According to Pratt, the pragmatic value of belief in immortality is huge; it has value for life. This belief in a future life conserves values and gives expression to two things: (1) it insists that conscious rational life and the supreme values of the universe shall not perish; and (2) that spiritual life is different in kind from the world of matter, and is therefore independent of its laws.

Cult

As against Tylor [1] and Tiele,[2] who maintained cult was subsequent to belief, and in opposition to Ames [3] and King,[4] who hold that cult is prior to belief, Pratt asserts that cult and belief originate together. Pratt answers the question Ames leaves unanswered—namely, How do merely social ceremonies become religious ceremonies? There must have been, according to Pratt, an early form of cosmic sense, a kind of Spencerian awe in the face of the unknown force from which all things come. The view of Goldenweiser is endorsed that man is not only sensitive to social influences but also to the influence of nature.[5] Pratt maintains there must have been a blurred belief in an indefinite power which was conceived of as controlling

[1] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 4th ed. (1903), vol. ii. chap. xviii.
[2] Tiele, *Science of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 127.
[3] Ames, R. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 49, 51.
[4] King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 88.
[5] Goldenweiser, A. A., "Religion and Society: A Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion," *Journ. of Phil.*, xiv. (March 1917), p. 116.

destiny. Modern anthropology calls this vague diffused power which is other than human, Mana, and sees in this the earliest religious object. Individuals as well as groups maintained an attitude to this indefinite power, and this attitude constituted the first private or public worship. Here, then, according to Pratt, we have the earliest religious belief, and men naturally seized on the existing social ceremony most suitable to express this belief.

Now, social ceremony takes on a new meaning when it refers to Mana, the power that controls destiny ; it becomes charged with a new significance, and becomes a religious ceremony. The forms of religious cult vary according to the group activities which have thus been appropriated, and to the local ideas of Mana. Each new rite added to the cult depends on a new belief that arises concerning Mana, or upon some old social custom being brought in. Local conditions must be sought for the strange details of cult.

Pratt holds that there is no distinction at first between religious and magic rites ; both emerge from the same matrix, but as the notion of impersonal force yields to the conception of supernatural personal spirits, religious rites break free from magic ceremonies. In animism, polytheism, and theism, the more developed stages of religion, religious cult is clearly differentiated from magic rites. The leading feature of magic is that it seeks direct control of the mysterious powers of the universe, and attempts to concuss these, while the characteristic of religion is that it seeks to gain its end through the assistance of the spirits or gods.

Pratt finds that there are external influences which cause the cult's continuance : first, cult is forced on men by the tyranny of custom ; second, the religious reactions involved in the cult establish paths in the nervous system, and so come under the law of habit. Four important reasons appeal to Pratt as explaining the retention of ritual—namely, the thought of pleasing God ; the thought of influencing the audience ; the desire to do things decently and in order ; and the mere force of habit. Ritual appeals to the instinct of gregariousness, and to that of self-expression. Men like to perform together actions related to their strongest sentiments, and their feelings demand expression by something a bit primitive and sensuous.

Pratt agrees with Stratton that, when ritual is cut out of worship, violence is done to human nature, which will be avenged.[1] In all developed religions the kind of ritual indicates the kind of God believed in.

Men practise the cult because they find it satisfying ; it gives vent to the impulse for self-expression, and brings a sense of social solidarity which appeals to the gregarious instinct ; and because they find it profitable, it reinforces religious faith, and helps men to the moral control of life, to peace, joy, and hope, and all the other values which religion mediates.

According to Pratt, the ends sought in cult are three—namely, to keep religious beliefs vivid ; to stimulate religious emotions ; and to fix attention on religion so as to make it vital for the worshipper. The means used to achieve these ends are six in number : (1) sensuous presentation ; (2) mental images of a vivid kind ; (3) appeal to the æsthetic sense ; (4) use of the powerful force of social confirmation ; (5) use of religious symbolism ; (6) use of public instruction.

Objective and Subjective Worship

This psychologist distinguishes clearly—perhaps too clearly—between two types of worship—the objective, the aim of which is to produce an effect on God, and the subjective, the aim of which is to bring about a psychological effect in the mind of the worshipper. These two types are illustrated from the religions of the Orient and from that of Christianity. According to Pratt, within Christianity, Roman Catholicism represents the objective type, while Protestantism illustrates the subjective type.

The objective type of worship is made evident by the very edifices of Roman Catholicism. Vast cathedrals are built not for worshippers but for the glory of God. It is difficult to see the priest ; it is impossible to hear him ; moreover, he turns his back on the congregation, and mutters in an unknown tongue. No matter ! the only thing of moment is that God should be gloriously worshipped. The essence of Catholicism is that God is present in an objective way in the wafer on the altar, and if one can close one's

[1] Stratton, G. M., *Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 150.

eyes to the scientific absurdity, the Mass is the most potent institution of any religious cult in history. Now this cult of the Mass is successful with two classes—first, with persons of mystic psychology, and, second, with ignorant persons.

A vivid contrast is drawn between the worship of the Church of Rome and that of Protestant Christendom, and, according to Pratt, the problem of Protestantism is to find a combination of the objective and subjective types of worship. The need of more ritual is felt, and this need is sourced in human psychology. But Protestantism must bring to the worshipper the sense of Real Presence without the aid of the two powerful things at the disposal of the Roman Church—namely, the naive belief which makes objective worship easy for large groups, and a ritual with the authority of generations behind it, and hallowed by centuries.

Pratt's conclusions are not very positive; he holds, subjective worship without objective worship is doomed, and objective worship of the sort that aims to please the Deity is impossible to the modern man; therefore, the only kind of worship left, which is possible for the intelligent man at once objective and sincere, is reverence in the presence of the cosmic forces. The instinct of self-abasement, with its accompanying emotion of negative self-feeling, is all that is left for the Church to stimulate and direct.

Prayer

Pratt holds that the earliest religious object was the impersonal power which modern anthropologists agree to call Mana. According to Pratt, individuals felt some kind of relation to Mana, and took up an attitude to it as well as social groups. This felt relation to Cosmic Power on the part of the individual gave rise to two phenomena—namely, private magic and private worship.

Pratt criticizes Marett's view—that prayer originated in the magic spell.[1] He affirms that if, as is most likely the case, belief in personal spirits developed out of the original feeling for Mana, direct appeal to these personal spirits was perfectly natural. For all this, Pratt concedes that

[1] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*; see chap. ii., "From Spell to Prayer," pp. 29–72.

spell and prayer have reacted on each other. Private and public prayer tends to become formal, and even comes to be viewed as having an inherent power in itself to produce a desired result; this kind of prayer is simply a magic spell. Pratt instances here the Thibetan prayer-wheel, the Latin Pater Noster of the illiterate peasant, and the Sanscrit prayer of the ignorant Hindoo. He asserts that while a ritual of prayer is helpful to many as an aid to concentration, two classes of temperament have no use for it—namely, the intellectual and the mystical.

People pray, Pratt discovers, because they began to pray in childhood as the result of instruction, and have simply continued through habit; or because they believe it helps them; or merely because they can't help praying. He notes two features with respect to mature prayer: first, its limitations become recognized; and, second, communion is substituted for petition.

Pratt's functional explanation of why men pray is because they have needs. They believe prayer will help them to get what they need; or because they cannot help expressing their need in prayer form; or because, regardless of theory, men feel the benefit of formulating their desires in prayer form. The result of Pratt's questionnaire proved that the majority of persons do not think that God's actions are changed by prayer, yet they keep on praying for the last two reasons. At the same time, Pratt emphasizes the fact that many people pray because they believe they get objective answers.

Pratt's position here is that psychology is not concerned to pronounce on the validity of these objective answers. The whole question as to the objective reality of the Higher Power religious men feel in touch with in prayer is a matter for metaphysics. Psychology is concerned with subjective religious states only, and it reports that these states are the results of an intense belief in the reality of a Higher Power and a Spiritual World.

The valuable subjective benefits of prayer are a matter of empirical observation. The prayer of confession relieves pent feeling, clarifies conscience, strengthens the will, and as Freud, Jung, Prince, and Sidis have proved, has great therapeutic value. Prayer is invaluable in the healing of disease through the power of suggestion, and no other

method is comparable to it for turning sorrow into resignation, fear into courage, despair into hope, and turmoil into peace. All this, together with spiritual uplift, renewed strength, and ability to accomplish ends, are the effects of prayer. He concludes, therefore, that prayer is worth while even for the sake of its subjective effects. At the same time, Pratt is careful to emphasize that the subjective value of prayer is due to the fact that it has values that are not subjective, and his conclusion is that prayer will become extinct if it can be proved that its value is subjective only.

Mysticism

Mysticism in general is defined by Pratt as a special psychic experience in which there is the feeling of the presence of some being or reality not got through the ordinary channels of perception, nor through any process of reasoning or inferential thought. Religious mysticism is a species of this, in which the presence sensed is felt to be Divine.

A conspicuous feature of Pratt's treatment is the clear line of demarcation he draws between the mysticism of the mild type, in which there is a quiet sense of the presence of the Divine, and mysticism of the extreme hectic type, which is annexed to a psychopathic temperament and constitution. The pathological side of mysticism has, in Pratt's opinion, been overdone. Pratt finds two things in the mystic experience—his analysis reveals an emotional element and an ideational element. Emotion is always present, but it nucleates round some truth or idea. The emotion intensifies conviction of the reality of this truth or idea, and determines the intellectual content. In the experience of the mild type of mystic this truth is the certainty of the presence of a greater life which touches his own. This presence, moreover, is felt to be Divine; therefore, the mystic experience has a special emotional intensity.

The " pains " of the mystic experience are annexed to the extreme type only, and may be of the nature of a positive sense of being deserted by God, or merely negative in the sense of lacking the joyous experience. James is criticized here for neglecting to allow for the law of rhythm

in the spiritual life. James's distinction between the " sick soul " and the " healthy minded " [1] is, according to Pratt, too sharply drawn, for the " sick soul " may be " healthy minded " very often ; there is ebb and flow in the religious life, religious souls are now sick and now sound.

The mystic cannot control the occurrence of the joyous states, he can only break down moral conditions which inhibit their coming. When both outer circumstances and inner conditions are favourable the sense of the presence of the Divine comes with a spontaneity and a suddenness which astounds the subject of it. Generally speaking, the ecstatic experience is not to be commanded ; but mystics of the mild type are able to live as if God were always present with them.

Methods

The central idea of extreme mysticism is that of being absorbed in God. The extreme type of mystic does not consciously seek the luxury of a bath of ecstatic emotion, but is driven to seek this experience by his congenital disposition.

The mental traits of the mystic type of mind are, according to Pratt's analysis, first, a big margin to the conscious mind, the emotional and ideational contents of which powerfully influence the conscious life ; second, a lack of inner unity bordering on distraction ; and, third, a tendency to mental dissociation in extreme ecstatics. Now, says Pratt, given an individual of mystical temperament who uses methods that have been deliberately devised to cultivate the mystic life, the desired mental state will inevitably be produced. The mystical experience is a state of mind which is brought about by psychological means, and follows psychological laws.

The methods to induce the mystical state are practically the same in all species of mysticism. Protestantism uses them in a blundering unconscious fashion, while Roman Catholicism has reduced them to a science. Pratt reduces the whole traditional course of training for Christian mysticism to two stages : the first is characterized by inhibition, the second, by auto-suggestion. The austerities

[1] James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* ; see Lectures iv., v., vi., vii.

of the first stage and the auto-suggestions of the second are fully described, illustrative material being drawn from Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity.

The Ecstasy

Pratt differentiates between the mystic ecstasy and the mystic life : the one is intermittent, while the other is a constant condition. Pratt finds two features conspicuous in the ecstasy. First, there is substitution of passivity for activity. The second great characteristic is the unity and narrowness of the conscious field. Four elements are discerned in the ecstasy : the outside world is shut out ; the senses are closed ; the idea of God with its congruent emotions, love and joy, monopolize the whole conscious field ; and, finally, there is immediate awareness of God.

The history of the development of the ecstatic condition is a gradual process of substituting an emotional for an ideational content on the one hand, and a corresponding process of narrowing the field of consciousness on the other. This ecstatic process, carried to its extreme limit, would issue in unconsciousness, or a trance condition which actually results in some cases.

Pratt, following James, declares there is a noetic element in the mystic experience which has two aspects : on the one hand, there is lack of conceptual knowledge ; on the other, there is the presence of an intense immediate experience. The most striking features of the mystic state are the visions and the locutions. Psychologically the structure and causes of visions is not dissimilar from that of the structure and causes of dreams. The symbolic visions of the mystic are caused by the dream imagination working on the mass of theological ideas already in the mind. Pratt cites Freud as insisting on the symbolic nature of normal dreams ; now, says Pratt, if Freud is right, then it should not astonish us to find that the dream imagination of the Christian mystic should work up visions of the symbolic sort.

Pratt stresses the fact that while visions, locutions, levitations, and hallucinations are simply pathological phenomena due to hysterical conditions, the great mystics themselves discount these things as being, even in their

least pathological form, merely accidental and not essential to the mystic state.

The core of the ecstasy is ideational, the emotional elements always nucleate round some idea. The mystic's experience is not one of emotion only, but of intuition of reality as well. The mystic, in Pratt's words, knows psychologically though not epistemologically. The mystic is certain he has come into contact with an objective reality other than his own subjective consciousness.

According to Pratt, all the alleged revelations of new truth manifest two definite tendencies—one towards optimism, and another towards monism. We are cautioned to distinguish between the actual insights gained and the result of reflection on these insights. Pratt refers to the fact of the incommunicability of the revelations of the ecstasy, and criticizes Poulain's explanation that incommunicability is due to lack of suitable terms. Pratt holds it is not lack of vocabulary, but lack of memory on the mystic's part, while Leuba maintains the mystic has no truths to communicate. Pratt is impressed with Leuba's suggestion, that the mystic's belief that he has had a new revelation of truth may be explained in terms of dream phenomena.[1]

Pratt's own position is, that what the mystic experiences is not some new truth but some old truth, which because of the extraordinary psychological condition of the subject at the time, becomes charged with the electricity of intense emotion and so transformed for the subject that he cannot recognize it for his own, but thinks that the old idea disguised in the glistering garment of emotion is a new revelation. His conclusion is, that the revelations of the mystic are first taken into the ecstasy before they are taken out of it, and that social education is the source of these alleged new truths, and not the ecstasy. But Pratt warns us there is one exception, namely, the sense of the presence of God. This he holds to be the one great genuine and universal deliverance of the mystical consciousness. The mystic is certain that he has experimental union with God, and has perceived God without the instruments of perception.

[1] Leuba, J. H., "Tendances Religieuses chez les Mystiques Chrétiens," *Rev. Philosophique*, liv. p. 480. Quoted by Pratt, pp. 409–410.

The tendency of mystics to describe God by negative terms is explained as due to the thought that since nothing in human experience can worthily be ascribed to God, He can best be described by negations. Pratt's explanation of the erotic terminology common in the writings of the mystics is, briefly, that there is no other language available to describe to the non-mystic what is felt. He, moreover, suggests that the Song of Songs has powerfully influenced the Christian mystics and has given them their amorous vocabulary. These two reasons, while explaining much, do not explain all, for the sexual tendency is present in mysticism. Pratt concludes, the sexual is there in mystical states, but the mystic himself is unconscious of the fact; therefore our valuation of the mystic from the moral point of view ought not to be affected by the fact of the physiological effects of intense emotion.

The Mystic Life

According to Pratt, the lives of mystics in general can be described by the word "oscillation." By the law of rhythm the mystic must pay for his exquisite ecstasy by suffering and a period of drought. This phenomenon is explicable psychologically by the impoverishment of the emotional life through its over-stimulation during the periods of ecstasy; the emotional nature is worn out, and the intense joy is followed by a reaction.

Pratt asserts four things make up the life of a great mystic: ecstatic joy, with its inevitable reaction, contemplation, and a life of active service inspired by the love of God. There is, in a word, a double rhythm in the lives of the great mystics—that between ecstasy and dryness, and that between contemplation and the life of activity. Pratt criticizes the theory of Delacroix, who traces a well-marked evolution from ecstasy to drought, and from drought to a life of perfectly guided activity.[1] These stages, Pratt asserts, do not fit the facts, for these so-called stages are not periods that come once each, but are actually states of mind that oscillate all through the mystic's life.

[1] Delacroix, *Etudes d'Histoire et de Psychologie du Mysticisme*, chaps. ii., vi., xi., quoted by Pratt, pp. 434–436.

Place and Value of Mysticism

In common with the majority of American investigators, Pratt holds that the phenomena of conversion and the mystic's experiences and ecstasies are all alike explicable in terms of the laws of psychology. The objects which the psychology of religion studies are the emotions, visions, beliefs, apprehensions, and experiences of religious men, not what the religious subject interprets as the cause of this phenomena. The mystics do feel a presence that is a psychological fact, but the fact that there is a presence to feel is not scientifically proven. Pratt's definite position is, that it is hopeless to look to psychology for anything transcendent. All that is scientifically verifiable are the states, activities, beliefs, emotions, and processes of the religious mind.

CRITIQUE

In this book, *The Religious Consciousness*, Professor Pratt deals with all the important phenomena which the psychology of religion has taken for its province. It is natural and inevitable, therefore, that a work so comprehensive should contain matter which at once challenges controversy and criticism. It should be stated, however, that most of the faults of this extremely able book are faults of emphasis rather than errors of fact.

One of the first things that strikes the reader in connection with this work, which is so unique for the range and diversity of its data, is that the author almost completely ignores genetic questions and the elementary forms of religious life. Pratt concentrates upon material drawn almost exclusively from the more cultured and highly developed religions. This neglect of genetic questions tends to lessen the book's value as a contribution towards the solution of psychological problems. It might not be hypercritical to suggest in this connection that Pratt's splendid descriptive work is at the expense of psychological analysis.

It is inevitable that one or two inconsistencies should appear in so comprehensive a work. In the first chapter of his book, Pratt lays down the thesis that the mystical factor is to be found in every genuinely religious person. But, in the last chapter, he flatly contradicts this assertion

by saying, " Many truly religious persons are emphatically not mystical, and mysticism is by no means essential to religion." [1]

A similar inconsistency occurs in connection with his discussion of tribal initiation ceremonies. At first, Pratt maintains strongly that the central part of the " puberty institution," and the rites celebrated on the admission of youth into it, are obviously purely social, with no reference to any non-human influence. Then, later, he just as emphatically asserts, " The initiation ceremonies of many primitive peoples are as truly religious in their nature as are the Christian sacraments of confirmation and baptism." [2]

Again, Pratt's truly valuable and suggestive distinction between the objective and subjective types of worship has the defects of its qualities. He does not make clear enough the fact that the distinction between the two types is rather one for thought than one which exists in practice. Both the objective and the subjective are often intermingled in the same religion, and even in the same worshipper. All Pratt is entitled to assert is, that in different religions and in different religious men we may perceive a lighter or a heavier accent upon the objective or the subjective in worship. It is not, therefore, a question of one or the other, it is rather a question of distribution of accent. Pratt certainly makes the difference between the objective and subjective in worship too absolute.

A similar criticism may be offered in connection with Pratt's four temperamental religious types. Pratt's too severe line of demarcation between each of these four types —the " Traditional," the " Rational," the " Mystical," and the " Practical," or " Moral "—tends to blur the fact that no actual religious subject exclusively represents one or other of these four types. Inge refers to this tendency to separate the different faculties as distinctly mischievous,[3] yet it is hard to see how we can altogether dispense with this distinctly convenient schema which certainly makes for clarity of thought in many instances ; it must be conceded it has pragmatic value. We cannot then censure

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*. Cf. pp. 14 and 477.
[2] Pratt, J. B., *op. cit.* Cf. pp. 263 and 289.
[3] Inge, W. R., *Christian Mysticism*, p. 21.

Pratt for using the compartmental theory of the mind, but we think that he has not sufficiently stressed the fact that all four types may and do exist in the same man, and that religious subjects are predominantly rather than exclusively one type or another.

Pratt's treatment of the subject of conversion provides a needed counter-blast to the extraordinary emphasis on the violent type of conversion on the part of the earlier investigators, Starbuck and James. But in reducing types of religious conversion to two only, is not Pratt guilty of over-simplification? Pratt has rightly emphasized the volitional type in which the subject throws into the business of conversion the force of will, as against the self-surrender type beloved of Starbuck and James; but he completely overlooks a third type of the conversion experience which these investigators hinted at, though they failed to do it justice—namely, the spontaneous awakening type in which the experience just comes upon one without any sense of effort at all.[1]

Starbuck and James put all the accent on the self-surrender type. Pratt has certainly supplied a needed corrective to the exaggeration of the importance of the catastrophic species with its characteristic mark of self-surrender, by his equally powerful emphasis on the volitional type of conversion. But Pratt is guilty, along with Starbuck and James, of failing to do justice to a genuine type of conversion experience which just comes spontaneously upon the individual. The position maintained here is that there are three fundamental types of conversion: (1) the self-surrender cataclysmic species emphasized by Starbuck and James; (2) the volitional type stressed by Pratt in opposition to Starbuck and James; and (3) the spontaneous awakening type, to which no psychologist has yet done sufficient justice.

Pratt lays down the thesis in this study, that the earliest religious object was a mysterious, indefinable, all-pervading, impersonal power called Mana, and that this concept grew up as the result of impressions made on the primitive mind by the tremendous forces of nature.[2] The

[1] James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 212, 224. See also Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 100, 200.

[2] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 261–262.

primary cause of cult with Pratt is to be found in this Cosmic sense. Pratt's position here needs to be scrutinized in connection with Miss Campbell's re-study of Mana.[1] Miss Campbell makes out a very strong case for the spirituality and personality of the Mana-concept. From the evidence of the field-workers themselves she convincingly shows that we have no grounds for supposing the concept of Mana is impersonal.

Miss Campbell is not so convincing, however, in regard to her second point—namely, that impressive phenomena of nature have nothing to do with the genesis of the Mana-concept, but that it is entirely due to the consciousness of heightened power which the individual experiences in a live group activity. According to this investigator, the mind of primitive man, having once had this inner experience, interprets all extraordinary things in terms of it, and ejects this experience of power into objects which it supplicates for aid, and this forms what is known as religion. With Miss Campbell, the source of the Mana-concept is simply the experience which is the psychic correlate of the successful conation of the gregarious instinct.

In connection with Pratt's discussion of the question of the sub-conscious as it touches religion, he lays down a debatable proposition—namely, that the co-conscious is always limited and inferior to the waking self. Pratt's statement does not seem to make sufficient allowance for the fact that one of the most difficult problems of this mysterious mental region is just that it is not so distinctly limited and inferior to the waking self as he supposes. Dr. Morton Prince and others have shown conclusively that there are most elaborate exhibitions of sub-conscious intelligence, involving not only memory but logical elaboration of original experiences, reasoning, volition, and a high order of constructive imagination. It is this fact that constitutes one of the hardest problems for the psychology of modern times. One of the questions of great practical and theoretic interest at the present time is just this, Can the sub-conscious processes perform the same functions as are ordinarily performed by conscious

[1] Campbell, I. G., "Manaism," *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, vol. xxix., No. 1 (1918), pp. 1–46.

intelligence?[1] That such a scientific question should have been formulated indicates that the limitations and inferiority of co-conscious processes are not as obvious as Pratt's proposition would lead one to suppose.

While Pratt's caution, which resembles Coe's with regard to the acceptance of the thoroughgoing doctrine of the sub-conscious, has much to be said for it, in view of the fact that neurologists and psychologists have not yet settled their differences with regard to this problem, yet we must concede that the sub-conscious, which began as a theory based on observed facts and formulated to explain these facts, has become more than a hypothetical concept. The assured results of the investigations of Janet with hysterics, and of Gurney with hypnotics,[2] the researches of Freud, Jung, Sidis, Morton Prince, and a host of other investigators, force us to admit that the existence of co-conscious states amounts to demonstration, and compel us to recognize in the sub-conscious a sound induction from experimental and clinical facts.[3]

In spite of the foregoing strictures it must be conceded that Pratt's book is the most thorough and comprehensive study of the phenomena included within the new science of the psychology of religion to date.

Many admirable features of this work support this statement; several of these deserve attention. Pratt's discussion of the methodology of his science is the clearest we have met. He consistently recognizes all across that the conclusions of the new science are valid within its own sphere only, that the methods it has adopted with such splendid success impose upon it certain limitations, and that these limitations constitute the very conditions of the psychology of religion's being a science at all. Pratt's book, therefore, will do much to win for the psychology of religion that place among the natural empirical sciences which was endangered by the ontological claims of Leuba and the impossible claims of Ames.

Pratt's chapter on the sub-conscious is probably the best treatment of this subject that has yet appeared in any book on the psychology of religion; it clarifies this whole conception as it affects religion.

[1] Prince, Morton, *The Unconscious*, p. 163.
[2] Prince, Morton, *op. cit.* p. 157. [3] Prince, Morton, *op. cit.* p. 544.

This author seeks to hold the scales evenly between the individual and society with a great measure of success; both the contribution of the individual and that of the social group are justly estimated. This judicious distribution of accent supplies the needed corrective to the exaggeration of the social, which is so conspicuous a feature of the work of Ames.

Pratt's chapters on conversion are a salutary criticism of the one-sided emphasis of Starbuck and James upon the cataclysmic species of conversion with its prominent characteristic of self-surrender.

Most critics will agree that the chapter on crowd psychology and revivals is the finest statement of the psychological principles involved ever found compressed into a single chapter.

Pratt, moreover, draws attention in this able work to facts that have been previously overlooked by psychologists of religion. In his chapter on belief in immortality he corrects many of our mistaken Western conceptions of religious life in India. He points out the interesting fact that there is vital belief in immortality among all classes in India except those who have come under Western influence. Belief in immortality is stronger with the Hindoos than with us, says Pratt, because Western science tends to destroy authority, to undermine ancient arguments for immortality, and to induce a form of imagination hostile to this belief.

The treatment of mysticism is finely done. Pratt makes the very necessary and helpful distinction between the hectic type of mystic beloved of most psychologists and psychiatrists, and the mystic of the mild type, without whose existence the world would become a poorer place. Pratt's analysis of the mystic ecstasy is most penetrating, and his estimate of the place and value of mysticism is the fairest we have seen.

No American psychologist has shown more sympathetic understanding of the religious life in all its diverse phases than has this investigator. Pratt's concern at all times is to get at the point of view of the religious subject himself. This extremely able book witnesses to his success in this respect.

The Religious Consciousness is certainly the best

single contribution which has yet been made to the new science of the psychology of religion in America. This extensive study, which traverses the whole field of the religious life, is marked by the moderation and strict impartiality of a judge; none of the bias of the advocate appears in this work.

The science of the psychology of religion is as yet a nascent science, and good books upon it are scarce, but we can safely say that here is one of the good books upon the subject. The author confesses in the preface that his book is the outcome of twelve years of research and study. The result, we opine, has amply repaid this great expenditure of time and labour, and we fervently wish that many modern authors on the same subject could make a similar confession. Much of the work done in connection with the psychology of religion seems to have been written overnight. It is, therefore, with peculiar pleasure we peruse this product of mature reflection from the sympathetic pen of Professor Pratt.

PART III.—RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS

CHAPTER XII

RESULTS

The nineteenth century was dominated by the science of Biology and enthralled by the magic word "Evolution"; in the twentieth century Psychology is supreme, and Mesopotamia is displaced by the blessed words "auto-suggestion" and "sub-conscious." In estimating the results achieved by the American School of Religious Psychology, therefore, we must withstand this Zeitgeist and view claims to omniscience on the part of this new science in a coldly critical spirit. We need to distinguish between loose generalizations of the psychology of religion, which are many, and the securely established results, which are few.

It may be said at the outset that the researches of investigators in this field are not yet sufficiently co-ordinated, nor are the conclusions of the science sufficiently established for it to make absolute and dogmatic pronouncements concerning its subject matter. All that the psychology of religion can justly claim at present is that it has surveyed the field in its broad outlines, and that it has formulated loose generalizations which are necessarily tentative and provisional.

Strictly speaking, results have not been established so much as problems have been raised and questions underlined. Many of the so-called explanations of the psychology of religion prove to be but re-statements of the mystery in other terms. The psychology of religion cannot claim to have given final solutions to the problems it has raised, though it has made valuable suggestions as to the lines along which such solutions may be sought. In the words

of Professor Coe, we may say, " The psychology of religion may be expected, of course, to modify to some extent our religious practices and our theological notions, but it is not likely to fill with great success the rôle of prophet, or of pope, or even of business manager." [1]

In saying this we do not attempt to depreciate the valuable work which has been done by psychology in the field of religion. It may claim to have accomplished much during the last twenty-five years, and have its claim allowed, but it must not claim to have accomplished everything.

The psychology of religion claims that it has brought under the recognized principles of psychological science religious phenomena such as the miraculous disappearance of deep-rooted vicious habits, automatic writings, visions, revelations, prophetic inspiration, voices, glossolalia, anæsthesias, levitation, stigmata, monitions, visual and auditory hallucinations, trances, the sensational phenomena of revivals, all the striking facts observed in the phenomenon of conversion, the sense of presence, illumination, and all the phenomena of the mystic ecstasy.

Conversion has been shown to be an adolescent phenomenon, which is conditioned by training, environment, physical development, and social influences.[2] Far from being unique, conversion is shown to be a perfectly natural psychological phenomenon which can be paralleled in departments of human life other than the religious. It is generally a process of the unification of a fractured self, and involves the sub-conscious factors of the mental life.

The phenomena of religious revivals are explicated in terms of crowd psychology. Psychology asserts that the methods of the revivalist are those of the hypnotist.

The Mystic is explained as a religious person who is an adept in the art of self-hypnosis. He takes into his mystic trance the ideas which he imagines he gets out of it ; all these insights and ideas are explained as due to his theological prepossessions and his social education.

Prayer is considered as a genuine psychological method of relaxation and an invaluable means of gaining power and poise. Its subjective effects are many and valuable, but all these valuable effects are due to auto-suggestion.

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Psychology of Religion*, preface, p. xv.
[2] Ames, E. S., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 214.

From the standpoint of the psychology of religion, prayer is self-communion which has tonic results.

These, then, are some of the loose generalizations of the American School. It is quite obvious that the general result of psychological investigations with regard to the religious life has been to reduce religion to mere subjectivism.

When we attempt to get at the actual concrete results of the work of the American School as distinguished from its generous assumptions and postulates, we discover the interesting fact that these results in the main have to do with the remarkable and indeed the abnormal phenomena of the religious life. Now it must be conceded that most of the striking psychic phenomena of religion have been expressed in terms of the laws of psychology and psychiatry. The most conspicuous successes of this new science have been in the field of the striking, the abnormal, and even the pathological in the religious life. But it is important to note that outside this field of exceptional religious phenomena the results of the psychology of religion are relatively meagre.

The deliverances of the psychology of religion concerning the normal religious condition are disappointing. The normal religious life is best seen "in the thousands of cheerful, wholesome, sometimes commonplace people who, though very much like others in most respects, meet their problems and look out on their world in the light of an inner experience whose authority they never doubt. This belief in their God determines the whole tenor of their lives." [1] Such persons have seen no visions, heard no voices, and enjoyed no superlative, ecstatic trances; therefore, they have been neglected by the psychologist of religion. We are justified in saying that this normal religious life is as yet a comparatively untrodden field to the psychologist.

It is worthy of note that the results of the American psychological investigations have little or no apologetic value. There is no reason to suppose that the psychology of religion will be stronger here; all the evidence points the other way. We endorse the pronouncement of Professor Pratt in this connection when he says, "I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to great disappoint-

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 298.

ment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should sanguinely expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have been led to expect, that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any of the truths of theology." [1]

The psychology of religion finds no empirical proof of a transcendent factor in human life. It has given no scientific proof of the existence of a spiritual order impinging on the natural, nor has it demonstrated any of the truths of religion. During the course of its investigations, extending over the last twenty-five years, the psychology of religion has not produced anything that would strengthen belief in extra-human agencies. All the evidence seems to point to the fact that, while the psychology of religion has no direct apologetic value, it will largely determine the nature of the religious apologetic of the future.

The investigations of the American School have issued in a position that is frankly negative. The whole tendency of the new science is towards the colossal *petitio principii* that, since the truth of religion cannot be proved by psychology, therefore religion is not true. This tendency will be treated more fully in the chapter on limitations. Suffice it to say here, with Barry, " Because we begin to know how things are done, we cannot simply assume that God doesn't do them." [2]

The psychology of religion has among its most assured results the particular characteristics of the child-mind, the youth-mind, and the mature-mind. It has discovered that the period of adolescence is pre-eminently the period of the rise of religious consciousness in the individual. Moreover, it has pointed out the existence of connections between spiritual and physiological facts, and has placed on record the remarkable differences of temperament in religious individuals. Along these lines the psychology of religion may afford much practical help to the religious worker. Instead of proceeding by rule of thumb, and learning by a process of trial and error, the preacher, pastor, and religious educationist may proceed scientifically to cultivate the religious life in himself and others. The most firmly established results of the psychology of religion are pedagogical.

[1] Pratt, J. B., *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 40.
[2] Barry, F. R., *Christianity and Psychology*, p. 172.

It is important to note in connection with the work of the American School that it has failed to define the religious consciousness. When we ask, What is the religious consciousness? What is there in any given human experience which makes it specifically religious? What is it that distinguishes religious feeling from moral feeling, æsthetic feeling, gregarious feeling, and every other kind of feeling? —the answer returned is oracularly ambiguous.

It will not be irrelevant in this connection to draw attention to Dr. Otto's book, which answers the question which is so inadequately treated by the American School —namely, What are the fundamental elements which distinguish religious experience from experience of other kinds? [1] Professor Otto, in this timely work, makes articulate for the man who knows what religion is from experience, what he has long wanted to say to psychologists of religion. He convincingly shows that psychologists have never made enough of the great qualitative differences between feelings, hence they have never discovered the fact that the religious feeling is entirely distinct from every other feeling.

The religious feeling is, according to Otto, a specific kind of feeling-reflex resulting from the impact upon the human mind of an objective Transcendent Presence. This feeling-response in its most primitive manifestations is at once non-rational and non-moral; it is simply the pure *a priori* apprehension of Transcendent Reality. This specific emotional response to the Divine as such, Otto calls "Numinous Feeling." This is a religious mental state perfectly *sui generis* and irreducible to any other; it is an absolutely primary and elementary datum. It is this specifically religious feeling emerging in the mind of primitive man which forms the starting-point for the entire religious development in history. Otto points out that in this unique emotional response certain characteristic elements may be discerned which are supra-rational. There is the feeling of the "uncanny" and a shuddering awe quite distinct from ordinary fear, which with Otto is the basic factor underlying the whole process of religious evolution.

[1] Otto, Rudolf, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. J. W. Harvey (1923), Oxford University Press.

There is the creaturely feeling, the feeling of self-abasement into nothingness before overpowering might and majesty. And there is the element of fascination: man is attracted, in spite of his shuddering dread, to the object of his awe. All these elements of religious experience correspond with some aspect of the Divine which makes its impact upon the human mind. Otto indicates that in the course of history the idea of the Divine becomes filled out with rational and moral content; but in all the protean forms which religion assumes, these basic "moments" of feeling are always found. These characteristic reactions in consciousness to the impact of the Divine are exhibited in all genuine religion from its most elementary to its most highly developed forms.

Otto's forthsetting of the elements of religious feeling and the specific religious experience is probably the best that has appeared in recent times. He does justice to the unique character of religious experience. He shows what the religious man has always known, that religious feeling is qualitatively distinct from all other feelings. He takes us beyond the mere subjectivism where the psychologists leave us, by rightly emphasizing the objective significance of religious feeling. In treating of religious experience, unlike the American psychologists, Otto does not leave out of account the Object of which it is an experience. Psychologists generally have ignored the elements in religious experience to which Otto has drawn attention. The facts which Otto adduces cannot be disregarded by any honest psychological inquiry, they must be reckoned with by the psychology of religion of the future.

We would observe, here, that the greater part of the remarkable phenomena in connection with which the psychology of religion has achieved its most conspicuous triumphs is merely accidental to religion and not essential to it. Psychology has been most successful in its elucidation of the accidentals of the religious life, and least successful in its treatment of what essentially constitutes religious consciousness and religious feeling. There is no unanimity among the psychologists as to what constitutes religious consciousness, or as to what makes a feeling specifically religious; these fundamental questions are left in the utmost obscurity.

The results of religious psychology may be briefly summarized thus: the general result has been to reduce to law, and to make intelligible and conformable to the rest of our organized knowledge, the major part of the striking phenomena annexed to the religious life.

The results of religious psychology have no apologetic value, but will probably largely influence the religious apologetic of the future.

The most firmly established results are pedagogical, and the most valuable contributions from the positive side have been made to scientific religious pedagogy.

Finally, the investigations of the American School have issued in a frankly naturalistic position.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

CHAPTER XIII

LIMITATIONS

We have already seen that the investigations of the American School have issued, in the main, in a purely naturalistic position. With this position we have no quarrel, for natural science as such is neither religious nor irreligious; it is simply non-religious. But the case is other when the science of psychology leaves the limits of its legitimate province, and passes by the problems proper to its own sphere, in order to pronounce on the validity of the ultimate grounds of its phenomena. Then, in the name of truth itself, we must cry "Halt!"

Several of the American investigators have attempted to invade the domain of metaphysics, and have given in *ex cathedra* fashion ontological deliverances. The whole trend of the psychology of religion is towards the somewhat arrogant position, that having explicated religious phenomena in terms of scientific law, the supernatural reference of such phenomena becomes entirely invalidated, and there is no objective reality corresponding to man's subjective religious mental states. In view of this fairly definite and increasing tendency, it is necessary to challenge psychology's claim to omniscience, and to draw attention to the fact that the standpoint and method which it has adopted impose upon it definite limitations.

In this connection, the limitations which belong to the investigator ought to be considered first of all. Many psychologists who confidently treat of the religious life do not know what it is from experience. We are willing to concede to Pratt[1] that the psychologist who is a total stranger to religious sentiments can know as much about religion as a blind man knows about colours, or a non-musical person about music but, we would add, no more.

[1] Pratt, J. B., *Religious Consciousness*, footnote, p. 33.

It is a psychological commonplace that men may be so destitute of certain mental traits themselves, that they may be unable to understand their presence in others. This fact is vividly illustrated in a great deal of the work of the French School, where the subject of religion is treated with so little understanding and sympathy as to be reckoned as a case of mental pathology.

As a matter of fact, there are two ways only to procure psychological data—namely, observation of others, and self-examination. In the last analysis the psychologist is shut up to one method—that of introspection.[1] The psychologist must construe the mental life of others in terms of what he observes in his own interior life. It is obvious, therefore, that if an investigator has never known what it is to be conscious of the realities of the religious life, he is at serious disadvantage when he attempts to psychologize concerning the religious experiences of a God-conscious man. Even in connection with the historical description of the external facts of religion, the man who stands outside these facts is scarcely a reliable historian.[2]

As a matter of fact, the non-religious psychologist does not really know what he is talking about. He certainly knows a number of things about religion, but he does not know what religion is. Now, much work has been done in the psychology of religion by investigators who do not know at first hand what religion means to the man who has fellowship with God, and who is conscious of that fellowship. This accounts for the artificiality of many of the psychological constructs of the religious life one finds in the published works of the psychologists of religion. This fact needs then to be noted and set over against the confident naturalistic dogmatism of many of the representatives of this new science.

Professor Leuba has attempted to rebut the position here maintained. He emphatically asserts that the non-religious psychologist is not handicapped in the least in his study of religion by his lack of experimental knowledge. In Leuba's opinion it is devotion to religion that warps the power of judgment. It is unnecessary to be a soldier,

[1] James, William, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 185. See also Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 30–35.

[2] Webb, Clement, *Group Theories of Religion*, p. 69.

he says, in order to understand military life, or mad in order to understand insanity.[1]

It would be very unfortunate for Professor Leuba if he made the first of these two statements in the presence of an Australian who had been through the carnage and horrors of Gallipoli. I can predict that his academic ears would be assailed with wrathful profanity, and his professorial person would be in grave danger of being treated with contumely, and that he would be glad to flee to the sanctuary of his study, where such remarks are perfectly safe, because they never have to face the test of stern reality.

The argument that one need not be religious in order to understand religion any more than one need be mad in order to discuss mental pathology, is a sophism. The fallacy is revealed by producing the true parallel, namely, it is not necessary to be a psychiatrist in order to discuss psychiatry. Now the fallacy becomes at once apparent. We imagine that the dogmatic naturalistic wing of religious psychology would be moved with choler were the religious subject to affirm it is not necessary to be a psychologist in order to intelligently discuss psychology.

We do not take up Professor Billia's uncompromising attitude here, that the non-religious psychologist cannot study religion to any purpose,[2] but maintain the perfectly rational position that such an investigator works under serious disadvantages from which his religious compeer is free when treating of the phenomena of the religious consciousness. In a word, the limitations which beset all theorists belong to the non-religious student of the religious life. His verdict has as much value as that of the man who passes judgment on a cathedral window from the outside. In view of this fact, psychological constructs of religious experience on the part of non-religious investigators are extremely likely to be somewhat arbitrary, and to increase in splendour and amplitude the farther they recede from reality.

There is a widespread tendency in much of the recent psychology of religion to claim that it has solved all the problems and completely explicated all the phenomena of

[1] Leuba, James H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 275.
[2] Billia, L. M., "Problem and Method of Psychology of Religion," *The Monist*, vol. xx., No. 1 (1910), p. 138.

the religious consciousness. Such a claim to omniscience is preposterous but intelligible. It is due to the intoxication of this adolescent science, resulting from its splendid triumphs in an altogether fresh field of psychological research, but in our present state of psychological knowledge such a claim is at once arrogant and unscientific.[1]

We do not believe that the psychologist has banished the mysteriousness of the phenomena of the religious life by uttering the magic words, " suggestion," " pathological," " sub-conscious." Too often the psychologist, when confronted with the inscrutable facts of the religious consciousness, instead of explaining them, relegates them to the sub-conscious, and becomes the victim of the auto-suggestion that he has explained the facts when he has really dodged them. For religious psychology the sub-conscious frequently serves as an asylum of psychological ignorance. The conviction grows upon one that the terms we have referred to, upon which the psychologist rings the changes so often, have exempted him from the labour of thinking.

The saner representatives of the new science, however, do not claim omniscience, but recognize that there remaineth yet for psychology much mental territory to be possessed. James's words are as true to-day as they were when written : " At present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo. It is indeed strange to hear people talk triumphantly of the ' New Psychology,' and write ' Histories of Psychology,' when into the real elements and forces which the word covers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists." [2]

It is simply not true that our knowledge of psychological laws is sufficient for us to fully explicate the mental states of the religious mind, as Leuba unwarrantably assumes.[3] But, assuming that the psychologist were to be able some day to completely explain the facts of religious consciousness in terms of natural law, this could not by any manner of means be construed as a scientific disproof of the presence of a transcendent factor in human life. This fact needs emphasis in view of the illegitimate assumption of the psychologist that, since he has explained

[1] Thouless, R. H., *Introduction of Psychology of Religion*, p. 261.
[2] James, William, *Psychology* (Briefer Course), p. 468.
[3] Leuba, J. H., *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 272.

religious states of mind by psychological principles, he has ergo disproved the existence of God. The position of the naturalistic wing of the American School is that, since the truth of religion cannot be proved by psychology, therefore religion is not true ; this is clearly a *non sequitur*.

Professor Pratt shows that the religious explanation of the facts is not in the least invalidated by any description of human experience which psychology has as yet given us or seems likely ever to give. His illustration supposes mankind living in perpetual sunshine, but that the majority of men are blind and that only a few see. When the eyes of one of these seers are open, he will, of course, be receiving light sensations. The blind psychologist, on investigating this rare phenomenon, says Pratt, will connect the light sensations with open eyes and their cessation with closed eyes. He would then set down the fact that the opening of the eyes was the cause of the light sensations, and that this was the adequate explanation of the psychical phenomenon. If the seer insisted that he saw the sun, and not merely his own sensations, the psychologist would assure him that the only verifiable scientific fact was his sensations of light, which had already been explained without any reference to the sun, or any other outer source. Now, says Pratt, both the seer and the scientist would be right. The psychologist explains phenomena by laws which take account of the psychophysical organism only. The psychologist works, like any other scientist, within certain limits ; within these limits his explanation is complete. But, at the same time, the light is really there, and the seer sees the sun. " Nothing," says Pratt, " that the psychology of religion can say should prevent the religious man, who wishes to be perfectly loyal to logic and loyal to truth, from seeing in his own spiritual experiences the genuine influence of a living God." [1]

It is a great fallacy to assume that, because we can describe the way things invariably happen in the physical and psychical worlds, therefore God does not do them.[2] As a matter of fact, the truth of religion can neither be

[1] Pratt, J. B., *Religious Consciousness*, pp. 457–458.

[2] Cutten, G. B., *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, p. 260. See also Barry, F. R., *Christianity and Psychology*, p. 172.

proved nor disproved by natural science. This question is not for psychological discussion.

All that psychology has proved up to date and can ever prove is that the mental world is a law-ordered universe all across. Therefore, what the psychology of religion has done is not to disprove the existence of the spiritual environment or the reality of God; this it could not do if it would, but simply to demonstrate the fact that the religious man's God is not the lord of misrule. Psychology has demonstrated that when man's mind is directed to religious objects it does not therefore become disintegrated and subject to anarchy, but that his religious like all his other experiences are characterized by laws and principles of consistency.

The psychology of religion has certainly made it impossible for the religious man to submit as evidence for the God-origin of his mental states the fact that these are lawless. The man who possesses the reverent type of advanced mind will not be perturbed by the deliverance of the youngest branch of psychology—namely, that his religious consciousness is not an arena wherein capricious forces and anarchic powers may riot, but a realm which obeys certain principles of consistency, which the intellect may discover and articulate into a coherent system of mental laws.

In the last analysis the utmost the new science has done is to prove that "religious experiences are not a chaotic mass in which consequents have no respect for antecedents"[1]; if there be a God, we would expect things to occur in this way, and the reverent mind will always posit that:

> "Though He thunder by law,
> The thunder is still His Voice."

In view of the confident ontological pronouncements of certain of the American investigators, it becomes necessary to state with firmness that psychology is not entitled to be heard on questions of metaphysics. Psychology is a natural science proceeding by the empirical method, which has taken as its special department of study the phenomena of the mental life. The psychology of religion is merely

[1] Coe, G. A., *The Spiritual Life*, p. 16.

a branch of general psychology dealing with the religious phenomena of the human consciousness. It ought, then, to be simply empirical and descriptive. This religious psychology may gather factual data, and may proceed from this data to classifications, generalizations, and laws; thus far and no farther may it go. It must stop short at the problem of the objective validity of the facts of religious experience.

Now much of the recent psychology of religion fails to recognize where psychology ends and philosophy begins. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize the important fact that the standpoint and method which the psychology of religion has adopted with such magnificent results impose on it definite limitations. If spiritual fact exists, it is utterly incompetent to declare anything as to its essential nature.

The words of Professor M'Kellar Stewart are worthy of note in this connection. He says rightly: "The time has arrived when, in the name of philosophy, morality, and religion, the recognition of the limitations of natural science should be insisted upon. In so far as science has been true to its own standpoint and method, it has paved the way for incalculable benefits to humanity. It has also encouraged some of the finest intellectual virtues—intellectual sincerity, toleration, and enthusiasm for Truth. But should it transgress its limits, or should its conclusions, valid as they are within its own sphere and limits, be put forward as the only possible achievement which mind can accomplish in its search for the nature of reality, we immediately protest." [1]

This dignified protest is timely in view of the arrogant assumptions of the extreme negative wing of the American School. The psychology of religion has no right to violate the frontiers of theology and metaphysics.[2] Psychology has problems enough of its own without seeking those which lie outside its proper field; its own theory of the sub-conscious is an explanation which needs explanation. Psychology's function is to describe the history of the facts

[1] Stewart, J. M'Kellar, *What is God?* Lecture published (1920) Melbourne.

[2] Cooley, W. F., "Can Science Speak the Last Word in Theology?" *Journ. Phil.*, vol. x. (1913), pp. 296–301.

of religious consciousness and not to determine their truth.[1] Whenever this youthful science forgets this fact and trespasses on the province of metaphysics and the philosophy of religion, its ontological deliverances are as worthless as they are impertinent.

The truth that the prerogative of interpretation belongs to philosophy is, of course, a commonplace; it is so simple that it needs to be constantly emphasized in view of the increasing tendency of religious psychology to assume that its psychological investigations and results have effectively refuted Theism. We reiterate, if spiritual fact exists, psychology is utterly incompetent to declare anything as to its nature. The decisions of religious psychology for or against the existence of the ultimate metaphysical grounds of religious phenomena are *ultra vires*. In any discussion of the ultimate grounds of the religious phenomena of the mental life the psychology of religion is not entitled to be heard, nor has it any right to a vote.

The religious consciousness defies the psychology of religion to disprove its claim that in its profounder moral and spiritual experiences it is in touch with God, and challenges psychology to prove that natural science covers the whole of reality.

Finally, if there be a Divine ground of the world—and no science or philosophy has ever disproved the existence of God—and if it should seem to the religious man that in his deeper moral and spiritual experiences he is in vital contact with Reality, can any valid reason be given why this fact should not be as it seems?

[1] Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, preface, p. xiv. See also Barry, F. R., *Christianity and Psychology*, chapter on "Psychology and Theology," pp. 158–173.

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